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“In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is
subordinated to various exceptions; it depends on accidents. In a small republic, the
public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen; abuses are
less extensive, and consequently less protected.”1

INTRODUCTION

M

any constitutional principles apply to more than one level of government. For
example, virtually all Bill of Rights guarantees, which long were understood to

limit only the federal government, have been applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment under the doctrine of incorporation.2 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, which by its terms applies only to States, has been “reverse incorporated” against
the federal government.3 “Multi-level” constitutional principles can be found outside the contexts
of incorporation and reverse incorporation, as well. For example, the Court has held that a
constitutional principle of representative democracy that prohibits the federal government from
augmenting Article I’s qualifications for Congress also applies to the States.4
The conventional wisdom is that such multi-level constitutional principles apply identically
to all levels of government. Thus, the Court has held that incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees
apply “with full force to the States.”5 Similarly, when reverse incorporating, the Court has
articulated the doctrine of “congruence,” under which Equal Protection applies identically to the

1

Mo ntesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris, 1961). As should become clear during the course of the Article, I do not
believe that constitutional protections always should be less searching in relation to smaller polities. The quotation from
Montesquieu is notable insofar as it suggests that the appropriate scope of constitutional protections might be related to
the size o f the polity.
2
See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833 ). The only exceptions are the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury
requirement, the Seventh A mendme nt civil jury requirement, the Second Amendment, and the Third Amendme nt.
3
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (19 54).
4
See U.S. Term Lim its, Inc. v. T hornton, 51 4 U .S. 77 9 (1995 ), discussed infra.
5
Lee v. W eisman, 505 U .S. 57 7, 58 0 (1992 ) (Establishment Clause). See infra Part I.B.3.
1

federal and sub-federal polities.6 And the principle of representative democracy limiting Congress
was applied identically to the states.7 In short, today’s doctrine virtually always utilizes what might
be called a categorical “One-Size-Fits-All” approach to those constitutional principles that apply to
more than one level of government.
The Article’s thesis is that this categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach is problematic because
the different levels of government – federal, state, and local – sometimes are sufficiently different
that a given constitutional principle may apply differently to each level. This Article critically
examines an alternative approach to One-Size-Fits-All that it dubs “Tailoring.” Tailoring refers to
the possibility, though not the requirement, that a constitutional provision may apply differently to
different levels of government.

Tailoring thus would permit a situation where the federal

government could regulate in ways unavailable to the sub-federal polities as a matter of
constitutional law. Conversely, states or localities other times might be permitted to regulate in ways
that the federal government could not. Finally, Tailoring holds out the prospect that states and
municipalities may be sufficiently different that constitutional principles also should be Tailored as
between them. For example, states may be more similar to the federal government than to
municipalities in some respects such that a constitutional limitation might forbid the federal and state
governments, but not municipalities, from regulating in a particular instance.
This Article does not ask whether any particular constitutional provisions should be
Tailored. It instead considers the antecedent question of whether Tailoring is a plausible technique
to consider. An affirmative answer does not commit a person to the conclusion that any particular

6

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (announcing the principle of “congruence
between the standards applicable to federal and state racial classifications”).
7
See U.S. Term Lim its, 505 U.S. at 820.
2

Constitutional provision should be Tailored, but uncovers a new set of doctrinal options for
consideration. In the end, the Article concludes that the One-Size-Fits-All approach should be
softened from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.
Although Tailoring at first might sound completely outlandish, it is not wholly unfamiliar
to American constitutional jurisprudence. As the Article shows, numerous Justices have argued that
particular constitutional provisions apply differently to different levels of government – including
Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Jackson, Harlan, Fortas, Powell, Stewart, Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg,
Rehnquist, and Thomas. Consider, for example, Justice Stevens’ dissent in the case of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.8 Prior to Adarand, state affirmative action programs were subject to
strict scrutiny9 whereas federal programs only had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the rule
announced in Metro Broadcasting.10

The Adarand majority announced the principle of

“congruence” – the requirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”11 – to reverse Metro Broadcasting.12 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued in dissent as follows:
The Court’s concept of ‘congruence’ assumes that there is no significant difference between
a decision by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative-action program and
such a decision by a State or a municipality. In my opinion that assumption is untenable.
It ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and state or local
decisionmakers.13

In short, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg contended that the constitutional principle of equal
protection should be Tailored, and criticized the doctrine of “congruence” for adopting what this

8

515 U .S. 200 (1995 ).
This was the rule announced in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U .S. 469 (1989 ).
10
See Metro B roadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 -65 (1990).
11
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U .S. 1, 93 (1976)).
12
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
13
Id. at 249 (Steve ns, J., dissenting). See infra Part III.B.1 for further discussion.
9
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Article terms a One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Moreover, though not conceptualized as instances of Tailoring, several contemporary
doctrines in fact vary in their application depending on what level of government they apply. For
instance, although equal protection proscribes the federal and state governments from conditioning
the right to vote on property ownership, certain local governments are allowed to utilize such voting
requirements.14 Similarly, although the dormant commerce clause prohibits states from adopting
protectionist measures that discriminate against sister-states, no such anti-protectionism principle
has been reverse incorporated against the federal government. Consequently, Congress can authorize
protectionist regulations that states cannot.15 As this Article explains, such variances are best
understood as instances of Tailoring, not as simply odd and discrete exceptions to ordinary
constitutional law.
Although Tailoring’s sensitivity to the differences among different levels of government is
not unknown to American constitutional law, the Court ignores such considerations most of the time.
This inattentiveness has led to troubling legal analysis. Consider the plurality opinion in the case
of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.16 At issue was the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Arkansas State Constitution that provided term limits for Arkansas’ federal representatives. The
amendment was passed by a ballot initiative that won nearly 60% of the popular votes and that
carried every congressional district in the State.17 The plurality nevertheless struck it down on the
ground that the amendment violated the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy”
that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them,” a principle that the Court had
14

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.4.
16
514 U .S. 779 (1995 ).
17
Id. at 845 (Thom as, J., dissenting).
15

4

identified in the earlier case of Powell v. McCormack.18
This reasoning is paradoxical: how can it be that fundamental democratic principles required
that the Court strike down an amendment that had been adopted by the direct vote of a majority of
Arkansas’ citizens? The plurality arrived at this puzzling rationale by reflexively invoking a OneSize-Fits-All jurisprudence that disregarded the differences between which level of government
(federal or State) was acting. The “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that “the
people should choose whom they please to govern them” was a thoroughly sensible principle for the
Court to rely upon in Powell, where a majority of citizens in New York’s 18th Congressional District
had voted for Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. and members of Congress sought to keep Powell from
taking his seat. After all, the additional qualifications for Representatives that Congress sought to
impose in Powell interfered with the choice that had been made by those who lived in Powell’s
congressional district – the people whose preferences mattered in respect of selecting their
representative for Congress. The plurality in Thornton gave no real thought to the significance of
which level of government was imposing the limit on who could sit for Congress, asserting simply
that “the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive
impact.”19 This was the plurality’s predicate for concluding “we believe that state-imposed
qualifications, as much as congressionally imposed qualifications, would undermine . . . the right of
the people to vote for whom they wish.”20
This reasoning is specious. That “the source of the qualification is of little moment in

18

395 U.S. 486 (1969). The plurality noted that this was the “most impo rtant[]” consideration in its rationale. See
514 U.S. at 806.
19
Id. at 820.
20
Id.
5

assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact”21 bears no relation to the question the Court was
considering: the relevance of Powell’s democratic principle to Thornton. Qualifications for who can
sit for Congress are not per se unconstitutionally undemocratic – indeed, the Constitution itself sets
qualifications.22 The pertinent consideration for purposes of basic democratic principles is who
imposes them. In Powell, additional qualifications were imposed by people who were not part of
the political community democratically entitled to select its representative for Congress; the
Congressmen who sought to bar Powell from sitting did not reside in New York’s 18th Congressional
District. That is why the additional qualifications interfered with the fundamental democratic
principle that the choice of the relevant political community must be respected. In Thornton, by
contrast, a majority of voters in every congressional district in Arkansas had voted for additional
qualifications – term limits – that applied only to them. Because term limits reflected the choice
of the relevant political community, overturning the Amendment cannot legitimately be justified on
the basis of fundamental democratic principles.23 Thus, “the source of the qualification” is of
decisive moment in assessing whether it is violative of, or instead consistent with, fundamental
democratic principles. The plurality’s fatally flawed rationale is part and parcel of a One-Size-FitsAll approach, which, by definition, ignores differences between the federal and state governments.
The problematic plurality reasoning in Thornton helps illustrate a crucial larger point. The
greater openness to Tailoring that this Article advocates is not important simply because many
Justices over the past hundred years have called for Tailoring ( which they have) or because several
21

Id. (emphasis supplied).
See U.S. C ONST . A RT . I, §2, cl. 2 (qualifications for Representatives); U.S. C ONST . A RT . I, §3, cl. 3 (qualifications
for Senators).
23
The dissent mad e this po int. See id. at 877 (Thomas, J., dissenting). I do not mean to suggest that there are no other
plausible grounds for overturning the Arkansas amendment, but only that the plurality’s self-described “most important[]”
argum ent, id. at 806, is unavailing.
22

6

constitutional doctrines already reflect the logic of Tailoring (which they do); although these two
observations should help smooth feathers ruffled by the mere notion of Tailoring by showing that
Tailoring is by no means foreign to contemporary doctrine, they do not on their own explain why
Tailoring should figure more prominently in our constitutional analysis. Rather, as an analysis of
Thornton suggests, and as this Article will try to demonstrate, the legal community should be more
open to Tailoring because systematically ignoring the differences among the different levels of
government, as current doctrine does, leads to troubling consequences.24
Sensitivity to what level of government is acting – the conceptual core of Tailoring – is
critical because the different levels of government are sufficiently dissimilar that a particular
limitation as applied to one may have very different repercussions when applied to another. It turns
out that, among other things, a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach thwarts many of federalism’s
potential benefits. Sometimes One-Size-Fits-All hamstrings the federal government, subjecting it
to constraints that are sensible for states or municipalities but not for our country’s central
government. Other times, One-Size-Fits-All chokes off the benefits of federalism by unnecessarily
subjecting sub-federal polities to strict and uniform limitations that make sense only in respect of
the federal government.
In short, constitutional analysis ignores at its own peril what level of government is acting
because the different levels of government systematically vary in important ways. Ignoring these
differences simplifies constitutional analysis, to be sure – but at a cost. There is no reason to

24

As this Article shows, virtually no legal scholars have given attention to Tailoring either. After this Article was
written, I learned of an excellent piece, since published, that considers what I call “tailoring” in the particular context
of religious liberty. See Richa rd C. Schra gger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,
117 H ARV . L. R EV . 181 0 (2004 ). I also ha ve published a short piece that examined tailoring in the context of the
establishment clause. See Mark D . Rosen, Establishm ent, Exp ressivism, and Fede ralism, 78 CHICAGO -K E N T L. R EV .
669 (20 03).
7

believe as an a priori matter that the cost is smaller than the administrative costs of developing more
complex doctrine that takes account of systemic cross-polity differences. The desirability of tailoring
constitutional doctrines to each polity requires an understanding of the opportunity costs of refusing
to do so, as well as the administrative costs of Tailoring. This Article aims to identify both types of
costs.
The Article is in five parts. Part I begins by formally defining One-Size-Fits-All and
Tailoring. It shows that both within and outside of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
virtually always adopts One-Size-Fits-All. Part I’s analysis also clarifies Tailoring’s precise
relationship to the incorporation controversy and to contemporary black letter doctrine. Although
Tailoring has important applications outside the contexts of incorporation and reverse incorporation
(as shown by Thornton, for instance), Tailoring’s significant implications in respect of incorporation
and reverse incorporation merit such a clarification. Among other things, Part I shows that deciding
the merits of Tailoring does not simply replay the incorporation debate of the 1950's and 1960's.
Indeed, Tailoring is fully consistent with selective incorporation, what emerged as the doctrinal
winner of that debate.
Part II shows that although today most multi-level constitutional principles are doctrinally
treated as One-Size-Fits-All, the Supreme Court has not made much of an effort to justify such an
approach. Part II argues that the Court’s arguments for a categorical One-Size-Fits-All doctrine are
unconvincing. Part II then surveys several scholars’ attempts to justify the contemporary One-SizeFits-All approach. Part II concludes that there are two reasonably strong defenses for the status quo,
but that they are pragmatic rather than theoretical justifications. As such, they do not support a
categorical One-Size-Fits-All doctrine. Pragmatism invites consideration of the benefits and costs

8

of alternatives to a One-Size-Fits-All approach and holds out the prospect that deviations from OneSize-Fits-All sometimes might be legitimate.
The Article’s next two parts explain why Tailoring is a plausible doctrinal option that should
be forthrightly considered, not dismissed out-of-hand by a categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach.
Part III provides a quasi-precedential argument that is designed to show that Tailoring is not as
foreign to American jurisprudence as may first appear. Part III’s analysis is not (and cannot be) fully
precedential, of course, because contemporary doctrine is One-Size-Fits-All, as shown in Part II.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to understand that Tailoring has been propounded by a line of
distinguished Supreme Court Justices for more than 75 years; that Tailoring already is found in
several constitutional doctrines; and that some non-constitutional federal law reflects the logic of
Tailoring as it distinguishes among the federal, state, and sub-state governments. This “precedent”
collectively suggests that doctrinal sensitivity to what level of government is acting – Tailoring’s
conceptual core – already can be found in American law. Tailoring thus is not as novel as it might
first appear.
Part IV identifies five respects in which the different levels of government might be
sufficiently different to justify Tailoring. First, each level is susceptible to distinctive political
malfunctions. Second, as a result of each level’s particular geographical scope, identical restrictions
may have systematically different consequences across the different levels of government. Third,
because there are divergent exit costs across the different levels of government, there might be
systematic variations with regard to whether and to what extent competition among polities can
generate efficient and diverse public goods. Fourth, identical restrictions can have very different
consequences vis-a-vis democracy since each level of government requires a different number of

9

people to garner a majority and thereby translate its preferences into law. Fifth, and finally, each
level of government may have certain distinctive responsibilities.
Part IV explains that whether any or all of these differences justifies Tailoring a given
constitutional principle ultimately turns on what is best characterized as pre-constitutional, political
commitments. Interestingly, however, a broad array of competing approaches to ordering social life
that often generates conflicting policy prescriptions – including public choice theory, law and
economics, Robert Nozick’s political philosophy, Ely’s process theory, multi-culturalist theorists
Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, and Rawlsian political thought – finds one or more of these
distinctions sufficient to support Tailoring. While Part IV does not take a position on the ultimate
merits of these contested approaches to ordering social life, it does make the following point: the
fact that many competing methodologies converge on the conclusion that Tailoring sometimes might
be desirable counsels that constitutional doctrine should be responsive to potential differences among
the various levels of government. This is the predicate for concluding that today’s categorical OneSize-Fits-All approach is unwise.
Part V completes the Article’s pragmatic analysis of Tailoring by considering Tailoring’s
potential costs. Although none gives rise to the conclusion that Tailoring is per se undesirable,
several are very real countervailing considerations that are relevant to determining whether a
particular constitutional provision should be Tailored. In conjunction with the conclusions of Parts
III and IV, these potential costs to Tailoring suggest that contemporary doctrine should be modified,
but not totally abandoned: One-Size-Fits-All should be downgraded from a categorical requirement
to a rebuttable presumption. The recognition that Tailoring generates costs also heightens awareness
of the subjectivity that invariably is involved in the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring;

10

trading-off between Tailoring’s potential benefits and costs is a determination that is not susceptible
to purely rational decisionmaking on account of the fact that Tailoring’s potential benefits and costs
are incommensurable. A short conclusion follows.
I.

ONE -SIZE-FITS-ALL AND TAILORING IDENTIFIED
This Part introduces a simple jurisprudential model that permits a precise definition of

Tailoring.

This Part shows that the contemporary doctrine, within Fourteenth Amendment

jurisprudence and more generally, is overwhelmingly of the One-Size-Fits-All character.
Importantly, Part I’s model also precisely clarifies Tailoring’s relationship to the doctrines
of selective and reverse incorporation. Elucidating this relationship is important for three reasons.
First, although Tailoring has significant applications throughout constitutional law, it has extensive
relevance to Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Second, the clarification rebuts the
misconception that advocacy of Tailoring is an invitation to revisit the incorporation controversy of
the 1950s and 1960s, a hard fought battle in which a clear victor has emerged.25 It is not, for
Tailoring is consistent with selective incorporation. Third, putting Tailoring into jurisprudential and
historical perspective shows that Tailoring is less radical than it may sound at first. Tailoring is best
understood as an alternative mode of selective incorporation that can realize many of the pragmatic
benefits of the contemporary doctrine while shedding the doctrine’s theoretically unjustifiable and
unnecessarily cramping aspects.
A.

A Simple Jurisprudential Model. Tailoring and One-Size-Fits-All are best understood

in relation to a simple jurisprudential model that identifies the character of constitutional doctrine
25

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 V A . L. R EV . 951, 968 (2002) (“Incorporation of
the Bill of Rights is one of the few great success stories of modern constitutional law. Judges and constitutional scholars
almost universally agree that, whatever else it does or does not do, the Fo urteen th Amendm ent makes most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states and their subdivisions.”)
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at any given point in time.26 The model builds on the commonly appreciated distinction between
“rules” and “standards.”27 Standards are legal edicts that describe the trigger of legal consequences
in “abstract terms that refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law.”28 Rules, by contrast,
are legal edicts that “describe the triggering event with factual particulars or other language that is
determinate within a community.”29
Now to the model. Constitutional provisions typically take the form of standards that require
active interpretation to identify concretely the actions that are required, permitted, or proscribed in
particular circumstances. The interpretive process can be usefully conceptualized as involving three
steps. Although the steps do not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the constitutional
provisions’ doctrinal development,30 identifying them is useful because they provide a means for
comparing legal doctrine.
First, the constitutional provision can be identified with a general “Goal,” by which I mean
a broad-stroke description of what the provision attempts to accomplish. The Goal sets the
parameters within which subsequent doctrinal development occurs.31 For example, the Goal of the
Fourth Amendment has been identified as protecting various “personal and societal values” including

26

I developed this m ode l in an earlier article. See Mark D . Rosen, The Radical Possibility of Limited Comm unityBased Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 W M . & M A R Y L. R EV . 927, 983 (20 02).
27
E.g., F REDERICK S CHAUER , P LAYING B Y THE R ULES : A P HILOS OP HICA L E X A M IN A T IO N O F R ULE -B A S ED D E C IS IO N
M A K IN G IN L A W A N D IN L IFE 102-04 & 104 n.35 (1 991 ); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Stand ards: An Eco nom ic An alysis,
42 D UKE L. J. 557 (1992).
28
Rosen, supra note 18, at 623.
29
Id. at 623.
30
See Mark D . Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Triba l Cou rts
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FO R DH A M L. R EV . 479, 490 (20 00).
31
Id. at 490-91 & nn.42-50. Perhap s counterintuitively, identification of the Goal freque ntly is not what happ ens first
in time during the interp retive process. Once the G oal is ide ntified, ho wever, it affects sub sequent do ctrinal develo pme nt.
Id. at 490 n.43.
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a “right to privacy.”32
The second step in the process is the creation of a “Legal Test” to determine whether the
identified Goal is met.33 This second step occurs because the Goal inevitably is too abstract, and
consequently, unworkable for the judiciary’s institutional needs of having a shorthand method for
decision making that identifies as legally relevant only a subset of the infinite facts that characterize
any given circumstance.34 The test almost always includes one or more “Standards.” For example,
the Supreme Court has translated the previously mentioned Fourth Amendment Goal into a Legal
Test composed of several Standards that ask whether “the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search” and whether society is “willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.”35 This Legal Test helps to particularize the Goal, but by
deploying Standards such as “expectation of privacy” and “reasonable,” it still leaves ample
uncertainty as to what concretely satisfies it.
Step three describes what occurs to the Legal Test’s Standard over time. As the Standard is
applied over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because
cases, by their nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided they become
showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard requires.36 Step three’s product is best
32

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 182-83 (1984). Although peop le typically view the contem porarily
understood Goal as inevitable, the Goal alm ost alwa ys is a non-axiomatic translation of the constitutional provision. That
is to say, a different Goal (or Goals) plausibly can be ascribed to the constitutional provision (and, frequently, have been,
as an historical matter). Rosen, Of Tribal C ourts, supra note 29, at 490 & n.45.
33
See id. at 490 & n.46.
34
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 H ARV . L. R EV . 56, 57 (1997) (“Even when general
agreement exists that the Constitution reflects a particular value or protective purpo se . . . the norms reflecting purposes
such as these are too vague to serve as rules of law; their effective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by
courts.”).
35
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 , 211 (1986 ) (emphasis added).
36
This pro cess of utilizing case law to make standards more concrete is not logically necessary; some say, for
instance, that it doe s not occur in French law. B arry N icholas, Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in C ONTRACT
L AW T ODAY : A NG LO -F R E N CH C O M PA R ISO N S 7, 9-10 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989). It is, however, an
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identified as a “Rulified Standard.” For example, do people have a “subjective expectation of
privacy” in open fields? The Court has said no.37 In curtilage surrounded by a high double fence? Not
from a naked-eye observation made from an aircraft, according to the Court.38
This simple model of interpretation can be graphically depicted as follows in Figure One:
F IGURE O NE
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
1.
2.

LEGAL TEST

3.
4.

Constitutional Provision
9
Goal
9

Standard
9
Rulified Standard

As we shall see, this simple model provides clarity with regard to the multifarious approaches
to understanding the constitutional limitations applicable to States that Justices have advocated since
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

Four Approaches to Importing Constitutional Principles. The issue of Tailoring arises

when a federal constitutional guarantee applies to more than one type of government (for example,
federal and state). We first must be attentive, therefore, to the threshold question of what levels of
government are regulated by the Constitution. There are five possible ways that a constitutional
accurate depiction of what happens under the United States’ common law method of constitutional adjud ication. Strauss,
supra note 202, at 877-906.
37
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
38
Id. at 209-10 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (emp hasis added)).
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principle might limit two or more levels of government. First, a constitutional provision might
explicitly apply to several levels of government. As it so happens, virtually none do.39 The bulk of
the United States Constitution applies by its terms only to the federal government. For example,
many of the Bill of Rights by their terms address only the federal government,40 and the landmark
case of Barron v. City of Baltimore41 famously held in 1833 that none of the Bill of Rights applied
to the sub-federal polities.42 Conversely, the provisions at the end of Article I apply by their terms
to the States, but not to the federal government.43
Barron’s rule unquestionably continued to be the law up to the adoption of the Civil Rights
Amendments. The new amendments by their terms contained many new limitations on States. But
what precisely was the requirement of “due process” and the curb that states not impinge on the
“privileges or immunities” of their citizens?44 And what relationship did these new limitations bear
to the constitutional constraints that applied to the federal government?
The jurisprudential model introduced above helps to distinguish four plausible approaches
39

One example is the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship Clause, which the Co urt has held ap plies to both the State
and federal go vernm ents. See Saenz v. Ro e, 526 U .S. 48 9, 50 0 (1999 ). For p urpo ses of T ailoring, a provision that
explicitly references both the federal and state governments and provides different explicit directions to each does not
count. See, e.g., U.S. C ONST . A RT . I (selection of Senators). The doctrinal op tion of Tailo ring that is this A rticle’s
subje ct does not arise if the C onstitutional text already differentiates between different levels of government.
40
For example, the First Amendment states that “Con gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exe rcise thereof . . .” U.S. C ONST . A M E N D . 1, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis supplied). The First, Sixth, and
Seve nth Am endments also explicitly address only the federal government.
41
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
42
See id. at 249 -50. C hief Justice M arshall reasoned that the States each had established constitutions that defined
and limited the ir state governments, whereas the United States Constitution was designed to define and limit the powers
of the federal government, except where it explicitly applied to the States (as in Article I, section 10). The Chief Justice
wrote that “Had Congress which proposed the amendm ents engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the
constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own
gove rnments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and
intelligible language. Id. at 250 ; see also id. at 247 (the Constitution’s “limitations on power . . . are naturally, and, we
think, necessarily applicab le to the government created by the instrum ent,” and not to “distinct [state] governments,
framed by different persons and for different purposes”).
43
See U.S. C ONST ., A RT . I, §§9-10.
44
See U.S. C ONST ., A MEND MENT XIV.
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to identifying constitutional limitations on the States in circumstances where the constitutional
limitation explicitly applies only to the federal government (and, mutatis mutandis, when exporting
to the federal government constitutional principles that by their terms apply to the States). All four
approaches, we shall see, have been advocated by Justices at different points in time. Two have
commanded majorities, and one is the current black letter law. Importantly, the four approaches also
are paradigms for the interpretation of those multi-level constitutional principles that are not
connected to either the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment due process clauses.
1.

Fundamental Fairness. The four approaches are best appreciated in relation to

a concrete constitutional guarantee. Let us take the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause. At
issue in Palko v. Connecticut45 was the constitutionality of a state statute that gave the government
the same right of appeal as the criminal defendant. The Palko Court recognized that an earlier
Supreme Court decision46 had held that the protection again double jeopardy “was not confined to
jeopardy in a new and independent case” but “forbade jeopardy in the same case if the new trial was
at the insistence of the government and not upon defendant’s motion.”47 This principle meant that
a federal statute allowing the government a right of appeal from a conviction would violate double
jeopardy.48
The question presented in Palko was whether there is such a guarantee in state courts.
45

302 U .S. 319 (1937 ).
That decision was Kepner v. Un ited States, 195 U .S. 10 0 (1904 ). In fact, Kepner involved construction of federal
legislation applicable to the P hilippine Island s that inco rporated virtually all of the Bill of Righ ts’ guarantees. See id.
at 123-25. The Kepner Court chose to co nstrue this statutory language in the same manner that it would have interpreted
the constitutional language. Id. at 124 -25. Palko accordingly treated the constitutional questio n to have be en settled in
Kepner. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323. T hough Palko’s approach in this regard is b eyond rep roach, Kempner could have
resolved the question before it differently. Indeed, the Supreme Co urt has held that a twentieth century statute applicab le
in Indian country that incorporates language of the Bill of Rights can be construed d ifferently than the B ill of Rights.
See Rosen, Of Tribal C ourts, supra note 2 9, at 48 7.
47
Palko, 302 U.S. at 322-23.
48
Id. at 323.
46
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Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo considered appellant’s argument that “[w]hatever would be
a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments 1 to 8) if done by the federal government is
now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state.”49 Justice Cardozo’s
answer was short and simple: “There is no such general rule.”50 The question instead was what was
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and that was answered by asking
whether the challenged practice “violate[d] those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?”51 (The Court answered “no.”). The Palko
Court’s method has been dubbed the “Fundamental Fairness” approach,52 and it commanded a
majority of the Supreme Court for nearly the first hundred years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment.53
The following chart illustrates this interpretive approach:

49

Id. at 323.
Id. Justice Cardozo’s choice of the word “general” is significant, for he noted later in the Palko opinion that certain
constitutional rights were treated differently. See infra Part I.A.3; see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[i]m plicit in this statement . . . is the understanding that some of the eight amendm ent do apply
by their very terms.”).
51
Id. at 328 (internal quotation omitted).
52
See, e.g.,Jero ld H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 G EO . L. J. 253, 257 , 291 (1982 ).
53
See id.
50
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Figure 2: Illustration of “Fundamental Fairness”
Model of Constitutional Doctrine

Doctrine applicable to the Federal
Government

Doctrine Applicable to the State
Government, Approach 1 (Fundamental
Fairness):

1.Constitutional Provision
9

1.F: Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy
guarantee

1.S: Due Process

2.

Goal
9

2.F: “A man shall not be brought into
danger of his life for one and the same
offense more than once.” Kepner, 195 U.S.
at 126.

2.S: makes certain that state procedures do
not violate those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice.

3.

Standard
9

3.F: No person can be “again tried for the
same offense.” Id. at 130.

3.S: Is the policy “so acute and shocking
that our polity will not endure it?” Palko,
302 U.S. at 328.

4.

Rulified Standard

4.F: Government cannot appeal an
acquittal.

4.S: State can appeal from an acquittal.

Let the numbers (1, 2, 3, 4) represent each step in the jurisprudential model’s representation of
doctrinal development. “F” signifies “federal” doctrine, and “S’ signifies “State.” Under the first
approach, the constitutional language applicable to the States is “Due Process,” not “double
jeopardy.”54 In the model’s representation,
1.S 1.F,
2.S does not (necessarily55) = 2.F,
3.S does not (necessarily) = 3.F, and
4.S does not (necessarily) = 4.F.
The different levels of government are governed by different constitutional language, and the legal
tests need not converge at any of the steps of the development of the two doctrines.
In short, under the fundamental fairness approach, there necessarily is incongruity at the first
54

The Fo urteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause was not a doctrinal option due to the Court’s ruling
in the Slaughterhouse Cases. See infra at 18 and following.
55
I include the term “necessarily” because it is always p ossible that the identical Goal, Standard, or Rulified Standard
could be imputed to two d ifferent co nstitutional provisions. The Court identified this possibility in the 1908 case of
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U .S. 78 (1908). The Court stated that “it is possible that some of the person al rights
safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against national action m ay also be safeguarded against state action . . . ”
Continued the Court, this was“not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendm ents, but because they
are of such a nature tha t they are included in the conception of due process of law.” Id. at 99. The Co urt’s language
can be represented by the model as follows: although 1.S does not = 1.F, it is possible that 2.S = 2.F.
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step of analysis, and there can be complete incongruity at all steps (as was the case in Palko).
Fundamental Fairness thus was a legal regime in which the federal and sub-federal governments
frequently were subject to different constitutional limitations.56 Under Palko, for example, state
prosecutors could appeal acquittals whereas federal prosecutors could not. States were subject to
a host of constitutional limitations under the fundamental fairness regime, but the touchstone was
what “fundamental fairness” required, not what limitations applied to the federal government.57
2.

Total Incorporation. A second plausible approach is the polar opposite of

Fundamental Fairness: to conclude that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable
to the States all doctrines that were developed in the federal context. In the model’s representation,
this would mean as follows:
1.S = 1.F
2.S = 2.F
3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F
This is an example of what this Article identifies as a “One-Size-Fits-All” approach. This was the
method famously advocated by Justice Black in the 1947 case of Adamson v. California.58 In the
56

See, e.g. Twining v. N ew Jersey, 21 1 U .S. 78 , 113 -14 (1 908 )(assum ing that a jury instruction allowing juries to
draw negative inference from a failure to testify would have violated the Fifth Amendment if administered in federal
court, but holding that such an instruction did not violate the due proc ess limitation that app lied to the States); Maxwell
v. Do w, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (holding that a state statute providing for 8 rather than 12 person jury was not
unco nstitutional, despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment required 12 person juries in federal court); Betts v. Bra dy,
316 U.S . 455 , 462 (1942) (holding that the due p rocess clause was “less rigid and mo re fluid” than the Sixth
Amendm ent); Wolf v. Colorad o, 338 U .S. 25 , 27 (1 949 ) (hold ing that due process did not includ e the Fourth
Amendm ent’s exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence).
57
For example, it was held that due process prevented states from taking private property for public use without
payment of just co mpe nsation, See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896), protected against “arbitrary
intrusion by the police,” see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), and sometimes required representation by
counsel. See Powell v. Alabam a, 287 U .S. 45 (1932). For a full discussio n, see Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited,
supra note 51, at 284.
58
332 U.S. 46 (1947). Though not completely free from doubt, Justice Black’s dissent appeared to adopt the position
that all doctrinal details developed in the federal context applied equa lly to the States. See Id. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting)
(“Nothing in the Palko opinion requires that when the Court decide s that a B ill of Rights’ p rovisio n is to be applied to
the States, it is to b e app lied piecem eal. Nothing in the Palko opinion recommends that the Court apply part of an
19

Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court and commentators have dubbed this position “total
incorporation.”59 Although four Justices embraced this approach in Adamson, total incorporation
never commanded a majority of the Court.60 The functionally identical approach was advocated by
Justice Bradley in the Slaughterhouse Cases, where he appeared to argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges or immunities Clause made the Bill of Rights provisions applicable against
the States.61 However, the Slaughterhouse majority famously narrowed the scope of the privileges
or immunities clause in such a way that it could not serve this role,62 and Slaughterhouse is still good
amendm ent’s established meaning and discard that part which does not suit the current style of fundamentals.”). Justice
Murphy’s dissent in Adam son attributed this position to Justice Black, when he stated that he was “in substantial
agreement with the views of” Justice Black with only “one reservation and one addition,” addressed the question of
doctrinal details. Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The first sentence, which purports to specify the aspects of the
Black dissent with which he concurred, states “I agree that the sp ecific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried
over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The word “intact” is best
unde rstood as referring to doctrinal details. Commentators have understood Black’s dissent to encompass absorption
of both all Bill of Rights gu arantees as we ll as all doctrinal details. See, e.g., Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited,
supra note 51, at 257 (“The total incorp oratio n position ho lds that the fourteenth amendment incorp orates all of the B ill
of Rights guarantees and thereby applies those guarantees to state action in the same manner that they are applied to the
actions of the federal government.”) (emphasis supplied).
59
See, e.g., Duncan v. L ouisiana, 392 U .S. 94 7, xx (1 968 ) (Ha rlan, J., dissenting); Israel, Selective Incorporation
Revisited, supra note 51, at 257.
60
See Israel, supra note 51, at 286-90.
61
See id. at 118-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley argued that arguing that the privileges or immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included “the right of habeas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of
religious worship, the right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discussion of public
measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” Id. A subsequent opinion authored by
Justice Bradley raises questions as to whether he believed that the Fourteenth Amendment applied all Bill of R ights
protections against the States. For a com plete d iscussion, see Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, supra note 51,
at 257 & n. 20.
62
Interestingly, notwithstanding the decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, in five subsequent cases the Co urt was
presented with argum ents that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or im munities clause mad e vario us bill of rights
protections applicable against the States. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890); McElvine v. Brush, 142 U.S.
155, 159 (1891); O’N eil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 363 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
582 (1900); Twining v. N ew Jersey, 21 1 U .S. 78 (1908). The majorities reaffirmed Slaug hterhouse in all these cases,
though Justices Field, Harlan, and B rewer wrote dissenting op inions in se veral o f them, arguing tha t the Fourteenth
Amendment mad e the rights “enum erated in the earlier Am endments” app licable against the states. See, e.g., O’Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting). (Justice Field a nd the first Justice H arlan p enned disse nts in O’N eil
v. Vermont. See id. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370 (H arlan, J., dissenting, joined by B rewer, J.). The first
Justice Harlan also wrote dissents in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605-17 (190 0) (H arlan, J., dissenting ), and in
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U .S. at 11 4-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In the 19 08 case of Twining v. New Jersey , 211
U.S. 78 (1 908 ), the Co urt acknowledged that several Justices long had espoused the view that the privileges or
immunities clause made the Bill of Rights applicab le against the States, but declared that it was “not profitable to
examine the weighty arguments in its favor, for the question is no longer open in the Court.” Id. at 98.
20

law. In short, neither the privileges or immunities clause nor due process has ever been interpreted
to effectuate total incorporation.
3.

Selective Incorporation. The third approach is illustrated by the contemporary

doctrine widely known as “selective incorporation” (though I soon shall suggest that this terminology
be slightly altered). Whereas total incorporation contemplates that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes all Bill of Rights guarantees applicable against the States, not all Bill of Rights provisions
necessarily apply under selective incorporation.63 For instance, advocates of selective incorporation
have not campaigned for overturning long-established precedent holding that neither the Fifth
Amendment’s grand jury requirement64 nor the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury guarantee apply to
the States.65 Virtually all other Bill of Rights guarantees, however, have been held to be applicable
against the States under selective incorporation.66 And where a guarantee applies, so do all doctrinal
details that were developed in the federal context.
In practice, selective incorporation is not very different from total incorporation. Although
the selective incorporation decisions typically continued to ask whether a particular constitutional
guarantee was required under “fundamental fairness,” they applied the test far more liberally than
the Court had done during the “fundamental fairness” era.

Justices embracing selective

incorporation have concluded that the Constitution’s specific enumeration of a guarantee is virtually
conclusive evidence that the guarantee is “fundamental.”67 Moreover, where a guarantee is
incorporated against the States, the selective incorporation approach makes all doctrinal details that
63

See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (per curium) (Brennan, J., joining).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1 884) (holding that the grand jury right does not apply against the States).
65
See Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 , 217 (1916) (holding that the Seventh Am endment’s
civil jury trial right does not apply against the States).
66
See J O H N E. N OWAK & R O N A LD D. R O T U N D A, C ON STITU TION AL L AW 431(6 th ed. 2000).
67
See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance C o. v. H aslip, 499 U .S. 1, 35 (1991 ) (Scalia, J., concurring).
64
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have been developed in the federal context applicable against the States, as well. For these reasons,
the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation is almost indistinguishable in practice from total
incorporation.
The case of Benton v. Maryland,68 which reversed the Palko decision analyzed earlier,69
illustrates the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation. Benton revisited the question of
whether and to what extent the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy applied to the
States. The majority wrote that “this Court has increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the
(Bill of Rights) to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law”70
and quickly concluded that “[t]he fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can
hardly be doubted”71 – in effect, that 1.S equals 1.F. The Court then asserted that “[o]nce it is
decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”72 The
analysis proceeds as follows for those constitutional guarantees that are deemed to apply against the
States under today’s doctrine of selective incorporation:
1.S = 1.F
2.S = 2.F
3.S = 3.F, and
4.S = 4.F
Selective incorporation thus utilizes a “One-Size-Fits-All” approach for every constitutional

68

395 U .S. 784 (1969 ).
See supra at p. 15.
70
Benton, 395 U.S. at 794.
71
Id. at 795.
72
Id. (emphasis supplied, internal quotation omitted).
69
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guarantee that is deemed to apply to the States.73

One-Size-Fits-All is the current black letter

doctrine in both selective incorporation and reverse incorporation.
4.

Tailoring: A Variant on Selective Incorporation. The fourth and final doctrinal

approach is a variant of selective incorporation. Like selective incorporation, the fourth approach
acknowledges that a guarantee’s specific enumeration in the Bill of Rights is strong evidence that
the guarantee is sufficiently fundamental to be applied against the States. Unlike the contemporary
doctrine, however, the fourth approach contemplates that the doctrinal details developed in the
federal context might not all transfer over to the States. In short, under this final approach,
1.S = 1.F
2.S = 2.F, but
3.S does not necessarily = 3.F, and
4.S does not necessarily = 4.F.

73

Even before selective incorporation’s adoption in the 1960s, the Court emp loyed a On e-Size-Fits-All ap proach in
its interpretation of many F irst Amendment guarantees b eginning in the 1940s. In 1943, for instance, the Court noted
“the special relationship of the Fourteenth Amendm ent to the rights of freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed
by the First. We have repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made app licable to the states the guaranties
of the First.” Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943). The Court went on to hold in that case that
“[a]llegations of fact sufficient to show deprivation of the right of free speech under the First Amendm ent are sufficient
to establish deprivation of a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth . . .” Id.
This One -Size-Fits-All app roach consistently drew dissents. See, e.g., Jeanne tte (Frankfurter dissent); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissenters had the better of the argument. The majority that embraced
One-Size-Fits-All with resp ect to the First Amendment rested their po sition on precedent. See, e.g., Jeanette, 319 U.S.
at 162 . The case law, how ever, hardly constituted precedent for a O ne-Size-Fits-All approach. The One-Size-Fits-All
Justices relied heavily on Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko, which stated that “the due p rocess clause of the Fourteenth
Amendm ent may make it unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First Amendment
safeguards against encroachment by the Congress, or the like freedom of the press, or the free exercise of religion, or
the right of peaceable assembly.” Palko, 302 U.S. at 324 . Card ozo came to this co nclusion, however, b y means of a
fundamental fairness methodology, not a One-Size-Fits-All rationale that willy nilly resulted in the adop tion of all
doctrinal details. Justice Cardozo wrote in Palko that the First Amendm ent guarantees “that are valid as against the
federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments” were “valid as against the states” not
because they were enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because they “have been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.” Palko, 302 U.S. at
324-25; see also id. at 326-27 (the Fourteenth Amendment “abso rbed ” the freedom s of “thought and spe ech” due to the
“belief that neither liberty nor justice would ex ist if they were sacrificed,” not because such freedoms were sp ecified in
the Bill of R ights). T his rationale me ans that the gene ral principles cross over to the State context, but it does not speak
to doctrinal details. Notwithstanding its tenuous grounding in precedent, a One-Size-Fits-All approach vis-a-vis many
First Amendm ent guarantees was securely in place during fundamental fairness’s heyday, twenty years before the
incorporation revolution.
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This is an example of what this Article dubs “Tailoring.”
Many Justices have advocated this fourth doctrinal approach, including Justices Fortas,
Stevens, Ginsburg, Powell, Rehnquist, and Thomas.74 In so doing, however, the Justices have not
clearly distinguished their method from the contemporary doctrine of selective incorporation.
Understanding this fourth possibility suggests that it is useful to distinguish between two types of
“selective incorporation:” (1) selective and undifferentiated incorporation and (2) selective and
differentiated incorporation. Consistent with ordinary usage, “selective” refers to the fact that not
all Bill of Rights principles carry over to the States. “Undifferentiated” means that where a given
principle is imported, all doctrinal details come along with it. “Differentiated” incorporation refers
to a methodology that rejects the unreflective importation of all doctrinal details, though it does not
mean that the doctrinal details necessarily differ across the different levels of government.
To summarize, selective and undifferentiated incorporation is a One-Size-Fits-All doctrine
that reflects contemporary black letter law. Selective and differentiated incorporation, by contrast,
is an example of Tailoring, and it has not been adopted by a majority of the Court.
It is useful to graphically compare the four approaches. Figure 3 arranges them, from left
to right, on the basis of increasingly equivalent treatment of the different levels of government:

74

See infra Part II.A. Justices Holmes, Jackson, Harlan advocated a similar approach, as will be discussed below.
See id.
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Figure 3: Four Approaches to Construing the 14th Amendment
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C.

1.F

One-Size-Fits-All Outside of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Fourteenth

Amendment’s due process clause is the most frequently used doctrinal conduit for exporting
constitutional principles developed in the federal context to the States, it is important to bear in mind
that not all multi-level constitutional principles spring from the due process clause. For instance,
the principle identified by the Supreme Court in the Thornton decision – that additional
qualifications for Congress violate a fundamental democratic principle – was not tied to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether a multi-level constitutional principle should be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored
accordingly arises outside the context of incorporation. As is the case with incorporation, the Court
virtually always opts for One-Size-Fits-All. This is true of exports that originate from the federal
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side as well as the state side. To illustrate the former, it was held in Thornton that additional
qualifications created by States are equally as problematic as those created by Congress. With regard
to state exports, the Court in Saenz v. Roe75 held that the right to travel, which until then had been
applied only against the States, applied in identical measure to the federal government.76
The Spending Clause is another doctrinal context where the Court has chosen One-Size-FitsAll over Tailoring. Though “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal
assistance in order to further its policy objectives,” it “may not induce the recipient to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”77 The question for present purposes is whether
the measure of what is unconstitutional potentially varies depending upon what level of government
decides upon the regulation. The answer is “no” under One-Size-Fits-All, and “yes” under Tailoring.
To illustrate, consider the recently decided case of United States v. American Library
Association.78 The Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA) required public libraries to use Internet
filters as a condition for the receipt of federal subsidies. Filters are to prevent minors from obtaining
access to harmful materials. Due to technological limitations, however, the filters block access to
materials that are neither harmful to children nor to adults.79 Moreover, there are alternatives to the
filters that could accomplish CIPA’s goal of protecting minors without blocking access to the nonharmful materials.80
Six Justices analyzed the statute with a One-Size-Fits-All jurisprudence. The question for

75

526 U.S. 489 , 500 (1999).
See infra at Part II.A.
77
United States v. American Library Association, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (2003) (internal quotation and citations
omitted).
78
123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
79
See id. at 2301-04.
80
See id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76
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them was whether a local public library could have constitutionally decided to install the filters.81
Justice Stevens expressly rejected the methodology embraced by the plurality and the Souter and
Ginsburg dissents and instead adopted what this Article dubs Tailoring. Stevens “agree[d] with the
plurality that it is neither inappropriate nor unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with
filtering software as a means of curtailing children’s access to Internet Web sites displaying sexually
explicit images.” Stevens accordingly “agree[d] with the plurality that the 7% of public libraries that
decided to use such software on all of their Internet terminals in 2000 did not act unlawfully.”82 But,
continued Justice Stevens, “[w]hether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United States to
impose that requirement on the other 93%, however, raises a vastly different question.”83 That is
to say, a local library’s decision to install an Internet filter implicates the Constitution differently than
the federal government’s requirement that local libraries install such filters. The federal act
“operates as a blunt nationwide restraint” whereas the library’s decision is a decision by the locality
that can be tailored to fit local circumstances.84 Thus, whereas Justice Stevens agreed that a local
library’s decision to install filters is constitutional, he concluded that Congress’ indirect imposition
of a nationwide requirement was not.85
81

See id. at 2303 & n. 2 (“we must ask whether the condition that C ongress req uires wo uld be unco nstitutional if
performed by the library itself”(plurality, internal quotation and citation omitted)); 2320 (“The question for me, then,
is whether a local library could itself constitutionally impose these restrictions . . .”) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg, J.). The major difference between these Justices’ analysis was as follow s: while the p lurality concluded that
using the filters was analogous to a library’s collection decision, which is subject only to ra tional basis scrutiny, see id.
at 230 6-07 , Justice S outer (joined by Justice G insburg) believed the filters more akin to a library’s decision to refuse
certain patro ns access to m aterials it alread y had in its collection, a censorship decision triggering strict scrutiny that
filtering technology could not satisfy. See id. at 232 0-23 22; id. at 2321 (“The p roper analogy therefore is not to passing
up a book that might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then kee ping it from ad ults lacking an acc eptab le
‘purp ose,’ or to buying an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to be unsuitable for all
adults.”).
82
Id. at 2312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg, by contrast, believed these libraries’ activities
to have bee n unco nstitutional.
83
Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84
Id.; see also id. at 2314-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens’ dissent thus spotlights the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring
that inheres in Spending Clause doctrine. Neither the plurality nor Justice Souter explained their
selection of One-Size-Fits-All.86 Nor did they explain why Justice Stevens’ approach was mistaken.
It is not important for present purposes to consider which approach is correct, but to see that the
contemporary doctrine reflects an One-Size-Fits-All approach. As will be shown in the next Part,
the Court’s failure to provide a justification for One-Size-Fits-All in the Spending Clause context
is characteristic of the Court’s tendency to reflexively adopt One-Size-Fits-All as if there were no
alternative.

II.

THE (ULTIMATELY ) PRAGMAT IC GROUNDS FOR ONE -SIZE-FITS-ALL
This Part II shows that the few justifications that the Supreme Court has offered for One-

Size-Fits-All are inadequate. When the Court shifted from fundamental fairness to selective
incorporation, it did not appear to appreciate that a choice had to be made about whether the
imported principles were going to be One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored. The factors that led to the
rejection of fundamental fairness in favor of selective incorporation did not likewise counsel the
adoption of One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring. Outside the context of incorporation, the Court also
has neglected to provide adequate justifications for its selection of One-Size-Fits-All over Tailoring.
As this Part II explains, the Court’s unreflective adoption of One-Size-Fits-All probably is the
outgrowth of a highly intuitive, but largely inaccurate, conception of constitutional rights. In the end,
86

The plura lity quoted language from S outh D akota v. Dole, 483 U .S. 20 3 (1987 ), that was intende d by the plurality
to suggest that the question alread y had b een d ecide d. See American Library, 123 S. Ct. at 2303 & n.2. However, the
choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring was not an issue that was decided in that case. Althou gh the linguistic
formulation of Dole’s unconstitutionality prong more readily lends itself to One-Size-Fits-All than to Tailoring, that alone
is not app ropriately treated as d eciding the question, particularly in view of the stro ng functionalist reasons Justice
Stevens offers as to why an identical regulatory decision made by different levels of government might have very
different constitutional implications.
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there are several strong justifications for One-Size-Fits-All, but they are pragmatic considerations
rather than categorical imperatives. They accordingly do not justify today’s doctrine of categorical
One-Size-Fits-All.
A.

The Disappointing Search for a Justification. Outside of incorporation, the Court’s

justifications for treating multi-level constitutional provisions as One-Size-Fits-All have amounted
to no more than ipse dixit. In Thornton, the case concerning the constitutionality of term limits, the
Court merely asserted that “the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the
qualification’s restrictive impact.”87 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court answered the United States
government’s argument that the right to travel should be Tailored as between the federal and state
governments88 with the unresponsive rejoinder that “the protection afforded to the citizen by the
Citizenship Clause of [the 14th A] is a limitation on the powers of the National Government as well
as the States.”89 This is unresponsive because the U.S. government conceded that the right-to-travel
limited the federal government, arguing only that the doctrinal details might vary as between the
federal and state governments because “Congress stands in a different relation to individual citizens
than do the legislatures of the several States,”90 and the Court’s explanation constitutes absolutely
no justification whatsoever for rejecting Tailoring in favor of One-Size-Fits-All. Only by failing to
appreciate the distinction between selective and undifferentiated incorporation, on the one hand, and
selective and differentiated incorporation, on the other, can the Court’s response in Saenz be
87

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 , 820 (1995). For m ore d iscussion of Thornton, see infra Part
IV.D.1.
88
See Anderson v. Roe, United States Supreme Co urt Amicus Brief, 1998 WL 7 98866, *8*-*11(noting that
“Congress has considered and acted on a question affecting the freedom of interstate migration– a freedom that has
special structural characteristics and is in important respects a right of national citizenship, as to wh ich Co ngress stands
in a different relation to individual citizens than do the legislatures of the several States” and arguing that federal
regulations accordingly should be subjected to lower level scrutiny)(emphasis supplied).
89
526 U .S. 489, 500 (199 9).
90
See Anderson v. Roe, United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 1998 WL 798866, *8*-*11.
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misconstrued as a justification for the doctrine that the Court embraced.
Although the question of whether a multi-level constitutional principle should be One-SizeFits-All or Tailored clearly arises outside the context of incorporation – as seen, for instance, in
Thornton and in Saenz – outside the Fourteenth Amendment this question arises only on a right-byright basis that readily can escape scrutiny. Incorporation, by contrast, is a high profile, transsubstantive doctrine where the question of whether multi-level principles should be Tailored
repeatedly occurs. For these reasons, it may be thought that solid justifications for One-Size-Fits-All
can be found in the incorporation case law, and that the caselaw outside of incorporation implicitly
relies on those justifications when it reflexively selects One-Size-Fits-All.
Case law in the incorporation context, however, has not been more illuminating. When the
Supreme Court recently replaced a Tailored equal protection doctrine with the One-Size-Fits-All
doctrine of “congruence” in the Adarand case over Justices Stevens and Ginsburg’s dissent that
urged continuation of Tailoring, the majority simply asserted that “[e]qual protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”91
The paucity of recent justifications cannot be explained by the presence of a definitive
justification for One-Size-Fits-All that was delivered in an earlier incorporation decision. The
justifications the Court offered for rejecting fundamental fairness and adopting selective
incorporation do not go to the question of whether the Bill of Rights principles that are imported
through the portal of the Fourteenth Amendment are One-Size-Fits-All or Tailored.92 Consider three
91

See Adarand C onstructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). For further
discussion o f Adarand, see infra Part III.B.1.
92
This is not surprising, for it is widely appreciated that the C ourt ha s offered scant justification for selective
incorporation itself, much less for having chosen one form of selective inco rporation o ver another. See Israel, Selective
Inco rpo ration Revisited, supra note 51, at 301 (“the Court has yet to offer a full-fledged exposition of the doctrine’s
underlying justifications”); Henry Friend ly, The B ill of Rights as a Cod e of Crim inal Pro cedure, 53 C AL. L. R EV . 929,
934 (1965) (“[i]t does seem extraordinary that a theory going to the very nature of our Constitution and having such
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possible justifications: text, history, and precedent. Textually, neither “due process” nor “privileges
or immunities” answers the question: “due process” is a phrase that hardly appears to refer to the
notion that Bill of Rights principles apply to the States,93 and even though the privileges or
immunities clause may be a more plausible candidate than due process for incorporating the Bill of
Rights,94 the privilege or immunity clause’s language does not speak to whether the doctrinal details
developed in the federal context (steps 3.F and 4.F) should be applied to the states. Historically,
even if there is evidence to support the view that the framers intended the privileges or immunities
clause to incorporate the bill or rights95 – what is an issue of enduring dispute96 – the evidence is
silent as regards the question of whether steps 3.F and 4.F were intended to transfer to the States.
(The absence of textual and historical guidance in resolving the choice between One-Size-Fits-All
and Tailoring is not surprising. The doctrinal details found at steps 3 and 4 constitute the

profound effects for all of us should be carrying the day without ever having been explicated in a majority opinion of
the Court.”); see also Do rf, Equal Protection Incorporation, supra note 24, at 969 (“As a matter of principle, there is
much that is wrong with the argument that the enumeration of a right in one o f the first eight am endment requires its
application against the states”).
93
To quickly summa rize several of the major textual critiques: (1) substantive d ue proc ess is oxymoronic; see Do rf,
supra note 24, at 969; (2) attributing such substantive meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause makes
the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause redundant (insofar as such substantive protections already apply to the federal
government via the B ill of Rights), id. at 969; (3) and “[i]t would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey
such specific commands in such a round-abo ut and inexplicit way” as through the d ue process clause. Adamson v
California, 33 2 U .S. 46 , 63 (1 946 ) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
94
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (Black, J., dissenting). Further, it has been argued that there is
historical evidence to suggest that some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers intended that the privileges or
immunities clause would authorize Congress to comp el the States to ab ide by the bill of rights. See M ICHA EL K E N T
C U RTIS , N O S TATE S HA LL A BRIDGE : T HE F O U R T EE N TH A MEND MENT AND THE B ILL OF R IGHTS 81-8 2 (1986 ).
95
To the extent the historical evidence supports the view that the privileges or immunities clause was intended to make
the bill of rights applicable to the States, the evidenc e supports total inco rporation, not selective inco rporation. See
Israel.
96
See, e.g., John Harrison, Reco nstructing the Privileges o r Imm unities Clau se, 101 Y ALE L. J. 1385, 1 387 -88
(1992)(arguing that privileges or immunities Clause was an equality-based, rather than a substantive-based, constitutional
protection: “The main point of the clause is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state
citizenship-the same positive law rights of pro perty, c ontract, and so forth-to all of its citizens.”); see also D A V ID P.
C U RRIE , T HE C ONSTITUTION IN THE S UPREME C OURT : T HE F IRST H U N D R ED Y EARS 1789-1888, at 342-51 (19 85)(same).
In any event, all these scholars’ unde rstandings of the privileges or immunities clause remain mere theoretical inquiry
for so long as the Court’s early holding in the Slaughterhouse Cases remains good law.
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implementation of constitutional norms, which typically falls to courts, not legislatures.97 Most of
the time, therefore, text and historical understandings are unlikely to shed light on the doctrinal
details of steps 3 and 4.98) Finally, as regards precedent, the champions of selective incorporation
could hardly have grounded their position on the earlier decided case law, which created the
fundamental fairness regime that selective incorporation disassembled.99 Precedent accordingly
could not have been the basis for selecting One-Size-Fits-All instead of Tailoring.
B.

The “Watering-Down” Thesis and the Structure of Rights. The Court has offered one

justification in the incorporation context specifically aimed at defending One-Size-Fits-All: that
doing otherwise would lead to “watered-down” constitutional rights.100 Although the Court never
went beyond this assertion to explain the theory behind it, I suspect that these words resonate with
the intuitions of many. I shall dub this the “watering down” thesis. This section unpacks the thesis’
unanalyzed assumption that the scope of a right defined in relation to limiting the federal government
automatically carries over to other levels of government. It suggests that the watering down thesis
is premised on a conception of constitutional rights that is widely held but largely inaccurate as a
97

See Fallon , Implementing the Constitution, supra note 33, at 57, 61-67. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
is a rare exception.
98
History is most likely to be illuminating vis-a-vis Steps 3 and 4 in respect of categorical Legal Rules. Consider
the rule that the federal government is categorically prohibited from requiring state executive officials to apply federal
law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 89 8, 935 (1997). A show ing that the federal govern ment actually did exe rcise
such powers vis-a-vis states in the past would be relevant to determining whethe r a categorical rule co mpo rts with
origina l understanding.
99
See Israel, supra note 51, at 302-03. (“It may seem strange that a doctrine that resulted in the overruling of so many
decisions has be en justified by reference to prio r prec edent, but sev eral Justices have offered p recisely that justification
for the selective incorporation doctrine.”). Once selective incorporation was established, the Court openly acknowledged
that its adoption had necessitated the aba ndonment of preced ent. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-95 (1969)
(“Palko’s roots had thus been cut away years ago. We today only recognize the inevitable.”).
100
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing fundamental
fairness approach as the “view that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of the sam e guarantee as applied to the Federal Government . . .”)
(emphasis supplied); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (19 64) (holding that Court had “rejected the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendm ent applies to the States only a ‘watered-down,’ subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights”).
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purely descriptive matter.

A more sophisticated conception that more accurately explains

constitutional rights in this country undermines the assumption on which the watering down thesis
rests.
One influential conception of rights, frequently associated with Ronald Dworkin, views rights
as categorical trumps enjoyed by individuals as against majoritarian preferences.101 On this view,
rights carve out spheres of immunity from governmental regulation so that individuals may engage
in the activities that rights protect.102 A similar conception is present in those who speak of
constitutional rights as being “rights, simpliciter” that guarantee that certain privileged conduct can
occur.103 Much language in the Court’s opinions is consistent with this conception of rights, and this
conception is widely held.104
It quite naturally follows from this conception that the sphere of immunity a right creates
should be equally impregnable by all levels of government. After all, if rights create spheres of
immunity from regulation, it would contradict the very concept of a right to allow any level of
government to regulate matters within this realm. Such conceptions of rights thus readily lead to

101

See Richard H. P ildes, Why Rights are not Tru mps: Social M eanings, Exp ressive Ha rms, and Con stitutionalism,
27 J. L EGA L S T U D . 725, 727-78 (1998) [hereinafter “W hy Rights are no t Trumps”]; see also Frederick Schauer and
Richard H. P ildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 T EX . L. R EV . 1803, 1809-19 (1997). Jeremy
Waldron has responded that although many people hold the view that rights are categorical trumps and attribute that
notion to Dworkin, Dworkin himself d oes not hold such a view. See Jerem y W aldro n, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of
Rights, 29 J. L EGA L S T U D . 301, 306 & n. 22 (2 000 ); but see Richa rd H . Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rig hts,
29 J. L EGA L S T U D . 309 (2000) (responding that such a categor ical trump conc eption is reflected in D workin’s early
writings). Regardless of what Dworkin’s precise conception of rights might be, Waldron does not dispute Pildes’ claim
that Dworkin’s work has “played an important role in fueling” the widespread view in contemporary political culture
that constitutional rights are catego rical trum ps. See Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions, 29 J. L EGA L S T U D . at 311;
W aldron, 29 J. L EGA L S T U D . at 306 & n. 22.
102
Pilde s, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 727-28.
103
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterog eneity of Rights, 6 LEGA L T HEORY 269, 271 (2000) (defining a “right,
simpliciter” R as meaning that “R provide s a shield against all interfere nces with any co nduc t C that constitutes an
exerc ise of R.”).
104
See Pilde s, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 727-728 (showing that this categorical understanding
of rights as trumps is held by M ichael Sandel, Allan Hutchinson, Charles Taylor, and Seymour Martin Lipset).
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One-Size-Fits-All. I suspect that this understanding of rights underlies the watering down thesis,
though I admittedly cannot prove it since the Court has done nothing more than to assert the thesis.
I also imagine that such a view, whether explicit or unstated, undergirds the intuition held by many
that One-Size-Fits-All is the only intelligible approach to incorporation.
A competing conception of constitutional rights views rights as “shields against particular
[governmental] rules.”105 Such “rights-against-rules” do not guarantee that particular conduct can
occur, but guarantee only that conduct cannot be regulated by certain forms of governmental action.
For instance, while the government may not proscribe the “desecrat[ion] [of a] . . . state or national
flag,”106 the identical flag burning activity can be prohibited “pursuant to a rule against arson, assault,
the destruction of government property, pollution, or some other such rule that was not targeted at
speech.”107 The Constitution thus does not guarantee a state of the world in which a person can burn
an American flag. It only guarantees that the proscription will not assume a form that singles out
the expressive activity of flag-burning. Burning a flag hence is not a “right, simpliciter,” but a
“right-against-rule.”
Jurisprudential scholars who analyze the structure of rights concur that both types of rights
– rights simpliciter and rights-against-rules – are found in American law. For example, the
Constitution’s ban on slavery is a “right[] not to have certain states of the world exist rather than [a

105
Matthew D . Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 M ICH . L. R EV .
1, 13 (1998 ). Richard Pildes has advanced a similar co ncep tion of rights. See Pilde s, Why Rights are not Trumps, supra
note 100, at 729-30 (discussed below in text).
106
See Johnson v. Texas, 491 U .S. 397 (1989 ).
107
Matthew D . Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6 LEGA L T HEORY 337, 344
(2000).
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] right[] not to be judged by certain kinds of rules”108 and accordingly creates a right, simpliciter.109
The flag burning case, by contrast, creates a right-against-rule.110 The jurisprudential dispute thus
is one of degree rather than kind.
As a purely descriptive matter, most constitutional rights in the United States fit the structure
of a right-against-rules. “[G]overnments can infringe even the most fundamental rights if its
justifications are sufficiently ‘compelling’ and the means used are the least restrictive available.”111
As such, “[r]ights are not general trumps against appeals to the common good” or creators of
spheres of immunity from government regulation that guarantee a certain state in the world, but
instead are “better understood as channeling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts
in certain arenas.”112 This structure of rights explains the widespread reality that Congress and the
States can regulate such constitutionally protected matters as speech and abortion.113 Constitutional
rights of the right-against-rule form do not categorically remove matters from majoritarian politics,
but simply condition regulation on the presence of better-than-ordinary reasons for regulating and
better-than-ordinary line-drawing when actually undertaking the regulation. Constitutionally
permissible regulations of speech and abortion are difficult to reconcile, by contrast, with the
conception of rights as creating spheres of immunity from regulation.
Importantly, the right-against-rules conception does not ineluctably lead to the watering-
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Do rf, Heterog eneity, supra note 102, at xx.
Matthew Adler, the strongest proponent of the rights as “rights against rules” thesis, acknowledge s this. See
Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Con stitutional Adju dication: A Re sponse to Professor Fallon, 113
H ARV . L. R EV . 1371, 1374 -75 (2000).
110
See, e.g., Richa rd H . Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 H ARV . L. R EV .
1321, 132 5 (2000 ); Do rf, Heterog eneity, supra note 102, at (agreeing that “rights as rights against rules is a plausible
first-order approximation of much Supreme C ourt doctrine”).
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Pildes,Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 729.
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Id. at 729.
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See Pildes,Why Rights are not Trumps, supra note 100, at 736-742.
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down thesis in the way that the rights simpliciter conception does. To the contrary, the right-againstrules structure provides prima facie support for Tailoring. Here is how. Once it is understood that
rights invite special types of justifications, the question arises as to what types of justifications
suffice to justify regulation. It has been argued that “context” plays a “crucial role” in determining
what justifications suffice.114 Government creates different “institutional space[s],”115 and arguments
that are sufficient to justify regulation in one context might not be satisfactory in another.
This seems right. Such an approach helps explain pockets of constitutional doctrine that are
inexplicable under a categorical rights-as-trumps approach. For example, military officials are part
of the federal government, and they are governed by the First Amendment.116 Yet they are permitted
to proscribe speech that is merely “intemperate, . . . disloyal, contemptuous and disrespectful,”117
enact prior restraints,118 and to ban private citizens’ political speech119 – regulations that would not
be permissible for other governmental actors.

How is it possible that identical constitutional

language – in this case, “free speech” – can mean different things in respect of different
governmental actors? Theoretically indefensible under a categorical rights-as-trumps account, such
regulations are comprehensible under a right-against-rules conception: context matters, and the
institutional space known as the military has institutional characteristics very different from general
society that accordingly may permit justifications for regulation that impermissible elsewhere.120 In
fact, this is the precise rationale that the Supreme Court has provided for the unusual constitutional
114
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doctrines that apply to the military: the Court has explained that ‘the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application of [constitutional]
protections’121 and that “fundamental necessit[ies]” of the military “may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”122
The understanding that many constitutional rights are rights-against-rules whose justifications
for regulation frequently are context-sensitive explains several other pockets of oddly performing
constitutional doctrine found in American law that are instructive to Tailoring. Like the military,
public school officials are permitted to regulate speech and to conduct searches in ways that mill run
government employees cannot.123 The same is true of prison officials.124 In all these contexts,
identical constitutional language requires different things of different government officials. In the
military, military officials are members of the federal government, and the doctrines that apply to
the military differ at levels 3.F and 4.F.125 Sometimes, that is,
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3.F(mill run federal actors) 3.F(military), and/or
4.F(mill run federal actors) 4.F(military).126
Public schools are a form of local government, to which the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and the
doctrines that apply to school officials also sometimes differ at the third and fourth levels of doctrine.
Sometimes, that is,
3.F(mill run federal actors) 3.S(public school officials), and/or
4.F(mill run federal actors) 4.S(public school officials).127
In short, the constitutional doctrines that apply to the military and to public schools
demonstrate that the doctrinal details of levels 3 and 4 do not invariably apply to all forms of
government. Such variations are readily explainable as the natural consequence of the fact that these
different types of governments (military, the schools) constitute different institutional contexts.
Insofar as the doctrines associated with constitutional rights determine the types of reasons that
provide a predicate for governmental regulation of the protected rights, it is not surprising that what
constitutes a justifiable reason for regulation will vary from institutional context to context.
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For example, at a time when government regulations interfering with the free exercise of religion were analyzed
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Consequently, what is constitutionally permissible may vary from institutional context to context,
as well.
The role of institutional context in determining what justifications suffice to support
regulation is not limited to the unusual doctrines that govern the military and public schools.
Frederick Schauer and Rick Pildes have argued at length, for example, that mainstream First
Amendment jurisprudence comprises multiple highly context-specific doctrines. Looking first to
the political institution of elections, they note that
elections are already highly structured spheres, including regulations that would be
impermissible in the general domain of public discourse. There are limits on what voters
are permitted to express at the ballot box; mandatory disclosure obligations on the identity
of political speakers; content-based regulations of electoral speech, ranging from mundane
constraints like electioneering near polling places to more dramatic ones, like selective bans
on contributions from some speakers . . . 128

They then argue that such doctrinal “exceptionalism” is not unique to elections but in fact is
generally characteristic of the First Amendment’s political speech doctrine. They conclude that
“[a]ll regulations of political speech are thus already measured by domain-specific, institutionspecific, sometimes media-specific, and generally context-specific First Amendment principles –
rather than some undifferentiated, ‘general’ First Amendment rule.”129
All this has critical consequences for Tailoring.

Tailoring is just another example of the

context-sensitize application of those constitutional principles that are best characterized as rightsagainst-rules. The predicate for Tailoring constitutional guarantees to the different levels of
government is that each level may constitute a sufficiently different institutional context such that
doctrinal variations at the levels of 3 and/or 4 are legitimate. Whether any particular doctrine is
128
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appropriately Tailored vis-a-vis any particular level of government is inevitably highly contextspecific, and accordingly falls outside of this Article’s scope. As Part IV discusses, however,
several generic considerations suggest that the federal, state, and local levels of government are
sufficiently different such that the possibility of doctrinal variations at the levels of 3 and 4 as among
these different levels of governments deserves serious consideration.
This analysis thus demonstrates the weakness of the watering-down thesis with respect to
constitutional rights best characterized as rights-against-rules. The possibility that different levels
of government are sufficiently different to require different justifications for regulating rights is what
makes the unstated assumption that doctrinal details need apply equally across all institutional
contexts wrong vis-a-vis such constitutional rights. On the other hand, the watering-down thesis is
valid as against constitutional rights that fit the pattern of a right, simpliciter.
Consequently, it is important to distinguish constitutional rights that fit the structure of a
right, simpliciter from those that constitute a right-against-rules. Commentators concur that both
forms of rights are found in American constitutional law. There also is considerable agreement as
to the rights that comprise each structure; for instance, that the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on
slavery creates a right, simpliciter. Several have suggested that torture is another.130 Given the fact
that there is not a unity structure to constitutional rights, but that they can assume two different
forms,131 it seems likely that in most cases “whether a right should be conceptualized as a rightagainst-rules or as a right, simpliciter, turns principally on substantive considerations about the
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particular right, rather than any deep fact about the structure of rights.”132 If this is correct, as I think
it is, the unreflective watering-down thesis is fatally undermined.

Determining whether a

constitutional right is a right, simpliciter, whose content necessarily is uniform vis-a-vis all polities,
or a right-against-rules, for which a sufficient justification for regulation might vary across different
institutional contexts, requires a highly particularized right-by-right analysis. The claim that
variations across contexts constitute a watering-down of constitutional rights is not compelling.
C. Plausible Justifications for Selective Incorporation and their Relation to One-Size-FitsAll. Having surveyed in the last section several rationales for selective incorporation that do not
justify the adoption of One-Size-Fits-All instead of Tailoring, this section identifies two
justifications for selective incorporation that have been identified by the Court and commentators
that are relevant to the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring. The justifications identify
pragmatic benefits of One-Size-Fits-All. Pragmatic justifications, however, by their nature invite
the taking account of competing considerations and hence typically give rise to non-categorical
rules. So too here: the justifications examined below give rise to a defeasible presumption of OneSize-Fits-All, but they do not support a categorical One-Size-Fits-All mode of selective
incorporation. These justifications fully carry over to those contexts outside the Fourteenth
Amendment when courts must determine whether a multi-level constitutional principle is to be
Tailored or One-Size-Fits-All.
1. Limiting Judicial Discretion. Much of selective incorporation’s success was due
132
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to justifiable dissatisfaction with the fundamental fairness regime that preceded it. Many decisions
under fundamental fairness were criticized as subjective and unpredictable.133 Justices sought a
method for cabining judicial discretion,134 and incorporation held out promise in this regard because
the Bill of Rights terms of “free speech” and “search and seizure” are unquestionably more specific
than “fundamental fairness.”
Limiting judicial discretion in this fashion is sensible. Selective incorporation in effect
means that guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights are presumptively assumed to apply against the
States (in contrast to being categorically presumed to apply, as under total incorporation).
“Fundamentality” still is the touchstone under selective incorporation for determining whether a
given Bill of Rights guarantee applies to the States, and surely there is good sense in concluding that
“what is important enough to have been included within the Bill of Rights has good claim to being
an element of ‘fundamental fairness.’”135
Is it the case, however, that the doctrinal details developed vis-a-vis the federal government
invariably have good claim to being an element of fundamental fairness as well? The answer
depends upon the structure of the constitutional right that is at issue: “yes” as regards a right,
simpliciter, but “not necessarily” with regard to a right-against-rule. With regard to the latter, the
particular legal rule that is utilized to implement a constitutional principle is a function of a host of
contingent factors,136 many of which conceivably could vary across different levels of government.
There is no good reason for categorically presuming that the Legal Test itself is “fundamental.”
133
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It might be responded that even if the doctrinal details at steps 3 and 4 are not themselves
“fundamental,” One-Size-Fits-All still has the great virtue of limiting judicial discretion. This is
true, but the important question is “at what cost?” Judicial discretion would be curtailed if all
constitutional doctrine were replaced by a single, simple legal rule. No one would advocate such a
position because the costs of limiting judicial discretion in this fashion would be too great; doctrinal
complexity is necessitated by the complex competing interests among which constitutional doctrine
must mediate. Selective incorporation’s check on judicial discretion is justifiable only because it
is sensible to conclude that general principles constraining federal powers found in the Bill of Rights
are (presumptively) fundamental and, accordingly, (presumptively137) applicable to the States. If the
same cannot be said about the doctrinal details that were developed in the federal context, then we
cannot be so certain that the benefits of limiting judicial discretion in this regard are worth the costs,
identified in Part IV, of foregoing the option of Tailoring.
In short, though limiting judicial discretion is a very real benefit, it is a pragmatic
consideration that is not a categorical trump. The interest in limiting judicial discretion may well
justify a presumption of One-Size-Fits-All, but it cannot justify a categorical rule of One-Size-FitsAll.
2. Judicial Administration. A second justification for selective incorporation is that
it facilitates judicial administration.138

It was very difficult for States to know what was

constitutionally required of them under fundamental fairness because the Court refused to generate
broadly applicable legal principles.139 Instead, the Court’s holdings were highly context specific.
137
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For example, the Court held that whether disallowing a criminal defendant in state court from
having an attorney violated fundamental fairness turned on such fact-specific variables as the
severity of the imposed sentence and the defendant’s capacity to defend herself.140 This offered
States precious little guidance. The selective incorporation adopted by the Court – that is, of the OneSize-Fits-All variety – had the benefit of making an already-developed and readily ascertained body
of doctrine applicable to the States. State officials accordingly had a ready body of constitutional
doctrine to consult that told them what the Fourteenth Amendment required.
Similar to the benefit of limiting judicial discretion, facilitating judicial administration is a
very real good but is only one among many considerations that informs constitutional doctrine. A
single rule applicable to all governmental actions would be the simplest to administer, but it would
come at too great a cost to concerns of fairness, democracy, and so forth. For this reason, the
pragmatic consideration of judicial administration does not support a categorical rule of One-SizeFits-All. On the other hand, it does strongly counsel against wholly jettisoning the One-Size-Fits-All
framework.
*****************************************************
*****
To conclude, except with regard to constitutional rights that qualify as rights, simpliciter,
there are no principled justifications for a categorical One-Size-Fits-All rule. There are, however,
two powerful pragmatic justifications for One-Size-Fits-All: limiting judicial discretion and
improving judicial administrability. Parts III and IV will show, however, that there are powerful
countervailing considerations that may justify Tailoring in some cases. Taken together, this Article’s
140
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analysis suggests that contemporary doctrine should be modified as follows: today’s One-Size-FitsAll doctrine should be downgraded from a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.

III.

A QUASI -PRECEDENTIAL ARGUMENT : THAT TAILORING IS NOT UNKNOWN TO AMERICAN

JURISPRUDENCE
Though One-Size-Fits-All is the dominant doctrinal paradigm today, Tailoring is not absent
from American jurisprudence. Tailoring has been advanced by Justices Holmes, Jackson, Harlan,
Fortas, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Thomas. Moreover, several contemporary
constitutional doctrines reflect the logic of Tailoring, though they are not typically conceptualized
in that way. Further, a very recent decision of the Court was decided on a rationale that reflects the
institution-sensitive logic that underwrites Tailoring. Finally, many statutory rules vary in their
application depending upon the level of government that is being regulated. The fact that Tailoring
already is part of our juridical landscape should cushion concern about this Article’s argument: the
quasi-precedent for Tailoring makes clear that the Article does not seek to introduce a wholly foreign
element of constitutional analysis, but instead advocates a willingness to expanding a methodology
already present in American law.
A.

Early Influential Support for Tailoring. Though the federal government and the States

generally were subject to different constitutional limitations during the era of Fundamental Fairness,
the opinions in those cases did not generate particularly searching rationales for the differential
treatment as between the federal and state governments. One-Size-Fits-All treatment was not then
deemed to be a serious option on account of the fact that the federal and state governments were
deemed to be governed by different constitutional language. Virtually all cases decided during the
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Fundamental Fairness era accordingly are not examples of Tailoring.
However, even during the heyday of Fundamental Fairness, the Court utilized an approach
virtually indistinguishable from “selective and undifferentiated” incorporation vis-a-vis many First
Amendment guarantees.141 One-Size-Fits-All was a serious doctrinal contender – indeed, it won the
day in this context – sparking dissents that generated the most sophisticated judicial expositions to
date concerning the logic of Tailoring. Justice Holmes penned one of the first of these in the 1925
case of Gitlow v. People of the State of New York.142 The case concerned a free speech challenge to
a state statute that criminalized the advocacy of anarchy, and the majority applied the doctrines
developed in the federal context without explanation or justification. Justice Holmes criticized this
in his dissent, writing as follows:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as
there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of
interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought
to govern the laws of the United States.143

This text-based argument was all that Holmes had to say on the matter, but the message was clear:
the principle of free speech might apply differently to the States than it applies to the federal
government.144
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The next significant discussion of Tailoring appears in Justice Jackson’s dissent in
Beauharnais v. People of the State of Illinois,145 which famously upheld a State’s group libel statute.
Jackson’s analysis focused on the different institutional characteristics of the federal and state
governments and hence works well with a right-against-rule conception of constitutional rights.
Jackson argued that the state and federal governments are meaningfully different in respect of
determining what activities are constitutionally permitted to each: “The inappropriateness of a single
standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and
duties in relation to those freedoms.”146 He then proceeded to explain why the federal and state
governments are differently situated as regards the regulation of libel:
Criminality of defamation is predicated upon power either to protect the private right to
enjoy integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquility. Neither of these are objects
of federal cognizance except when necessary to the accomplishment of some delegated
power . . . . When the Federal Government puts liberty of press on one scale, it has a very
limited duty to personal reputation or local tranquility to weigh against it in the other. But
state action affecting speech or press can and should be weighed against and reconciled with
these conflicting social interests.147

These differences led Jackson to conclude that the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee should
be Tailored to the the federal and state governments:
For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to the Federal Government
such latitude as I think a State reasonably may require for orderly government of its
manifold concerns. The converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of
the State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power.148

Justice Harlan was the next member of the Court to offer a full-blown defense of Tailoring
(or, as he called it, opposition to “jot-for-jot” incorporation of the Bill of Rights149). His position was
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developed over numerous dissenting opinions.150 Roth v. United States151 contains one of his clearest
expositions of Tailoring, and has been relied upon by many subsequent Supreme Court Justices.152
The ideas developed there are not appreciably different from Justice Jackson’s approach in
Beauharnais: Harlan argued that the state and federal governments have different substantive powers
and interests, and therefore that “[w]hether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld
because it subserves a paramount governmental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend on
whether that government has, under the Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power
to act, in the particular area involved.”153
Harlan advanced two additional justifications for Tailoring in his other dissenting and
concurring opinions on the subject. First, in the spirit of Justice Brandeis’s New State Ice dissent,154
Justice Harlan praised the fact that each State can serve as an independent “experimental social
laborator[y]” that can experiment with “novel techniques of social control.”155 Harlan thought that
there was an “immense advantage” of having “separate centers for such experimentation,” and
argued that there was “no overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment” so long as there was
“no uniform nation-wide” regulation.156

Justice Harlan argued that the possibility of
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experimentation, in the absence of severe risk due to the fact that other States can be expected to
legislate differently, was a reason to treat State legislation differently than federal legislation for
purposes of constitutional analysis.157
Conversely, Justice Harlan argued that there are far greater “dangers to free thought and
expression . . . if the Federal Government imposes a blanket ban over the nation on such a book”
than if a State does because a federal would bar all American citizens from accessing the proscribed
publication.158 A federal ban also destroys “[t]he prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of
morality.”159 The greater dangers inherent in federal regulation accordingly justify a constitutional
regime under which the federal government would be subject to more stringent constitutional
limitations than States, meaning that States could ban materials that the federal government could
not in Harlan’s view.
These opinions of Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan are the most sophisticated treatments of
Tailoring in the judicial corpus, and numerous Justices have drawn upon them in their advocacy of
Tailoring particular constitutional doctrines. For example, in a concurring opinion in Duncan v.
Louisiana,160 Justice Fortas cited to Harlan’s opinions when writing that “[n]either logic nor history
nor the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to require that the
Sixth Amendment or its jury trial provision be applied to the States together with the total gloss that
this Court’s decisions have supplied.”161 Justice Powell similarly relied heavily on Harlan’s
arguments when he advocated Tailoring the Double Jeopardy Clause and several Sixth Amendment
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protections.162

Justice Rehnquist relied on Homes, Jackson, and Harlan when he argued in a

concurrence in Buckley v. Valeo163 that “not all the strictures which the First Amendment imposes
upon Congress are carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather it is only
the ‘general principle’ of free speech . . . that the latter incorporates.”164 Justice Thomas relied on
the same set of Justices in his concurring opinion in the Zelman decision,165 where he wrote that “in
the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on
different terms than similar action by the Federal Government.”166
Neither Justices Fortas nor Powell nor Rehnquist nor Thomas have advanced the theory
behind Tailoring; their opinions are wholly derivative of the arguments developed by Justices
Holmes, Jackson, and Harlan. But these opinions of Fortas, Powell, Rehnquist, and Thomas
demonstrate that Tailoring’s logic is not foreign to modern Supreme Court justices.
B. Contemporary Constitutional Decisions That Reflect the Logic of Tailoring. There are
other recent cases in which Justices have accepted the logic of Tailoring. Some are majority
decisions. Several of these decisions have won the support of liberal Justices. This shows that
Tailoring is not just a tool of conservative jurisprudence, notwithstanding the fact that to date
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Tailoring has been advocated primarily by right-leaning Justices.
A tantalizingly simple lesson emerges from a study of the instances where individual Justices
or the Court has been willing to Size. Tailoring is invoked when Justices believe that two levels of
government are sufficiently different to merit different constitutional treatment. To be sure, the
Court has not identified a determinate set of principles to identify when sufficient differences are
present. Nevertheless, the practical, functional analysis that leads to judicial willingness to engage
in Tailoring is black letter predicate for Part IV’s examination of generic reasons for treating the
different levels of government differently.
1. Federal Affirmative Action Programs. One of the most sustained recent defenses
of Tailoring can be found in Justice Stevens’ dissent in the case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.167 The majority opinion in Adarand replaced a rare instance of Tailoring with a One-Size-FitsAll approach. Prior to Adarand, state affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny168
whereas federal programs only had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the rule announced in
Metro Broadcasting.169

The Adarand majority identified what it labeled the principle of

“congruence” – the requirement that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”170 – to reverse Metro Broadcasting.171 In its place,
Adarand established that federal and state affirmative action programs are to be analyzed under
identical legal standards.172
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515 U .S. 200 (1995 ).
This was the rule announced in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U .S. 469 (1989 ).
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See Metro B roadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 -65 (1990).
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U .S. 1, 93 (1976)).
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
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The principle of “congruence” announced in Adarand accordingly is an example of OneSize-Fits-All in the particular context of equal protection doctrine. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, dissented with regard to the principle of congruence:
The Court’s concept of ‘congruence’ assumes that there is no significant difference between
a decision by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative-action program and
such a decision by a State or a municipality. In my opinion that assumption is untenable.
It ignores important practical and legal differences between federal and state or local
decisionmakers.173

The majority in Adarand relied exclusively on a quotation from the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo
in support of its principle of congruence,174 but Justice Stevens demonstrated that the majority
ignored many subsequent decisions in which the Court had found that there were constitutionally
relevant differences between the federal and sub-federal polities with regard to the application of
equal protection principles.175 The Adarand majority was content to rely on what fairness suggests
was insufficient precedent – it was insufficient because there was more recent countervailing
precedent – and did not feel it necessary to engage in a substantive exchange of views with Justice
Stevens’ several arguments as to why the federal and sub-federal governments were sufficiently
different so as to justify subjecting them to different legal tests.
Justice Stevens provided three arguments against the One-Size-Fits-All approach of the
“congruence” doctrine. First, as a purely textual matter, the federal government’s “legislative powers
concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth Amendment.”176 Stevens then
provided two arguments as to why the Congress has a “special institutional competence” not enjoyed
by the sub-federal polities with regard to matters of race.177 Quoting from Scalia’s separate opinion
173

Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U .S. 1, 93 (1976)).
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See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 249-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Croson is one such op inion. See Croson, 488
U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Id. at 250.
177
Id. at 249-50 (internal quotation omitted).
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in the Croson case, Stevens first explained Congress’s special capability by drawing on Madison’s
famous discussion of factions from Federalist No. 10:
[R]acial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state and
local than at the federal level. To the children of the Founding Fathers, this should come
as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression from political
factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very beginning of our national
history.178

It is sensible to impose greater review on sub-federal racial classifications than federal
classifications, Stevens argued, because of the greater potential for discrimination that exists at the
sub-federal level.179 Third, Stevens explained that “greater deference [should be given] to the
National Legislature than to a local lawmaking body [because] federal affirmative-action programs
represent the will of our entire Nation’s elected representatives, whereas a state or local program may
have an impact on nonresident entities who played no part in the decision to enact it.”180
Justice Stevens provided one additional argument on behalf of Tailoring in his Adarand
dissent that did not have any application to the issue in the case. Stevens quoted dictum from the
majority opinion he authored in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong181 to the effect that “the two protections
[the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses] are not always coextensive. Not only
does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding
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Id. at 251(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia (and Stevens) thereafter quoted from
the Federalist No. 10: “The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing
it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party, and the
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more easily will they concert and execute their plan of oppression. Extend th e sph ere and you ta ke in a grea ter variety
of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens . . .” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
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Id. at 250 )(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is a representation-reinforcement type justification of the
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national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an
individual State.”182 This rationale is quite close to the justification for Tailoring that was offered
by Justices Jackson and Harlan.183
I do not mean to suggest that Justice Stevens’ conclusion necessarily was correct in Adarand.
It does seem, however, that the precedential and functional arguments he advanced for treating the
federal and state governments differently from the federal government as regards affirmative-action
programs merited a serious response – something the majority opinion neglected to provide.
2.

Property-based Franchise.

Continuing with this Article’s review of

contemporary examples of Tailoring, let us turn to the guarantee of equal protection that prohibits
both the federal government and States from conditioning a citizen’s right to vote on property
ownership under the principle of one-person, one-vote.184 The Court held in Ball v. James,185
however, that there are types of local government that while subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause186 are not barred from utilizing a property-based franchise. This is true, for
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Adarand, 515 U.S. at 253 & n. 8 (Steve ns, J., dissenting), quoting Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100. The remainder of
the quotation reads as follows: “On the othe r hand , when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as
the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when there is no special national interest involved, the Due
Proc ess Clause has been construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection Clause.” Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 253 & n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100. While this generally is descriptively true,
this Article suggests an alternative justification for Tailoring that would support Tailoring in a broader range of
circumstances. To be completely clear, the point of Part II of this Article is to identify some instances of Tailoring in
contemporary constitutional law not for the purp ose of suggesting that Tailoring should be limited to like circumstances,
but to show that Tailoring is not completely unknown to our constitutional jurisprudence.
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See supra Part III(A). Justice S tevens, howe ver, did not refer to those opinions, nor that of Ho lmes, in the course
of his dissent in Adarand or his opinion for the Court in Hampton. Perhaps Justice Stevens did not believe that opinions
concerning incorporation were relevant to the re verse incorp oratio n issues ra ised in Hampton and Adarand. The analysis
provided in this Article, however, suggests that the incorporation issues addressed by Holm es, Jackson, and Harlin and
the reverse inco rporation q uestions raise the same conc eptua l questio n: are the different lvels of go vernm ent sufficiently
different to justify Tailoring? It stands to reason that the case law found in one context may be illuminating to the other.
Part IV of this Article shows this to be the case.
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See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (19 64).
185
451 U.S. 355 (1981). This was not the first time the Co urt had so held . See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare La ke B asin
W ater Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (19 73).
186
See Ball, 45 U.S. at 371.
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example, of water reclamation districts187 and business improvement districts.188
In this circumstance, the Tailoring occurs as between “general” state and federal
governments, on the one hand, and “special-purpose unit[s] of government,” on the other.189 With
respect to our model of constitutional doctrine, deviation occurs at levels 3 and 4, such that although
1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government) and
2.S(general government) = 2.S(special-purpose government),
it is the case that
3.S(general government) 3.S(special-purpose government), and
4.S(general government) 4.S(special-purpose government).
This is an example of Tailoring: although the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause
applies to both general and special-purpose governments (1.S(general government) = 1.S(special-purpose government)),
it applies differently to each. More specifically, 3.S(general government) is heightened scrutiny,190 which
under 4.S(general government) includes the requirement of one-person, one-vote. By contrast, 3.S(special-purpose
government)

is the far more deferential requirement that the voting scheme “bear[] a reasonable

relationship to its statutory objectives.”191 The one-person, one-vote requirement simply is not part
of 4.S(special-purpose government). All that is necessary under 4.S(special-purpose government) is a showing that “the
effect of the entity’s operations on [those with the right to vote] was disproportionately greater than
the effect on those seeking the vote.”192
The Court justified its decision to Tailor equal protection on the basis of the different
institutional characters of the two types of governments. The Court concluded that “special-purpose
187

See id.
See, e.g., Lane v. Town of Oyster Bay, 603 N .Y.S.2d 53, 54 (N .Y. App. 199 3).
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units” of government are sufficiently different from “general” governments to merit different
constitutional treatment. Because special-purpose units of government “affect[] definable groups
of constituents more than other constituents” it is permissible to allow only those primarily affected
to vote.193 To be sure, it can be exceedingly difficult to distinguish these two categories; Ball in fact
is one such case.194 The important point is that there is precedent supporting the principle that
identical constitutional language may apply differently to two levels of State government when each
level is sufficiently different to merit differential treatment.
3.

Separation-of-Powers Tailoring. The Court recently adopted the same

institutionally sensitive analysis with regard to an analogous issue that might be dubbed “separation
of powers” Tailoring: the question of whether constitutional limitations on the legislature seamlessly
transfer to the judiciary. The defendant in the 2001 case of Rogers v. Tennessee,195 who had been
convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the basis that the victim had died more than a year
and a day after the defendant had stabbed him. At the time of the stabbing Tennessee unquestionably
had a common-law “year and a day rule,” which precluded conviction of murder unless a victim had
died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act.196 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
abolished the “year and a day rule” and applied a new rule to the defendant,197 upholding the
conviction despite the fact that 15 months had elapsed between infliction of the stab wounds and the
victim’s death.198
The question in Rogers was whether such retroactivity was constitutional. The Ex Post Facto
193

Id. at 363.
The dissent does a go od job o f explaining why. See id. at 374, 377-85 (W hite, J., dissenting).
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532 U .S. 451 (2001 ).
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Clause by its terms applies only to State legislatures,199 and the Rogers Court assumed that the
Clause would have been violated if the Tennessee legislature had abolished the year and a day rule
after the defendant had stabbed his victim.200 Language from a 1964 Supreme Court decision
declared that state legislatures and state judiciaries should be treated no differently in this regard; the
Court in Bouie v. City of Columbia201 stated that “[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing . . . a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due
Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.”202 Bouie hence
adopted a One-Size-Fits-All approach to separation of powers as regards the retroactivity of criminal
rules.
Notwithstanding Bouie, the majority in Rogers opted for a rule that treated the state
legislature and judiciary divergently.203 The Rogers Court explicitly rejected the One-Size-Fits-All
approach, referring to it using Justice Harlan’s “jot-for-jot” terminology and stating that “nowhere
in the [Bouie] opinion did we go so far as to incorporate jot-for-jot the specific categories of Calder
into due process limitations on the retroactive application of judicial decisions.”204 The
jurisprudential model developed earlier in the Article facilitates an appreciation of precisely where
199

See U.S. C ONST . A RT . I, §10, CL . 1 (“[n]o State shall . . . pass any ex post facto Law.”).
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There was a most unusual split in the Rogers decisio n. Justice O ’Connor’s m ajority opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that was joined by Justices
Stevens and Thoma s and by Justice Breyer in p art. Justice Breyer also penned a separate dissent. See id. at 451.
204
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459. The Rogers majority was technically correct to the extent that the Bo uie Court’s language
was dictum , as the majority held. Id. On the other hand, one can hardly imagine a clearer signal of the Co urt’s
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provides a strong argument that this aspect of Bo uie was part of the decisio n’s rationale. See id. at 469 (Scalia, J.,
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the doctrines deviate. To begin, there were differences at Step 1; the Court noted that while the Ex
Post Facto Clause applied to state legislatures, the state judiciary was limited only by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process requirement.205

With regard to Step 2, the Rogers Court expressly

concluded that both the Ex Post Facto Clause and due process nevertheless shared the identical Goal,
stating that it was “undoubtedly correct” that “the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses safeguard
common interests – in particular, the interests in fundamental fairness (through notice and fair
warning) and the prevention of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws.”206 Deviation also
occurred at steps 3 and 4 in the doctrine, the levels of Standard and rulified Standard: while the
legislature is precluded from making any change in the criminal law subsequent to the criminal act
that works to the defendant’s disadvantage,207 the judiciary is prevented only from making
unforeseeable changes.208 To graphically summarize,
1.S(legislature) 1.S(judiciary),
2.S(legislature) = 2.S(judiciary),
3.S(legislature) 3.S(judiciary), and
4.S(legislature) 4.S(judiciary).
The Rogers Court then held that because the year and a day rule was “widely viewed as an outdated
relic of the common law,” it “was not unexpected and indefensible” for the Tennessee Supreme
Court to abolish it.209 The Court accordingly upheld the defendant’s conviction.210
The Rogers majority elected to treat the legislature and judiciary differently – what might be

205
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termed “Tailoring” along the dimension of separation of powers rather than federalism – due to the
“important institutional and contextual differences between legislating, on the one hand, and
common law decisionmaking, on the other.”211 The Court provided two reasons why the two
institutions were meaningfully different for constitutional purposes. First, constitutional constraints
on the judiciary could be less strict because courts are less susceptible to “political influences and
pressures” since they only “constru[e] existing law in actual litigation.”212 Second, because the
judiciary is responsible for the case-by-case development of the law, Calder’s absolute brake on
retroactivity would “unduly impair the incremental and reasoned development of precedent that is
the foundation of the common law system.”213 Whether or not one agrees with the Rogers Court’s
ultimate disposition, the following methodological conclusion is incontestable: the Court justified
its holding by carefully considering the institutional character of each governmental entity. The
Court refused to reflexively import doctrines developed in the legislative context to the judiciary,
notwithstanding dictum in the Bouie decision that said such a One-Size-Fits-All approach was
appropriate.
The Rogers Court analysis, and its treatment of Bouie, are precedent for the methodology
advocated in this Article. Bouie was decided in 1964, in the midst of the Court’s ongoing rejection
of “fundamental fairness” and embrace of selective incorporation. In that era, the conclusion that
a constitutional guarantee

was incorporated invariably was followed by the unexplained

determination that all doctrines developed in the federal context naturally applied to the States in
equal measure.214 Bouie is part of that historical context. Rogers is a more reflective analysis of
211
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what precisely is imported from one context to another during the process of incorporation. The
context- sensitive institutional analysis utilized by the Rogers majority is precisely the sort of
approach that this Article suggests is appropriate in the more usual situation of “federalism”
incorporation.
To be sure, the Rogers Court’s institution-sensitive analysis runs up against far less
precedent than Tailoring in the federalism context would, for there have been very few cases that
have considered how constitutional principles transfer across the different branches of government.
The policy reasons for engaging in institutional-sensitive analysis, however, are identical in both
“federalism” and “separation of powers” incorporation: two institutions might be sufficiently
different to justify differential treatment as a constitutional matter. While adopting the functional
analysis of the Rogers variety in the context of “federalism” incorporation certainly would require
that the Court revisit a methodology of One-Size-Fits-All that it has applied and discussed in many
decisions, this precedent should not foreclose the possibility of Tailoring. The justifications for a
categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach are deficient (Part II), and there are strong policy reasons to
conclude that Tailoring may be advantageous (Part IV). Under these circumstances, the Court’s
recent willingness to utilize institutionally-sensitive analysis in Rogers is instructive to “federalism”
incorporation. Precedent can be honored without ignoring Tailoring’s potential benefits by
downgrading the categorical One-Size-Fits-All approach that characterizes contemporary doctrine
to a rebuttable presumption that could take account of the varying institutional characteristics of the
different levels of government.
4.

Dormant Commerce Clause. Dormant commerce clause doctrine also fits the
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Tailoring paradigm. Dormant commerce clause limitations apply only to the States, not Congress.215
Consequently, Congress can enact protectionist legislation whereas States may not.216 This
differential treatment of the States and the federal governments thus fits the paradigm of Tailoring.

It could be argued, however, that dormant commerce clause doctrine is not an example of
Tailoring. The dormant commerce clause does not illustrate a judicial determination to treat the
States and federal governments differently, some might say, because the doctrine applies only where
Congress has not acted.217 The dormant commerce clause only limits the States and accordingly does
not fit the Tailoring paradigm.
For some readers, this formal argument might definitively establish Tailoring’s irrelevance
to the dormant commerce clause. I view the matter differently. The mere fact that constitutional
language addresses only one level or branch of government has not prevented migration of the
constitutional principle to other levels or branches of government. For instance, equal protection
principles have been applied to the federal government despite the fact that the equal protection
clause by its terms applies only to States,218 and retroactivity principles have been applied to the state
judiciary despite the fact that the ex post facto clause applies only to state legislatures.219 If explicit
215

See Maine v. Taylor, 47 7 U .S. 13 1, 13 8 (1986 ) (“It is well estab lished that Co ngress may au thorize the States to
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216
See The statement above in text simplifies matters a bit. There is a virtually per se rule aga inst protectionist state
legislation, not an abso lute pro hibition. See Maine v. T aylor, 477 U .S. 13 1 (1986 ). There is no limitation as regards
protectionism whatsoever, ho wever, on fed eral legislation. See id. at 138.
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constitutional language addressing only a particular level or branch of government does not prevent
the export of constitutional principles to other levels or branches, it follows a fortiori that
constitutional principles lacking an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, such as those found in
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, in principle could be exported to other levels of
government. For instance, many have identified the dormant commerce clause with a principle of
non-discrimination,220 and it is quite conceivable that some such principle could be applied to acts
of Congress.
If this is right, then formal grounds alone cannot explain why dormant commerce clause
limitations have not been exported to the federal government. The Court and commentators indeed
have provided an explanation that focuses on the different institutional characteristics of federal and
state governments. Concerns that are present when states legislate are absent, or at least are far less
pronounced, when the Congress acts. The dormant commerce clause “permits Congress to legislate
on certain matters of national importance while denying power to the States in this area for fear of
undue impact upon out-of-state residents.”221 The Congress is differently situated than state
legislatures vis-a-vis the imposition of costs on unrepresented outsiders because Congress is
composed of representatives from all States.222
Donald Regan, an influential commentators on the dormant commerce clause, has argued
that the doctrine is primarily concerned with guarding against “protectionist” legislation that is
designed to “improv[e] the competitive position of in-state economic actors at the expense of their
220
See Donald H . Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Comm erce
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infra Part IV.A(1).
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See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U .S. 761, 767-68, n.2 (1945 ).

62

out-of-state competitors.”223 “Such behavior,” Regan argues, “has no place in a genuine political
union of any kind” because it is “inconsistent with the very idea of political union.”224 Such
protectionist behavior, it has been argued, “expresses a constitutionally impermissible attitude
toward the interests of other States in the political union.”225 To the extent protectionism in this
sense is the problem addressed by the dormant commerce clause, an institutional analysis suggests
that it is sensible that the doctrine limits only the States. The centrifugal, nation-shattering impulse
giving rise to protectionist legislation is far less likely to be found in the halls of the national
legislature than in state houses insofar as national legislators are more likely than their state
counterparts to keep the national interest in mind. Furthermore, parochial tendencies are less likely
to prevail in the national legislature, where the parties who would be injured by protectionism have
representatives to protect their interests.
In sum, that dormant commerce clause limitations have not migrated from the States to the
federal government is best understood at least partly in institutional terms. The federal and state
governments are different in ways that make it unnecessary for there to be dormant commerce
clause-type checks on the Congress. As a result, under the dormant commerce, the federal
government is permitted to do things that the States cannot – yet another contemporary instance of
Tailoring.
5.

Apportionment and other Methods for Enhancing the Political Power of

Numerical Minorities. Many constitutional principles that relate to the weight of each individual’s
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vote have not migrated from the States to the federal government and visa-versa. The two levels of
government accordingly are treated differently under the Constitution and are thus additional
contemporary examples of Tailoring.
(a) Area-Based Apportionment. The most significant variation between the
federal government and the States concerns the permissibility of apportionment on the basis of
criteria that generate voting districts of unequal populations.

The United States Senate is

apportioned not on a population basis, but on an area-basis.226 The Court has held that every State,
however, must structure its legislature so that all the members of each house represent substantially
the same number of people.227 Indeed, the Court struck down a state scheme that apportioned one
of its legislative houses on an area-basis akin to the United States Senate.228
Area-based apportionment hence is yet another instance where the federal and state
governments are treated differently: it is permissible for the federal government, but not the States.
Indeed, the scope of the deviation is unusually large. Variation occurs at the first step in doctrinal
development: the Court in essence held that the “equal population” aspect of the equal protection
principle does not apply to the federal government, despite the fact that virtually all other
components of equal protection are reverse incorporated against the federal government.
One might be tempted to conclude that the fact that the federal and state governments are
regulated by different constitutional provisions (the States by the equal protection clause, the federal
government by Article I, § 3, which creates the U.S. Senate) means that area-based apportionment
226
See U.S. C ONST . A RT . I, § 3. E ach State has two senators, regardless of population. “[T]he ratio of overrepr esenta tion of the least populated state, Wyoming, to the most populous state, California, is just under 70 to 1.”
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is not an example of Tailoring at all insofar as there is no constitutional principle common to both
levels of government that is being Tailored. As explained in relation to the dormant commerce
clause,229 however, such formal differences alone cannot explain the failure of the constitutional
principles to migrate,230 for other constitutional principles that by their terms applied to only one
level or branch of government have migrated. Other factors accordingly must account for the
different treatment of the federal and state governments. The Court repeatedly has rejected the socalled “federal analogy” as being “inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting
schemes,”231 explaining that the federal system was “conceived out of compromise and concession
indispensable to the establishment of our federal republic” and arose from “unique historical
circumstances.”232 It is an open question whether this is sufficient to justify the differential
treatment.233 In any event, what is relevant for present purposes is not the wisdom of any particular
example of Tailoring, but the fact of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law.
(b) State Analogs to the Electoral College. The electoral college is another
system that deviates from population-based voting.234 Under the electoral college that selects the
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See supra at p. 56.
Tw o patterns of m igration could have o ccurred. First, the fact that so ce ntral a political institution as the S enate
does not rely o n populatio n-base d apportionment could have be en relied upon for the principle that Am erican dem ocracy,
and equa l protection b y extensio n, does not require the States to have p opulation-based apportionment. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 298 -300 , 308 (1962)(Ha rlan, J., dissenting) (making this argument). Co nverse ly, the equal pro tection
principle of population-based apportionment could have been applied to the fede ral gov ernment on the theo ry that Article
I, §3 was altered by the later ena cted F ourteenth Amendme nt. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 6566 (1996)(holding that Congress can subject States to suit in federal courts for violation of federal law enacted pursuant
to §5 o f the Fourteenth Amendment, but not Article I, because the §5 altered the earlier-enacted Eleventh Amendment).
The former is the more likely of the two insofar as the latter would constitute an extraordinary alteration of our country’s
political structure. On the other hand, powerful normative arguments have been formulated in opposition to area-based
app ortionment. See, e.g., D A H L, H O W D EM O CRAT IC ?, supra note 2 25, at 46-50; id. at 144-45.
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Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 573 ; see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 , 378 (1963 ).
232
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574.
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See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Genera l Assem bly, 377 U.S. 713, 745 -46 (1 964 ) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr,
369 U .S. 186, 298-300, 30 8 (1962 )(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 , 376-77 (196 3).
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President, each State has a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which it is entitled in the Congress.235 Because the Senate is not apportioned on
a population basis, the ratio of Electors among the States is not equal to the ratio of the populations
among the States.236 For this reason, among others,237 the results of voting in the electoral college
can diverge from the popular vote.
The Court has held that States, however, may not use a voting system analogous to the
Electoral College for the election of state officials.238 Georgia had a “county unit system,” under
which counties were allotted units on the basis of their population. The majority in each county
determined which primary candidate would be allotted the county’s unit.239 Because the units were
not allocated on a linear population basis, the units were not proportional to population. As a result,
rural votes were weighted more heavily than urban votes.240 A three-judge United States District
Court upheld the Georgia system to the extent that “the disparity against any county is not in excess
of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation.”241 The
Supreme Court found the analogy to the electoral college to be “inapposite” because it was “the
result of specific historical concerns.”242 Irrespective of the fact that equal protection principles do
not disqualify the Electoral system, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause rendered
235

See U.S. C ONST . A RT . II, §1, cl. 2.
The number of Representatives also diverges from a strict population basis due, among other reasons, to the
constitutional requirements that all States have at least one Representative and that no congression al district cross state
lines. See U.S. Dep ’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U .S. 44 2, 44 7-48 (1992).
237
Another crucial reason is that Electors are awarded on a winner-take-all basis at each State.
238
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 378-81.
239
The voting scheme was complex. T o be nominated for office, candidates fo r statewid e office w ere required to
receive a majority of both the popular and unit votes. If no candidate received both, a second run-off primary was
required between the candidate that received the most popular votes and the one that received the most unit votes. The
cand idate with the highest num ber o f unit votes would pre vail. See id. at 372.
240
Id. at 372-73.
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Id. at 378 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 ).
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Id. at 378.
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Georgia’s analog to the Electoral system unconstitutional. Regardless of whether the Court’s
proffered distinction is persuasive or not, the electoral college system accordingly stands as yet
another example of constitutional principles applying differently to the federal and state
governments.243
(c)

Population-Based Apportionment. Tailoring also is manifested in the

differences between States’ duties regarding intrastate districting and Congress’ duties vis-a-vis
interstate districting. State legislatures are responsible for drawing congressional districts for the
House of Representatives (intrastate districting). Congress is responsible for determining the number
of Representatives that each State has (interstate districting).

Intrastate districts drawn by state

legislatures are subject to a strict requirement that they be of equal populations.244 The relevant
constitutional language is Article I, §2, clause 1, which requires that Representatives be chosen “by
the people of the several States.” The Court has construed this to “require the States to pursue
equality in representation,”245 which in turn has been interpreted as dictating that States make “‘a
good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality’ within each State.”246 Population
deviations across intrastate districts of as little as one percent have been struck down as violating this
constitutional requirement of equality.247
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The Co urt declared that “all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may
be in [a] geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept
of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but eq uality among those who meet the
basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor
of one of several comp eting candidates, underlies many of our decisions.” Id. at 379-80. This logic would suggest that
the electoral college violates equal protection, and the Court in Gray offered no explanation as to why the electoral
college is exempted.
244
See U.S. Dep’t of Comm erce v. Montana, 503 U .S. 442, 460 (199 2).
245
U.S. Dep’t of Comm erce v. Montana, 503 U .S. 44 2, 46 1 (1992 ); see also id. at 460 (referring to the principle of
“equal representation for equal numbers of people”).
246
Id. at 463 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 , 530-31 (196 9)) (emphasis omitted).
247
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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The Court in United States Department of Commerce v. Montana248 was confronted with the
question whether Congress is held to the same standards in interstate districting to which States are
subject in intrastate districting. The precise textual question was whether Article I, §2, clause 3's
requirement that Representatives be apportioned among the several States “according to their
respective Numbers”“embodies the same principle of equality” that applies to the States.249 A
majority of a three-judge District Court had decided that Congress’ interstate districting
determinations were subject to the same requirements as the States’ intradistricting decisions,
meaning that “the only population variances that are acceptable are those that are ‘unavoidable
despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.’”250
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion, concluding that
Congress’ apportionment method “commands far more deference than a state districting decision
. . .”251 The doctrinal variation across the federal and state governments accordingly occurs at step
3, such that 3.F

3.S.252 These variations are particularly striking in light of the fact that the Court

derived the districting duties incumbent on both the federal and state governments from the same
section of the Constitution: Article I, §2.
Once again, the Court pointed to institutional differences between the States and the federal
government to explain why doctrinal variations were appropriate. Though intrastate and interstate
248

503 U .S. 442 (1992 ).
Id. at 461.
250
Id. at 446 (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531).
251
Id. at 464 . While it is difficult to disc ern the precise standard to which the Co urt subject Congress’ interstate
districting decisions, it uncontroversially was far less searching than what the States are subject to. The fact of such
Tailoring is all that matters for present purposes.
252
W hile it is difficult to discern the precise standard to which the Court subject Congress’ interstate districting
decisions, see id. at 464-66, it clearly was far less searching than what the States are subject to. See id. at 459-61. The
mere fact that the federal and state governm ents were subject to varying constitutional stand ards – that is, that the
principle of “equal representation” was Tailored as between them – is all that matters for present purposes, that is, for
displaying instances of Tailoring in contemporary constitutional law.
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districting both are directed at creating equality in representation, the Court ruled that equality
means different things across the different institutional contexts of interstate and intrastate
districting. At the level of intrastate districting, the requirement of numerical equality is a
straightforward concept. Drawing district lines so districts contain equal populations is a task that
does not require any tradeoffs because it is driven by a single criterion. The Court concluded that
“equality” is a more complex a notion at the interstate level. Because the Constitution itself requires
that each State have at least one Representative and forbids the creation of congressional districts
that cross state lines,253 it almost always is impossible to ensure that congressional districts across
all States are of equal size. Because of these limitations, there are multiple, mutually incompatible
conceptions of “equality” that an interstate districting scheme could seek to realize. For that reason,
concluded the Court, equality in respect of the federal government’s interstate districting obligation
is an indeterminate concept.
The facts in the Montana case illustrate this. If Montana had prevailed in the litigation and
had been awarded an additional congressional district, then the State of Washington would have lost
one seat. Bringing Montana closer to the “ideal” district – the nation’s population of voters divided
by 435 yields the “ideal” district size of equal population districts across the country – would have
pushed Washington’s eight congressional districts away from the ideal.254 Which would have been
the preferable outcome from the perspective of equality? The Court concluded that there is no
253

See id. at 447-48.
Under the 199 0 census utilized in Montana, the ideal district was 572,466. Under the interstate districting scheme
challenged in that case, Montana’s population of 803,655 comprised one congressional district and the State of
Washington had nine districts that averaged 543,105. If Montana had prevailed, M ontana would have had two districts
with an average population of 401,838 and Washington would have had eight districts averaging 610,993. In other
words, if Montana had prevailed, its districts’ deviations from the ideal district would have gone from 231 ,189 above
the ideal to 170,628 below the ideal, whereas W ashington’s deviation would have gone from 29,361 below the ideal
district to 38,527 above the ideal across its eight remaining congressional districts. Bringing Montana closer to the ideal
district accord ingly would have pushed W ashington’s co ngressional d istricts away from the ideal. See id. at 461-62.
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uncontroversial conception of equality that can determine which interstate districting plan is more
equal, and that great deference accordingly should be given to the federal government’s
determination.255
C. Statutory Examples. This Part of the Article aimed to show that notwithstanding OneSize-Fits-All’s predominance, pockets of American constitutional law already reflect sensitivity to
the different levels of government. An examination of contemporary law’s responsiveness to
different levels of government would be remiss if it failed to refer to the many instances where
statutory law distinguishes between the different levels of government. For example, although States
are exempt from the federal antitrust law,256 municipalities are not.257 Similarly, states may not be
sued under §1983, but municipalities may be.258 Though not direct precedent for constitutional
Tailoring, the statutory examples are further evidence that doctrinal sensitivity to the different levels
of government is not absent from American jurisprudence.

IV. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR TAILORING : THAT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MAY BE
RELEVANTLY DIFFERENT
After having argued in Part II that there is no convincing rationale to support a categorical
255

See id. at 464. What is significant for present purposes is that the Court deemed it necessary to provide an
explanation for why the federal and state governments should be treated differently, not whether the explanation
ultimately is compelling. I m yself am skeptical of the Court’s decision in Mo ntana. While notions of equality are more
complex in interstate districting than intrastate districting, one candidate stands out from the rest as most consistent across
both contexts. The driving principle behind the intrastate district cases is that the weight of each individual’s vote should
be as equal as possible. See Mo ntana, 503 U.S. at 460 (noting the principle of “equal representation for equal numbers
of people”). This is an individual-focused conception of equality that disregards the group to which individuals belong.
Applied to the interstate districting context, it would mean that districting shou ld be perform ed in such a m anner that,
consistent with the limitations that each State have at least one Representative and that no district cross state lines, the
population variances across co ngressional d istricts nationwide is minimized. Such an approach reflects an ind ividualfocused conc eption of eq uality that disregard s the significanc e of group affiliation (such as what State a person is a
citizen of).
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See Parker v. Brown, 317 U .S. 341 (1943 ).
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See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U .S. 389 (1978 ).
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See Mo nell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (197 8).
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One-Size-Fits-All (Part II) and having shown in Part III that numerous Justices have embraced
Tailoring and that several contemporary doctrines are instances of Tailoring, this Part IV provides
a formal analysis of the differences among the different levels of government that may justify
Tailoring. It does not delve into the specifics of what constitutional provisions should be Tailored
and what the resulting context-sensitive doctrines should look like. Part IV instead makes a generic
argument that Tailoring is a sensible option to consider as a prima facie matter. It generates only
a prima facie case for Tailoring, not a definitive case, because there are countervailing costs
associated with Tailoring, which are identified in Part V.
The basis for the prima facie case, however, is surprisingly robust. It turns out that a broad
array of approaches to ordering social life, which typically generate divergent policy prescriptions,
concurs that Tailoring may be sound some of the time. Furthermore, though these different
methodologies do not generate identical conclusions as to what constitutional guarantees should be
Tailored and what the variant doctrines should be, there is considerable overlap in the considerations
they deem relevant to determining when Tailoring is appropriate.
Drawing on these competing methodologies, Part IV identifies five broad respects in which
different levels of government might be sufficiently different to justify Tailoring: (1) the differing
political malfunctions to which each level is susceptible, (2) the distinctive consequences that attend
each level’s geographical scope, (3) the divergent exit costs across the different levels of government
and, correspondingly, the varying extent that efficient and diverse public goods can be generated
through a competition among polities, (4) the varying number of people necessary to garner a
majority and thereby translate their preferences into law, and (5) each polity’s distinctive functions
and responsibilities. The analysis suggests that sometimes the central government ought to be

71

accorded more leeway to regulate than the lower level governments, and visa-versa.
To be clear, Part IV does not argue that any one of the competing approaches to ordering
social life is preferable. The different methodologies rest on different conceptions of personhood
and/or conceptions of the appropriate role of government, and choosing among them is an eminently
political enterprise. Deciding whether or not to expand Tailoring accordingly would appear to turn
on ante-legal commitments that cannot be decided by the Constitution alone.
A.

Different Governmental Malfunctions. Several influential schools of constitutional

theory conceptualize constitutional law largely as a tool for correcting governmental malfunctions.
Many of these analysts have focused on failures in the democratic political process at the legislative
level.259 Others have noted that many constitutional provisions – primarily those concerning
criminal process – aim to keep the executive branch in check by means of prophylactic rules. The
discussion below shows that the presence and extent of the political failures to which constitutional
doctrine is addressed frequently is a function of the level of government that is acting. From the
perspective of malfunction-remedying approaches to constitutionalism, it accordingly would follow
that Tailoring is a sensible approach to consider.
1.

Malfunctions in the Representative Process. With the exception of the “direct

democracy” of initiatives and referendums, polities at all levels of government260 in the United States
are representative democracies. This system can operate successfully only if elected governmental
officials are able to satisfactorily represent the interests of the people. Many theories that understand
constitutional law as a remedy for governmental malfunctions have focused on malfunctions relating
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See, e.g., E LY , supra note 1 79; N EIL K. K OMESAR , L AW ’S L IMITS : T HE R ULE OF L AW AND THE S U P P LY
D EMA ND OF R IGHTS (2001).
260
One further caveat is in order: not all tribal governments function as rep resentative dem ocracies.
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AND

to representation.

It is useful to break these into three types of representation failures: (1) the

absence of representation, (2) under-representation, and (3) over-representation. Careful thought
suggests that many of these failures are a function of a polity’s size. This provides a prima facie
basis under a malfunction-remedying approach to the Constitution for concluding that constitutional
doctrines that remedy failures in the representation process may be amenable to Tailoring.
a. Absence of Representation. Consider first the absence of representation.
A well-known example is political spillover effects, a type of externality. Such spillover effects are
found where a policy pursued by one polity has negative effects on persons in other polities. The
democratic malfunction is that parties who are negatively impacted have severely

limited

opportunities to shape the policies that affect them because they are not members of the political
community adopting the policy and accordingly cannot vote.261 Constitutional law corrects the
problem of negative political externalities by constraining polities from imposing such costs on
political outsiders. Many of these constitutional limitations come from the dormant commerce
clause and Article IV’s privileges and immunities clause.262 For example, the dormant commerce
clause almost categorically disallows states from discriminating against out-of-staters263 and sharply
limits states’ powers to legislate extraterritorially, 264 while the privileges and immunities clause
allows one state to treat citizens from other states differently from its own citizens only for
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In Ely’s terminology, such political outsid ers must rely on insid ers to “virtually represent” their interests. E LY ,
supra note 179, at 82-87 . Such virtual representation will not be adeq uate if the insiders’s interests systematically
diverge from those of the outsiders. Of course, political outsiders typically can lobby and contribute money to the
political campaigns of politicians in whose jurisdictions they do not reside in an effort to have their preferences
accounted for.
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Another limitation com es from the legislative jurisd iction limitations imposed by the due pro cess clause. See
Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Fede ralism, supra note 216, at 871.
263
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U .S. 131, 138, 144 (1 986) (subjecting such state regulations to strict scrutiny).
264
See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 346 (1989). For a full discussion of the dormant commerce
clause’s limitations on extraterritorialism, see Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Fede ralism, supra note 2 16, at 919 -30.
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“substantial reason[s].”265
The political malfunction regarding spillover effects disappears, however, when all affected
parties are members of the political community that enacts the law, for there are no unrepresented
parties in respect of whom there can be spillovers. The problem of political spillover effects
consequently disappears when the Congress acts.266 This helps to justify why the constitutional
principles of non-discrimination grounded in the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and
immunities clause that counteract the political malfunction of spillover effects have not been
“reverse incorporated” against the federal government.267 Accordingly, although one State cannot
discriminate on the basis of citizenship by refusing to allow garbage from another state to be
disposed in its landfills,268 Congress can authorize the states to discriminate against other states’s
garbage.269 In short, the very existence of this particular political failure is a function of the size of
the polity. Consequently, the nature of the Constitution’s limitations vary in this context depending
upon which level of government is acting. In this Article’s parlance, the constitutional principles
of anti-discrimination and anti-extraterritoriality are Tailored.
265
See Lund ing v. N ew Y ork T ax Appe als Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (199 8) (quoting Supreme Court of N.H . v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274 , 284 (1985)). For a full discussio n of the p rivileges and im munities clause, see Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and Fede ralism, supra note 216, at 897-909.
266
This is true at least as far as sp illover effects being imp osed on U .S. citizens is concerned. There of course may
be spillover effects that are felt outside the United States. Various principles of international law, including the principles
of legislative jurisdiction, deal with these types of po litical externalities.
267
The dormant comm erce clause d oes not ap ply to Congress. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U .S. 131, 138 (198 6) (“It
is well established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regu lation that the Co mmerce C lause would
otherwise forbid.”). No case to my knowledge has even contemplated that the privileges and immunities clause’s
principles apply to the federal governme nt. Furthermore, the Supreme Court long has held that the privileges and
immunities clause grants no rights to a citizen as against her ow n State because state residents “at least have a chance
to remedy at the pols any discrimination against them. Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity.” United
Building & C onstruction T rades Council v. M ayor o f Cam den, 465 U.S. 208 , 217 (1984); see generally Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and Fede ralism, supra note 216, at 900-903 (d iscussing cases that establish this principle).
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See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1 978).
269
See New Y ork v. Un ited States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may grant states the right to refuse
to accept another state’s radioactive waste, something that states could not have done on their own without congressional
authorization).
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Similar concerns for spillover effects have led a recent commentator to argue that local
regulations should be subject to stricter scrutiny than state or federal regulations across a wide range
of constitutional property rights.270 Professor William Fischel argues that many constitutional
provisions function as intertemporal commitments by governments. Such commitments encourage
citizens to engage in activities they otherwise would not due to fear that the government will take
the fruits of their labor. Government commitment to keep promises, such as respecting private
property, accordingly encourages investment and development today that yields benefits
tomorrow.271
Fischel argues that smaller governments are more apt to break their promises, and that they
accordingly require heightened judicial review:
Left to their own devices, the smaller republics would discount the welfare of
underrepresented outsiders. Local insiders can use regulation in a way that subverts the
Constitution’s clear commands not to take property without compensation. The larger
republics are less subject to that temptation because the burden of regulation is more likely
to fall on properly represented insiders and their progeny.272

The burden of a smaller government’s promise-breaking is more likely to fall on unrepresented
outsiders because the costs of government promise-breaking today arise only in the future (insofar
as current promise-breaking discourages investment today, which will have consequences later), and
much of the future population that will suffer is not currently located in smaller jurisdictions on
account of the great “mobility of the population.”273 At larger levels of government, by contrast,
democratic processes provide a better check on governmental promise-breaking because the costs
of promise-breaking are more likely to fall on the people, or the descendants of those, who currently
270

See W ILLIAM A. F ISCHEL , R E G U LA T O RY T AKINGS : L AW , E CONOMICS , A N D P OLITICS (1995).
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reside in the polity. In short, Fischel argues that larger governments require less active constitutional
oversight by the judiciary because they are less capable of imposing promise-breaking costs on
unrepresented outsiders.274
Fischel applies his theory to takings doctrine, which currently is One-Size-Fits-All, and
concludes that the law should be altered so that smaller polities are subject to greater scrutiny than
larger polities.275 There is another area of constitutional law Fischel does not mention in this regard
that is consistent with his theory.276 The Contract Clause, which by its terms applies only to States,
is an anti-retroactivity principle that proscribes legislative impairment of contracts. Although there
is no analogous constitutional language that addresses the federal government, the Supreme Court
long has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes anti-retroactivity limitations
on the federal government, as well.277 It is well established, however, that these anti-retroactivity
limitations are not identical.278 The Court has offered virtually no justification for the disparate
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See id. at 131 (providing “an economic-federalism rationale for judicial review” that “[i]n order to run a system
in which there are m any governments, there must be some external control over opp ortunistic defaults by one unit who se
costs are shifted to o thers or to the nation as a who le”); id. at 132 (noting a variety of non-judicial constraints on the
federal government and states that limit various types of malfeasance but noting that “in the context of local government
takings, sometimes courts are the only serious constraint”).
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See id.
276
Fischel’s analysis focuses only on the contract clause decision of Hom e Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdsell, 290
U.S. 398 (193 4), and m istakenly treats the co ntract clause as wholly devo id of sub stantive b ite. See F ISCHEL , supra note
269, at 130-31 . In fact, the Court has relied on the contract clause in striking down two state statutes since Blaisdell was
decided. See United Trust Company of Ne w Y ork v . New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977 ); Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U .S. 234 (1978 ).
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See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Comp any, 467 U.S. 717 (19 84).
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See Pension B enefit G uaranty, 467 U.S. at 732-33 (“it is suggested that we apply constitutional principles that have
been developed under the Contract Clause . . . when reviewing this federal legislation. We have never held, however,
that the principles embodied in the Fifth Amend ment’s Due Process Clause are coextensive with prohibitions existing
against state impairments of pre-existing contracts. Indeed, to the extent that recent decisions of the Court have
addressed the issue, we have contrasted the limitations imposed on States by the Contract Clause with the less searching
standards imposed on economic legislation by the Due Process Clauses.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Natioal
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 , 472 & n. 25 (19 85) (same).
76

treatment of the federal and state governments as regards retroactivity. 279 Fischel’s theory provides
a plausible answer: the Court appropriately subjects retroactive federal legislation to lower level
scrutiny than is given to state legislation280 because the federal government is less able to break its
promises than are the states. When Congress acts, there are fewer unrepresented outsiders upon
whom the externality of promise-breaking could fall by virtue of the fact that Congress represents
the interests of a larger bloc of citizens than do either states or municipalities.
b. Under-Representation. Consider next the problem of systematic
“under-representation” of discrete and insular minorities that was famously identified by John Hart
Ely. Ely argued that the heightened scrutiny that the Court affords to suspect classifications is a
proper doctrinal response to political failures where governmental officials systematically disregard
the interests of a “discrete and insular” minority for two reasons. First, “widespread hostility” may
“distort reality” such that legislators will be unable to see the “overlapping interests that can bind
them into a majority on a given issue.”281 As a result, the “wheeling and dealing by which various
minorities that make up our society typically interact to protect their interests” may “prove
recurrently unavailing.”282 Second, even where there is not such hostility, there might be “subtle[]
self-aggrandizing biases of the majority”283 that “distort” their perspectives284 and result in
legislation that is based on problematic stereotypes and generalizations.

Ely argued that

contemporary constitutional doctrine, which upholds “suspect classifications” only when the state
279

The Co urt has explained that “[i]t could not justifiably be claimed that the Contract Clause applies, either b y its
own terms of by convincing historical evidence, to actions of the National Government.” Pen sion B enefit, 467 U.S. at
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can “come up with a goal of substantial weight” and “show that the classification fits that goal with
virtual perfection,”285 is a sensible way to identify legislation that is the product of the political
malfunctions of hostility or distorted perspectives.286
Importantly, the risk of both types of political malfunctions turns on the size and make-up
of the polity that is acting. For instance, though there might be “widespread hostility” across the
country against a particular group, there might be a majority of that group in a particular sub-federal
polity. If so, the very predicate for heightened scrutiny would be absent when such a sub-federal
polity acts. Similarly, the self-aggrandizing perceptions that distort the perspective of the majority
when the Congress acts, and that appropriately invites the doctrine of suspect classifications and
heightened scrutiny under Ely’s approach, would not be present if the government that enacted a
racial classification (for instance) were a sub-federal polity in which the majority of citizens and
representatives belonged to the racial group that constitutes a minority on the national political
stage.287
Ely’s analysis accordingly suggests, at least as a prima facie matter, that whether a given
classification constitutes a suspect class that appropriately triggers heightened scrutiny may depend
on which level of government has acted. What constitutes a “minority” at the national level, with
respect to whom the majority might either be hostile or might systematically misperceive, may not
be a minority at the sub-federal level. If the predicate for political malfunction is absent, it would
follow that the constitutional doctrine that seeks to remedy the malfunction is inapposite. So, for
285
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example, a racial classification might appropriately be subject to heightened scrutiny if enacted by
the federal government but only to rational basis scrutiny if enacted by an African-American majority
local government.288 More generally, Ely’s analysis gives rise to the possibility of Tailoring at the
levels of 3 and 4, such that
3.F 3.S, and/or
4.F 4.S.
It also suggests that not all sub-federal governments that are situated at the same hierarchical level
should be treated the same. A white majority in a municipality, for instance, may be relevantly
different for present purposes from an African-American majority in a municipality.
c. Over-Representation. Finally, consider the malfunction I termed “overrepresentation.” This refers to a political decision that reflects the desires of the numerical majority
that does not take adequate account of the numerical minority’s interests. James Madison famously
referred to this as the problem of “factions” in the Federalist 10.289 Though contemporary readers
schooled in public choice may naturally conceptualize “factions” as numerical minorities that can
successfully influence governmental action due to their intense desires – that is, as “interest
groups”290 – this is not what Madison appears to have had in mind.291 As Neil Komesar has pointed
out, Madison seemed to be of the view in Federalist 42 that numerical minorities are not dangerous:
“If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
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enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote.”292 The problem of factions, instead,
arises when the faction is part of the majority: “When a majority is included in a faction, the form
of popular Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens.” Komesar has usefully dubbed this political
malfunction the problem of “majoritarian bias.”293
Determining what qualifies as majoritarian bias is tricky insofar as it is not simple to explain
why a system of rule by numerical majority constitutes a political malfunction.294 After all, the right
to regulate rule in accordance with the majority’s desire is a cornerstone of our democratic
government.295 Determining if and when majoritarianism is problematic rests on contestable value
judgments that are exogenous to democratic theory, and about which people are deeply divided.296
In short, identifying why and when laws that reflect the will of the majority constitute a failure of
the political process is a deeply political question, and resolving it is beyond the scope of this Article.
Regardless of how the political malfunction of over-representation is normatively grounded,
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however, the discussion immediately below shows that the extent of this political failure (for those
who identify it as such) will likely be a function of the polity’s size. The logic that inclines these
people to conceptualize constitutionalism as a remedy for the political malfunction of
majoritarianism accordingly should lead them to a prima facie conclusion that Tailoring is a
doctrinal option that ought to be considered.
(i)

Federalist 10. First consider Madison. He proposed that the

problem of factions is tamed, if not solved, to the extent a polity “[e]xtend[s] the sphere.”297 By this,
Madison meant extending the borders of the relevant political unit and accordingly enlarging it.
“Extend the sphere,” wrote Madison, “and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.”298
To be sure, the discussion in Federalist 10 was not intended to give guidance to courts, but
instead sought to explain the benefit of a “large over a small republic.”299 Supreme Court Justices,
however, have understood Madison’s insight to have implications in respect of constitutional
principles that remedy political malfunctions. Thus it is these very passages from the Federalist 10
that Justice Scalia quoted in his concurring opinion in the Croson decision, and that Justice Stevens
cited in his dissent in Adarand, to support the proposition that the dangers of racial discrimination
are greater at lower levels of government than at higher levels.300 The lower likelihood of
factionalism at the higher level of government was the predicate for these Justices’s conclusion that
297
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congressional enactments of benign racial classifications should be subject to a lower level of
judicial scrutiny than racial classifications created by states or localities.301
The Justices’s arguments based on the Federalist 10 can be usefully restated as follows: The
content of the constitutional principle of equal protection appropriately varies across polities of
different size when the political malfunction that equal protection seeks to remedy is a function of
the polity’s size, and “factionalism” is one such political malfunction. This logic can be generalized:
to the extent a constitutional principle remedies the political malfunction of majoritarianism, there
is a prima facie basis for concluding that the principle should be Tailored depending upon the level
of government whose activity is being reviewed.
(ii)

Komesar’s “Two-Force” Model of Politics. Professor Neil

Komesar has propounded a rich theory of politics that builds on public choice’s interest group
theory. Komesar identifies political malfunctions and construes various constitutional provisions as
remedies for certain types of political malfunctions. His account suggests that the nature and extent
of political failure is a function of the level of government that has acted. It follows that
constitutional doctrines also may vary in accordance with the level of government that has acted.
Komesar identifies two types of political malfunctions: “majoritarian” and “minoritarian”
bias.302 Minoritarian bias refers to the legislative distortions recognized by interest group politics:
the ability of groups with small numbers but high stakes to organize and successfully lobby for laws
that benefit them at the expense of a diffuse majority that fails to press their interests due to the
transactions costs of organizing a large group, free rider problems, and relatively low per capita
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stakes.303 Majoritarian bias, as discussed above, is the converse situation of numerical majorities
winning laws that advance their interests at the expense of minorities. Komesar astutely notes that
determining whether any given policy is an instance of legitimate governmental response to majority
desires (“majoritarian influence,” which is not a political malfunction) or illegitimate invasion of
minority interests at the behest of the majority (the political malfunction of “majoritarian bias”) turns
on the normative metric used to evaluate the governmental action.304 The same need for a normative
baseline besets efforts to distinguish minoritarian influence from minoritarian bias.305 Though the
line between welcome influence and dysfunctional bias thus is bound to be deeply

contested,

Komesar is probably right when he states that there is a “pervasive, though amorphous, intuition that
both simply counting noses without considering the degree and extent of impacts [majoritarianism]
and simply ministering to the desires of the active few [minoritarianism] can sometimes lead to
severe injustice.”306
For present purposes we need not establish what normative baseline is appropriate. What
matters instead is that we have an understanding of the dynamics of majoritarian and minoritarian
influence on the political process. Under Komear’s account, the nature and extent of each type of
influence systematically varies on the basis of which level of government is acting. This suggests
that there is a prima facie basis for concluding that multi-level constitutional doctrines may vary in
their application depending on which level of government is acting.
Under Komesar’s analysis, whether majoritarian or minoritarian influence prevails in a given
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situation is a function of the costs and benefits of participating in the political process that are faced
by the majority and minority.307 The costs are a function of the size and complexity of the political
process (which is a function of the number of legislators, “the frequency of elections, the size and
scope of the legislative agenda, and the rules of the legislature”308), the complexity of the substantive
issue, and the cost of organizing the group (which is a function of the group size and the information
costs of educating the group members).309 The relevant benefits of participation are the per capita
stakes and the distribution of the potential benefits.310 The costs and benefits typically will vary
depending upon the size of the group that shares a common interest. All other things being equal,
it is easier to organize smaller groups than larger groups because it is cheaper to educate smaller
groups of people and less expensive to form and police agreements among smaller groups.311 If the
benefits exceed costs for the minority but not the majority, then minority influence is likely to prevail
over majority influence. If the benefits exceed costs for both the majority and minority, then
majority influence is likely to prevail.312
Importantly, the costs of political participation systematically vary across different levels of
government.313 Information and agency costs typically increase at higher levels of government.
Compare, for instance, participation costs at local versus the federal government. Effective political
participation is far cheaper at the local level because lobbying costs are smaller (there are far fewer
307
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politicians that must be lobbied, and the lobbying costs per politician are likely to be far less
expensive insofar as it is cheaper to walk into their offices than to fly to Washington), it is “easier
to discipline unwanted action at the ballot box”314 (because it is easier to hold small numbers of
representatives politically accountable), and the costs of politically organizing a group of people who
feel similarly about a given political issue is smaller since the size of the group is smaller at the local
level.315 Moreover, the information costs associated with attaining sufficient mastery of the
substantive issue so that one can effectively influence politics typically are smaller at the local level,
where the issues are less complex and the more immediate personal stakes tends to mean that
citizens already have a stock of “general information” that diminishes the costs of obtaining
information about even relatively complex matters.316

These factors may help explain the

robust cross-country, empirical findings of prominent political theorist Robert Dahl and social
scientist Edward Tufte that citizen effectiveness and participation is far greater at local levels than
the national level.317 In any event, Dahl and Tufte’s work provides empirical support for Komesar’s
predictions as regards varying political participation across different levels of government.
The implication of the preceding analysis is that majoritarian influence is far more likely to
prevail over the interests of numerical minorities in smaller governmental units than in larger units;
because the costs of political participation are smaller in smaller governmental units, majorities can
be expected to participate, and hence exert determinative influence by virtue of their numbers, even
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when per capita stakes are relatively small. Conversely, minoritarian influence is more likely to
prevail in larger governmental units, where there are higher costs of political participation, per capita
benefits frequently are low, and free rider obstacles may hinder if not wholly bar effective political
organization by the majority, leaving only small groups with high per capita interests to politically
organize and affect policy. To be sure, what is significant under Komesar’s analysis is not the legal
status of the polity but its physical size; for instance, majoritarian influence is more likely to prevail
in a rural county than a large metropolitan city. Nonetheless, generalizations certainly can be made
with respect to federal, state, and local governments. For example, minoritarian influence is more
likely to prevail at the federal level than at the sub-federal levels.318
Understanding the nature of the political malfunction is important to constitutional analysis
under Komesar’s approach because he suggests that many constitutional provisions are remedies for
particular types of political malfunctions. The Anti-Federalists were concerned with curbing
minoritarian bias,319 but the Constitution that was adopted ultimately reflected the Federalist’s
concern with controlling majoritarian bias.320 In keeping with the Constitution’s general antimajoritarianism tendency, Komesar suggests that the takings clause is best understood as a protection
against majoritarian bias.321 Indeed, Komesar argues that the Taking Clause’s requirement of just
compensation is structured in a manner that “corrects majoritarian bias, not minoritarian bias.”322
How so? The requirement of just compensation imposes a cost on all taxpayers – the majority –
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hence eliminating the majority’s incentive to take from the minority. Compensation would not,
however, discourage minoritarian bias because the pro rata tax increase small groups would bear by
virtue of the takings clause’s compensation requirement is smaller than the benefits they could reap
by the taking. 323 Indeed, a judicially administered compensation requirement itself creates new
opportunities for minoritarian bias insofar as the judicial process is very costly. 324 This suggests that
if the takings clause were utilized to correct minoritarian bias, it not only would fail in its mission
but perversely would make matters worse.325 Komesar accordingly argues that takings doctrine
should be understood as a remedy for majoritarian bias, and that takings doctrine should review local
regulations more strictly than federal regulations because majoritarian bias is far more likely to occur
at lower levels of government.326
****************
To quickly conclude, the analyses of Madison, Fischel, and Komesar converge on the
following principle: constitutional principles designed to correct political malfunctions might vary
in their application if the malfunctions they aim to remedy systematically vary from one level of
government to another.
2.

Prophylactic Rules. It is widely thought that many constitutional doctrines,

particularly those relating to criminal procedure,327 are prophylactic rules designed to insure against
constitutional violations by governmental actors, particularly members of the executive branch such
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as police and prosecutors, when they implement government policy. 328 Prophylactic rules prohibit
behaviors that in themselves are not unconstitutional, or require behaviors that in themselves are not
constitutionally mandated, for the sake of ensuring that core constitutional rights are not violated.
Prophylactic rules hence “overprotect[] the constitutional clause at issue.”329 The Miranda warnings
long were understood as paradigmatic prophylactic requirements.330
The Court has not articulated a coherent theory regarding prophylactic rules.331 This has led
to a sizable amount of scholarly discussion of the subject.332 The first generation of scholarship
identified the phenomenon of prophylactic rules and debated their legitimacy. 333 The scholarly
consensus today is that the Court has the power to fashion such rules.334 The second generation of
scholarship has considered the appropriate scope of prophylactic rules.335 Although not much has
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been written yet on this subject, several commentators’ analyses, as well as good sense, suggest that
the scope of a given prophylactic rule may appropriately vary depending upon the level of
government to which the rule is to be applied.
a.

The Need to Over-Protect Constitutional Rights. Professor Klein, for

example, has argued that prophylactic rules are appropriate when “the Court finds that it cannot
otherwise protect a particular constitutional clause,” but notes that “[a]lthough in such situations
some prophylactic rule is necessary, no particular rule is required – only one that is ‘effective.’”336
Klein accordingly concludes that prophylactic rules can be modified “as changed circumstances and
new data generated by social scientists mandate.” Furthermore, the Court can “change the rules by
accepting alternate rules provided by Congress, state legislators, federal and state law enforcement
agencies and state judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances encountered or facts
on the ground . . .”337 Indeed, Professor Klein shows several instances where the Court has adopted
a prophylactic rule and then “signal[ed]”338 to other federal or state actors that they could adopt
alternative strategies for protecting the core constitutional right that the Court’s prophylactic rule
protected.339 In some instances states and the federal executive have responded, “attempt[ing] to
institute substitute procedures” for the prophylactic rule laid down by the Court.340 Not surprisingly,
these responses were neither coordinated nor identical, with the result that the federal executive
branch and the different states adopted different procedures.341
Professor Klein’s reasoning suggests that it might be appropriate to Size prophylactic rules.
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On her account, prophylactic rules are pragmatic attempts to guard constitutional rights, and a
prophylactic rule’s scope is determined by whatever the “circumstances” require so that the rule is
“effective” in accomplishing its protective goal. The question becomes whether the circumstances
that call for prophylactic rules might systematically vary across the different levels of government.
Might there, for example, be consistent differences across workers at the different levels of
government with regard to such variables as training, skill, accountability to the public, and so forth?
If so, the risks of constitutional violation accordingly may vary across the different levels of
government.
The answer ultimately is empirical in nature, and it might well vary across subject matter.
There seems to be little reason, however, to conclusively presume identicality as among the different
levels of government across all relevant variables, as the contemporary doctrine of One-Size-Fits-All
does. In the end, considerations of administrability might lead to the conclusion that the Court
should not draft one set of prophylactic rules for federal actors and a different set for state actors.
But it should be understood that such an election to adopt a One-Size-Fits-All approach to
prophylactic rules is driven by pragmatics rather than conceptual necessity. Legalists accordingly
should be open-minded to the possibility that there may be sufficient differences across levels of
government in some circumstances to justify Tailoring.
b.

The Costs of Over-Protection. Whereas Professor Klein’s analysis

focuses primarily on what is necessary to protect the constitutional right, it also might be wise to
take account of the potential costs of over-protection. 342 Professor Landsberg suggestively invokes
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the concept of “proportionality,” which the Court has utilized to limit Congress’s powers to enact
prophylactic legislation pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,343 as
a guide.344 Though proportionality is notoriously difficult to specify, the concept that serves as its
foundation is instructive in the present context. One factor relevant to a proportionality analysis is,
as under Professor Klein’s approach, the likelihood of constitutional violation absent some
prophylactic rule. Proportionality also bids the analyst to consider the costs of over-protection
imposed by the prophylactic rule.345 Over-protection costs refer to the liberty sacrifices that attend
proscribing (or requiring) behaviors that themselves are not constitutionally proscribed (or required)
for the sake of protecting core constitutional rights, as well as the consequences of those proscribed
or required behaviors. For instance, the exclusionary remedy is a prophylactic rule whose overprotection costs include withholding relevant evidence during prosecution and possibly keeping
dangerous persons on the street instead of in prison.
In assessing whether a given prophylactic rule was appropriate in scope, a proportionality
analysis thus would take account of the probability of a constitutional violation, the cost of any such
violation, and the over-protection costs. I do not mean to suggest that these various considerations
can be reduced to a common metric and readily balanced; surely the “costs” of a constitutional
violation and the “costs” of over-protection are incommensurable.346 I simply mean that a
proportionality analysis would take account of the costs of over-protection in the same way that
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courts typically take account of incommensurable considerations when they decide cases.347
Common sense suggests that some over-protection costs may systematically vary depending
upon which level of government is acting. Such costs are a function of what the government is
attempting to accomplish. A prophylactic rule might hinder the government’s ability to accomplish
a particular task, and the rule’s over-protection cost will be a function of the value of that task.
Tailoring is implicated to the extent that different levels of government may be responsible for
different tasks that have dissimilar values. As discussed above, Justice Jackson and Justice Harlan
made just this point.348 To provide another concrete example, compare specialized federal agencies
and local governments. Imagine a federal agency that were responsible exclusively for preventing
and investigating terrorism. The over-protection costs of a prophylactic rule that interfered with the
agency’s discharge of its duty would not be identical to the over-protection costs of the same rule
in respect of local law enforcement that is directed to solving petty crimes.349
The point is that there is no good reason to conclusively assume that over-protection costs
are identical across different levels of government. To the extent they are not, a proportionality
analysis supports the Tailoring of prophylactic rules. Once again, administrability concerns might
suggest that it is not wise to create different prophylactic rules for different levels of government.
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Such a conclusion should be recognized, however, for what it is: a pragmatic determination, and not
a judgment of what the Constitution requires as an a priori matter. Indeed, the insight that there is
a basis for concluding that federal authorities can be subjected to different prophylactic rules than
state and local authorities might be particularly relevant in our post-9/11 world.

There is a

principled basis for concluding that a federal anti-terrorism agency populated by highly trained
experts could be subject to less stringent prophylactic limitations than local police departments
owing to the federal agents’s higher training and the greater over-protection costs as a result of the
agency’s responsibility.
B.

Differing Geographical Scope. Another difference between the different levels of

government is the different geographical scope to which their regulations and other activities apply.
For example, Congress’s statutes apply nationwide, whereas Chicago’s ordinances for the most part
apply only within the territorial borders of Chicago.350

It is conceivable that the differing

geographical scope of different levels of government could be constitutionally significant such that
Tailoring is appropriate.
1.

Varying Risks and Benefits. The risks and benefits of a regulation frequently are

a function of its geographical scope. With regard to risks, consider a regulation banning a particular
book on the ground that it is obscene. One constitutional defect of such a regulation is that it
interferes with the marketplace of ideas or art. The quantum of the constitutionally problematic
interference is smaller if the regulation is the product of a municipality rather than the federal
government because a nation-wide proscription interferes with these interests more than a city-wide
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A caveat is in order: polities ha ve the p ower to regulate extraterritorially to a certain degree. See generally Rosen,
Extra territoriality and Fede ralism, supra note 216, at 877-9194 5-55. In general, however, the statement above in text
is corre ct.
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prohibition does. This was Justice Harlan’s point in his dissent in Roth v. United States:351 “it seems
to me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment and to gratify our tastes in
literature is likely to result from the suppression of a borderline book in one of the States, so long
as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression of the book, and so long as other States are free to
experiment with the same or bolder books.”352
Justice Harlan’s statement contains both a positive and an evaluative statement. As to the
former, it seems undeniable that there is a difference in point of fact between the consequences that
attend a local proscription and a nation-wide ban. As to the evaluative question of whether this
difference in fact ought to be of legal significance, I do not intend here to argue that Justice Harlan’s
judgment was correct. A legal doctrine that categorically ignores such differences, however, cannot
plausibly be said to be self-evidently correct, for the consequences of these differences may go to the
heart of what the constitutional provision aims to guard. When this is the case, logic suggests that
there must be an argument proffered as to why regulations emanating from two differently situated
polities ought to be treated identically by constitutional doctrine. Justice Harlan’s dissent provided
a reasoned explanation as to why they should not. The Roth majority, however, did not feel it
necessary to explain why it adopted a One-Size-Fits-All approach.353 One need not concur with
Justice Harlan’s ultimate evaluation to agree that a categorical and unexplained One-Size-Fits-All
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354 U .S. 476 (1957 ).
Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is possible, of course, that a patchwork of regulations could lead to nationwide
banning in effect if national retailers decid ed no t to stock works that were pro hibited in any of the markets in which they
did business. On the other hand, there remain independent vendors in most locales, and a decision by Barnes and N oble
or Amazon not to stock su ch co ntroversial wo rks likely wo uld serve only to deepen the independent vendors’s market
app eal.
353
See id. at 476-494. Much of the analysis in Roth presumes id enticality of constitutional standards as they app ly
to the States and to the Federal gov ernment. See, e.g., id. at 482 (looking to the “guaranties of freedom of expression
in effect” in the States that ratified the Constitution to shed light on the meaning of the First Amendme nt); id. at 488
(speaking of the need to bar “federal and state intrusion into” the “fundamental freedom of speech and p ress”).
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approach is problematic in view of the undeniable differences that attend the different geographical
scopes of federal and state regulation.
Next consider the linkage between benefits and geographical scope. Think about regulations
of hate speech. In the view of most, hate speech primarily injures the members of the denigrated
group about which the speech concerns. Now compare a federal and municipal prohibition against
Nazi marches. In the case of a federal ban on such Nazi activity, the benefits would be diffuse
because there would be potential victims in only a fraction of the places to which the proscription
would apply. The benefits would be far more concentrated if the regulation were adopted by a
municipality populated by a significant percentage of Holocaust survivors.354 These differences as
regards the distribution of benefits frequently can be relevant under contemporary doctrine. For
example, although it would not be relevant under today’s hate speech doctrine,355 the presence of a
heavily concentrated population with particular needs might be relevant to establishing a
“compelling” governmental interest in other contexts. Conversely, widely dispersed benefits may
suggest that a regulation has not been narrowly tailored.
2. Varying Expressive Consequences. The “social meaning” of a constitutional rule
frequently turns on the level of government to which it applies. For expressive theorists, who believe
that social meaning often is an important determinant of constitutional doctrine,356 the level of
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This hypo thetical ca lls to mind, of course, the Nazi Party’s effort to march in Sko kie, Illinois, a largely Jewish
suburb then pop ulated by large numb ers of H olocaust survivors. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1 197 (7th Cir. 1978).
355
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minneso ta, 505 U .S. 37 7, 39 1-96 (1992)(app lying categorical test that did not rely
on heightened scrutiny analysis).
356
See Restatement, supra note 222, at 1551 (arguing that “constitutional practice is pervasively more oriented toward
expressive considerations than is generally recognized.”). As is true with all the approaches to social ordering explored
in this Article, expressivism is not witho ut its critics. See, e.g., Matthew D . Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. P A . L. R EV . 136 3 (2000 ).
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government that is acting accordingly may be a constitutionally significant consideration.357
Expressivists believe it necessary to identify the“social meaning” of legal doctrine,358 by
which they mean the messages that are expressed by law and that are “recognizable” by citizens.359
Expressivists are of the view that social meaning is an important determinant of constitutional
doctrine as a purely descriptive matter.360 Expressivists believe this to be a good thing, though they
justify this normative conclusion on different grounds. Professors Elizabeth Anderson and Richard
Pildes are of the view that legal doctrine appropriately takes account of social meaning because
expressing messages invariably is part of what law does. That is to say, understanding a law’s
expressive component is necessary to fully understand law.361 While Anderson and Pildes
deliberately try to disassociate expressivism from efforts to identify laws’ “direct cultural effects,”362
apparently due to a concern that courts are not capable of making such “speculative” judgments,363
other noted theorists are interested in the ways that law’s social meaning socializes citizens. Robert
Cooter, for example, speaks of two expressive uses of law, one of which is “[c]hanging individual
values.”364 Similarly, Cass Sunstein argues that law inevitably and properly is involved in “norm
357

Much of the discussion that follows in this subsection draws on m y analysis in Mark D . Rosen, Establishm ent,
Expressivism, and Fede ralism, 78 CH I.-K ENT L. R EV . 669 (2003 ).
358
See, e.g., Richa rd H . Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Con stitutionalism, 27 J. L EGA L S T U D . 725, 749 (19 98).
359
Restatement, supra note 222, at 1520-27. Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, among the most important of
the expressivist theorists, argue that the social meaning “do not actually have to be recognized by the community” but
only “have to be recogniza ble by it, if people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.” Id. at 1525. For more
about their und erstand ing of expression, see Rosen, Expressivim & Establishment, supra note 356, at 112-15. For a brief
discussion abou t competing schools of expressivist thought, see id. at 113-15.
360
See Restatement, supra note 222, at 1551 (arguing that “constitutional practice is pervasively more oriented toward
expressive considerations than is generally recognized.”).
361
Id. at 1530-31.
362
Id. at 1560.
363
Id.
364
Robert C ooter, Expressive Law and Econo mics, 27 J. L EGA L S T U D . 585, 586 (199 8). The other expressive function
Cooter mentions is “[c]reating focal points” that lead to a new equilibrium for a given system o f social no rms. Id. By
this, Cooter means law’s ability to switch behavior witho ut altering the individual’s tastes. Id. at 595 . Examples include
prohibiting smoking in airports and req uiring dog owners to clean up after their pets. Id. It is likely that altering
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management,” and in “expressing social values” and the “social norms” that constitute the political
community.365
To understand the possible link between governmental level and social meaning, consider
the Establishment Clause. It is not difficult to show that social meaning varies depending upon what
level of government – federal, state, or local – is barred from doing the “establishing.” A
constitutional rule prohibiting a national church precludes the federal government from proclaiming
that this is a Christian country. A rule that also disallows the establishment of state or local
churches, as our current doctrine does,366 expresses wholesale disapproval of the intermixing of
secular and religious authority. By contrast, a rule prohibiting a national church but not limiting
sub-federal polities –

as was the case from the Founding up to the incorporation of the

Establishment Clause against the states367 – could be said to express neutrality on the issue of
intermixing insofar as such a rule disallows a single, nationwide orthodoxy but permits divergent
approaches to flourish at the sub-federal level. Indeed, one could not plausibly have described the
American political tradition as expressing categorical opposition to the intermixing of religious and
political authority during our country’s first century inasmuch as there were established churches in
six states,368 and state and local governments in many cases paid salaries for clergy.369
For an expressivist, the fact that a constitutional limitation’s social meaning might vary
behavior in this way ultimately lead s to a change in societal values, as well.
365
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 C O LU M . L. R EV . 903, 907, 910 (1996); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. P A . L. R EV . 2021 (1996) (examining how law effectuates changes
in social norms).
366
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (“Go vernment
in our d emo cracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religio us theory, doc trine, and practice.”) (emph asis
supplied).
367
Depending on one’s view, this occurred either upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption or in Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (19 47).
368
Daniel O. Conkle, Tow ard a G eneral Theory of the Estab lishmen t Clause, 82 N W . U. L. R EV . 1113, 1132 (1988).
369
See P HILIP H AMBUR GER , S EPARA TION OF C H U R C H AN D S TATE (2002).
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depending on the level of government to which the limitation is applied is a prima facie basis for
concluding that the constitutional principle may apply differently to the different levels of
government, i.e., that it may be appropriate to Size the constitutional guarantee. Whether or not a
provision should be Tailored ultimately turns on normative considerations. What follows below in
Sections C through E is an examination of how a variety of normative approaches answers this
question. Though these varying approaches to ordering social life generate divergent policy
prescriptions, they all suggest that Tailoring sometimes might be appropriate.
C.

Different Exit Costs. Exit costs are another systemic difference among the different

levels of government that may have constitutional relevance for purposes of Tailoring. Common
sense suggests that it is easier, both financially and emotionally, to leave smaller polities than larger
ones. As will be shown, the empirical data supports this. As exit costs diminish, it is increasingly
realistic to make two related assumptions: that (1) citizens make active choices where to live and (2)
polities compete among each other for citizens. This is deemed to be beneficial by several
approaches to ordering social life. Economists (and their law and economics cousins) argue that
such competition among polities leads to greater efficiencies as well as increased diversity than a less
competitive system. Easy exit also is a precondition of the “framework for utopias” described by
libertarian political theorist Robert Nozick.370
What connection do reduced exit costs and the normative commitments that view them
favorably have to constitutional interpretation? The answer is this: Once it is realized that Tailoring
is a doctrinal option that is not precluded by the Constitution itself – the point made in Parts I and
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See R OBERT N OZICK , A N A R C HY , S TATE , A N D U TO PIA 312 (1974). As will be shown belo w in section D, exit also
plays a pro minen t role in John R awls’s po litical thoug ht, though it does not assume the centrality that it plays in the
approaches ado pted by economists and Nozick.
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II of this Article – whether to Size invariably becomes a question that turns on the constitutional
interpreter’s pre-legal commitments. Under either a law and econmics or Nozickean approach, the
nature and extent of exit costs are relevant to determining the powers and limits of any given level
of government. It would follow that a systemic difference in respect of exit costs would be
doctrinally relevant to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that concern the powers and
limits of the different levels of government. It is in this respect that exit costs are doctrinally relevant
to Tailoring constitutional provisions.
1.

That Smaller Polities Have Smaller Exit Costs. Exit costs refers to the cost of

leaving one polity for another.371 In general, it is easier to exit smaller polities than larger polities.
Moving from a large polity to a new jurisdiction on average will require a move of a greater distance
than will a move from a smaller polity to a new jurisdiction. Moving costs generally increase with
the distance of the move. Many of the nonfinancial costs of moving also tend to increase with
distance moved. Short moves need not disrupt networks of friends, family and job in the way that
long-distant moves typically do. Short moves do not necessitate the relocation of new doctors,
dentists, shopping, and other resources in the way that longer-distance moves do.
Data concerning mobility supports the hypothesis that exit costs are smaller for shorter
moves. To begin, it is worthwhile to note that the evidence shows that Americans move a great deal.
Between March 1999 and March 2000, for instance, 43.4 million Americans moved.372 This
amounts to 16.1% of the entire population.373 This is not unusual. From 1990 to 2000, the
percentage of the population that has moved on a yearly basis has ranged from 15.9% to 17.3%, and
371

See A LBERT H IRSCHMAN , E XIT , V O IC E AN D L OYALTY (1973).
See Jason Schacter, Current Population Reports: March 1999-March 2000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, May
200 1) (av ailable at www.census.gov/prod/200 1pubs/p2 0-53 8.pd f) [“Population Reports”].
373
Id. at 1-2.
372

99

between the years 1947 to 1969 at least 19%, and as much as 21.2% of the population, moved in a
one-year period.374 Interestingly, the likelihood of moving is inversely proportional to income.
Between March 1999 and March 2000, “[p]eople living in households in lower-income categories
were more likely to move than those in higher-income categories: 21 percent for incomes under
$25,000, compared with 12% for incomes over $100,000,” and “[t]hose with income below the
poverty level were more likely to have moved (28%) than those with income 150% above the
poverty level or higher (14%).”375
Now consider the distribution with respect to distance moved. Between March 1999 and
March 2000, approximately 56% of the moves were local, meaning within the same county, and an
additional 20% were between counties in the same state.376 About 19% were moves to a different
state. Approximately 5% of all moves were outside the country.377 Unfortunately, census figures
do not distinguish between those intra-county moves that are intra-municipality and those that are
inter-municipality.

Working with similar data from a few years before, however, one noted

commentator wrote that a “conservative estimate is that approximately 20% of the population will
move to a different political jurisdiction in a five-year period.”378
In short, Americans are quite mobile. Most moves are short-distance; the mobility rate
diminishes with distance moved. This data supports the hypothesis that Americans exercise “exit”
from their home jurisdictions with significant regularity. The data also is consistent with the
hypothesis that exit from smaller jurisdictions is cheaper than exit from larger jurisdictions, though
374
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Id. at 4-5.
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Id. at 1.
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See id.
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Vicki Be en, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 C O LU M L. R EV . 473, 518 & n. 210 (1991 ).
375

100

it admittedly does not establish a causal link between exit costs and distance of move.
2. Law and Economics. Economists long have conceptualized the federal political
structure as affording the possibility of a competition among sub-federal jurisdictions. In a seminal
article, economist Charles Tiebout theorized that local governments compete for citizens by offering
different packages of public goods.379 Competition generates differences across jurisdictions along
two dimensions under this approach. The first is efficiency: jurisdictions will be pressed to deliver
their public goods in a cost-efficient way, or people will move away to locate in another jurisdiction
that offers the same public goods for less money. Second, jurisdictions will try to differentiate
themselves by offering different packages of public goods, which will appeal to different types of
citizens. This competition among jurisdictions is normatively desirable in Tiebout’s view for two
reasons. First, ceteris paribus, the efficient provision of goods is preferable to less efficient
provision. Second, greater numbers of options increase consumer welfare; those who value public
good “A” can locate themselves in a jurisdiction that provides it, and those that do not can live in
a polity that does not so that they’ll not have to pay for something they do not value.380
Like all economic models, Tiebout’s was based on specified ideal conditions that are not
fully reflected in the real world.381 Tiebout’s model has been criticized on the basis that the real
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See Charles M . Tieb out, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. P O LIT . E C O N . 416 (1956 ).
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world’s deviations from the model’s assumptions fatally undermine the model’s utility. 382 Two
points merit mention. First, notwithstanding the fact that the real world is far more complex than
the conditions idealized in Tiebout’s model, there is a substantial body of empirical data that
“provides substantial proof that local jurisdictions do compete for residents”383 and that “support[s]
the core Tiebout proposition that jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable
public service / tax packages.”384
The second point relates directly to Tailoring. One of the Tiebout model’s assumptions is
the absence of exit costs. Although there obviously are exit costs in the real world, the quantity of
costs is a function of the size of the polity from which a person exits. This is crucial for Tiebout’s
analysis. Remaining or exiting is the mechanism by which “voter-consumers” choose a bundle of
public goods.385 Such choice is what induces polities to spend efficiently and carefully tailor the
382

Some have argued that even if the mod el’s assum ptions sufficiently rep resent the real world, mod eling public
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house values, data about the relationship between migration pattern and fiscal characteristics of communities, and data
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and tax package is strong evidence supporting the core Tiebout proposition that jurisdictions compete for residents by
attempting to offer desirable public service / tax packages.” Id.
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Pro fessor W illiam A. F ischel’s new bo ok builds on Tiebout’s model, but offers an important modification of it.
Tiebou t’s assumption of perfect mobility is replaced with the assumption that local governments must be able to restrict
new immigrants so as to keep ea ch po lity scarce. See W ILLIAM A. F ISCHEL , T H E H OMEVOTER H Y PO TH ES IS : H O W H O M E
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102

public goods they offer. If exit is not a realistic possibility, these “market” checks on polities are
lost. It follows that the potential benefits identified by Tiebout likely are a function of exit costs and,
correspondingly, the size of the polity under consideration. For instance, localities will be subject
to the market pressure of citizen-consumers more than is the United States since smaller exit costs
mean that inter-city moves are more likely than international relocations.
These insights have implications for economic analyses of constitutional law. Under a law
and economics methodology, constitutional provisions are construed to generate welfare-enhancing
results.386 Tieboutian analysis is relevant to the interpretation of constitutional provisions that bear
on the powers of the different levels of government. Welfare is enhanced by permitting a
competition among jurisdictions in circumstances where voter-consumers realistically can exercise
an exit option. There is no a priori reason to exclude policies that implicate constitutional principles
from the mix of public goods with respect to which polities can compete. Competition cannot be
expected to occur, however, where exit is not a realistic option. Taken together, this analysis
suggests that the systemic differences in exit costs across different levels of government are a prima
facie basis for Tailoring constitutional principles to different levels of government. Generally
speaking, there is less need for judicially enforced constitutional protections at lower levels of
government, where exit costs are lower.387 As Professor Robert Cooter recently put it,
[i]n general, escaping jurisdiction by a less comprehensive government is easier than
escaping jurisdiction by a more comprehensive government. Differences in the cost of exit
from different levels of government justify different degrees of vigilance by courts in
protecting individual liberties . . . . The ‘exit principle’ implies the ‘federalism of individual
rights,’ by which I mean that courts should tolerate more interference with individual liberty
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when the effects are localized.388

In short, under a Tieboutian analysis, constitutional principles should be Tailored so that the
policies of smaller polities are more deferentially reviewed than regulations from larger polities for
two reasons. First, the threat of exit tames polities’ policy choices, and the threat of exit is more
viable at smaller levels of government, where exit costs are smaller. Second, greater deference to
lower levels of government allows for a broader range of regulations at lower levels of government.
Citizens accordingly have more options to select among, thereby increasing the welfare of voterconsumers.
To be sure, Cooter’s application of Tieboutian principles to constitutional law leaves
unanswered many important questions. For example, should every constitutional guarantee be
amenable to Tailoring? Are there any firm floors below which a constitutional protection could not
be Tailored? If so, what justifies them? The absence of ready replies to these questions means that
they require more serious thought, not necessarily that no good answers can be supplied. It is not
surprising that such basic question remain open, for there has been virtually no scholarly attention
paid to Tailoring up to now.389

Consistent with this Article’s limited focus, I’ll not attempt to

answer these particular questions here, particularly since any analysis is likely to be specific to the
constitutional protection at issue.390 What matters for present purposes is that the economic approach
388
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generates a prima facie case for Tailoring constitutional principles. This suggests the wisdom of
modifying doctrine so that it can be receptive to such arguments, should they prove to be compelling.
This analysis accordingly supports the hypothesis that One-Size-Fits-All should be downgraded from
a categorical requirement to a rebuttable presumption.
3.

Robert Nozick’s “Framework for Utopias”. Exit also is a precondition for the

libertarian political philosopher Robert Nozick’s social vision. Applying Nozickean analysis to our
contemporary constitutional order, the systemic differences across different levels of polities with
respect to exit suggest that limitations on governmental power ought to vary in accordance with the
level of government that is acting.
Nozick famously argued that the ideal state would establish a “framework for utopias”391
within which communities could do almost anything they wanted, subject to only a few caveats.392
Nozick’s vision takes the form of a federal political structure within which the “central” state
apparatus has few regulatory powers but the sub-state regulatory entities (“associations”393 and
“communities”394 in his terminology) may extensively supervise their members’ behaviors, if they
so choose.395 His solution is driven by two assumptions. First, that there are such great differences
justification opens the door to Tailoring because the determination of whether speech imposes any externalities, and if
so whether they’re beneficial or negative, turns on cultural values that might vary from group to group. If there are
different cultural evaluations of this that correspond to different groups that are situated in discrete geographical
locations that coincide with political jurisdictions, then an approach designed to maximize preferences would suggest
that Tailoring is desirable. Whether or not one agrees with this analysis, the point for prese nt purp oses is tha t the analysis
is specific to the particular constitutional guarantee with regard to speech, and does not shed any light on, for instance,
the appropriate scop e of the c ontracts clause.
391
N OZICK , supra note 369, at 312.
392
See id. at 320-23.
393
See id. at 299 (defining “association” as “a world which all rational inhabitants may leave for any other world they
can imagine (in which all the rational inhabitants may leave for any other world they can imagine in which . . .”).
394
See, e.g., id. at 307, 309 (using the appellation “comm unity” to describe what Nozick previously defines as
“associations”).
395
Id. at 320-21 (“though there is great liberty to choo se among comm unities, ma ny particular co mmunities internally
may have many restrictions unjustifiable on libertarian grounds: that is restrictions which libertarians would condemn
if they were enforced by a central state apparatus. For example, paternalistic intervention into people’s lives, restrictions
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across individuals that it is impossible that any single “utopia” would be best for all of them.396
Second, that it is impossible to specify the character of complex social systems in an a priori fashion,
but that the development of a society only can occur in an evolutionary process.397
Nozick’s solution requires a competition among communities to attract adherents.398 The
competition accomplishes two things.

First, it permits experimentation and step-by-step

refinement.399 Second, it allows there to be different communities that satisfy the needs of different
people, thereby increasing overall welfare.400 One of the crucial requirements for the framework to
succeed is that people can “freely leav[e] their own community to join another.”401 As shown
above,402 exit is instrumentally necessary for there to be a competition among jurisdictions under a
Tieboutian analysis. Even more than this, exit is a foundational precondition under Nozick’s
libertarian political philosophy. The core of Nozick’s approach is that “you choose what you will,
with the sole constraint being that others may do the same for themselves and refuse to stay in the

on the range of books which may circulate in the community, limitations on the kinds of sexual behavior, and so on.”).
Below I discuss the qu estion o f whether any polity can function in place of the “communities” (and “associations”) that
Nozick speaks of, or whether “com munities” (and “assoc iations”) necessarily must be no n-political entities. See infra
at p. ?.
396
See id. at 310-11 (“Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg,
Harry Wo lfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Mo ses, Einstein, Hugh H effner, Socrates,
Henry Ford , Lenny Bruce, B aba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, Raymond Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra,
Colum bus, Freud, N orman Ma iler, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted W illiams, Thom as Ediso n, H. L. Mencken, Thomas
Jefferson, Ralph E llison, Bobby Fischer, Em ma G oldman, Peter K ropo tkin, you, and your pa rents. Is there re ally one
kind of life which is best for each of these people? Imagine all of them living in any utiopia you’ve ever seen described
in detail . . . . The idea that there is one best composite answer . . . one best society for everyone to live in, seems to me
to be an incredible one.”).
397
See id. at 313-15 (arguing that social deve lopment must occur by means of “filter devices” rather than “design
devices”).
398
See id. at 302 (noting the parallels between his approach and “the economists’ model of a competitive market” in
which there are “[m]any associations competing for my membership”).
399
See id. at 315-19.
400
See id. at 309 (“if there is a diverse range of com munities, then (putting it roughly) mo re persons will be ab le to
come closer to how they wish to live, than if there is only one kind of community”).
401
Id. at 307 ; see also id. at 299.
402
See supra at p. 94.
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world you have”created.403 “You” can choose the world you want to live in and others can either
remain or “refuse to stay,” however, only if there is a real option to exit.
To what extent can Nozick’s approach inform the interpretation of our Constitution?
Determining the practical applications of Nozickean theory to our system of government is tricky.
Nozick’s analysis does not take as a given our Constitution – or any other governmental institutions,
for that matter.404 Indeed, his approach, if adopted in its entirety, would require a radical retooling
of many aspects of our governmental system.405 Nonetheless, Nozick’s framework still may have
policy implications for an analyst who wished to work from within the United States’s existing
governmental institutions and structure.406
I submit that the following is a faithful application of Nozick’s analysis to contemporary
American constitutional doctrine. The framework for utopias, under which each association under
the minimal central government may extensively regulate its members, requires low exit costs from
association to association. Small sub-federal polities, with respect to which exit costs are minimal,
may be rough contemporary substitutes for Nozick’s “associations.”407 Under this approach, states
403

Id. at 302.
Instead, his analysis proceeds as a thought-experiment that starts with no assumptions concerning current
institutions, the size of go vernm ent, and so forth. See generally id. at 297-306.
405
For instance, the central government would have far few er po wers than does today’s federa l government. See id.
at 333 (concluding that only a “m inimal state” is “mo rally legitimate” because “any mo re extensive state would (will)
violate the rights o f individuals”). B elow I discuss what N ozick ’s analysis implies ab out sub -federa l polities.
406
American legal scholars certainly appear to believe this to be true . A rec ent W estlaw search o f references to
No zick’s Anarch y, State, and U topia uncovered more than 1 ,100 citations. Westlaw search conducted on 2.7.03,
(Nozick /3 Anarchy) in Journals and Law Reviews library (1120 citations).
407
Indeed, there might not be ve ry much difference at all between small po lities and Nozickean assoc iations.
Associations are permitted to redistribute wealth and exe rt other coercive powe rs over its memb ers for so long as a
person remains a me mbe r. See id. at 321 . Furthermore, Nozick’s logic behind permitting coercive regulation in the
“face-to-face com munity” – in such com munities “one canno t avoid being directly confronted with what one finds to be
offensive [in another person’s actions]. How one lives in once’s immediate environment is affected,” id. at 322) –
suggests that face-to-face communities should have a monopoly on coercive powers within their geographical locale.
Such a monopoly on coercive power within a fixed territory is one of the core characteristics of a “state” for Nozick.
See id. at 22-25 (distinguishing a “protective association” from a “state” on the ground that a state has a monopoly on
coercive power whereas a p rotective association has powe r only in respect of those individuals to decide to pay for its
404
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would be too large to qualify as associations, but many municipalities likely would qualify, as would
smaller forms of local government such as villages. Nozick’s analysis thus suggests that qualifying
small polities should be granted more extensive regulatory powers than large polities. Under our
contemporary constitutional order – where the Constitution’s constraints have been incorporated
against the sub-federal polities – Nozick’s analysis accordingly suggests that constitutional principles
should be Tailored, such that qualifying small polities be permitted more regulatory powers than are
larger polities.
D. Different “We’s” and Democratic Theory. Another systemic difference across different
levels of government that might justify Tailoring is the number and identity of the polity’s citizens.
Each polity is constituted by a different “we.” The varying number and identity of citizens that are
represented in a particular polity can have significant consequences in respect of democratic theory.
A limitation on one level of government accordingly might have very different democratic effects
when it is applied to another level.
1.

Outsiders’ Extraterritorial Interference Versus Insiders’ Self-Regulation. A

cornerstone of democratic theory is that, with only limited exceptions, a political community has the
right to create laws that bind the entire community if a majority of its members (or its
representatives) desire the law. This is paradigmatic democratic self-governance by the political
community. Conversely, it is violative of basic democratic principles for outsiders of the political
community to dictate laws to the community. Such regulations may be thought of as extraterritorial
in nature, and are just a step away from the “taxation without representation” that so vexed our
country’s forefathers. It follows that a particular regulation could constitute either democratic self-

protection, and thus may be unable to exercise power over all people in a given geographical location).
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governance or its converse depending upon which polity enacted it. Stated differently, the
determinant of a regulation’s consistency with democracy sometimes may be a function of which
polity acted, not the content of the regulation itself. A constitutional principle that aimed at securing
democratic principles against interference by outsiders – and there are some, as we shall see below
– accordingly would have to be cognizant of which level of government acted. In fact, One-SizeFits-All would be absolutely unsuitable for such a constitutional principle.
The crucial step in determining whether a particular regulation constitutes acceptable
democratic self-governance or problematic extraterritorial governance is defining the relevant
political community. After all, a regulation that comes from outsiders when the political community
is conceptualized as being small can be viewed as an exemplar of self-governance if the relevant
political community is more broadly characterized so as to encompass the (former) outsiders.
Determining what is the relevant political community is complicated in the United States’ federal
system because each person simultaneously belongs to multiple political communities – federal and,
for most people,408 state and local political communities, as well.
In the end, identifying the relevant political community for purposes of determining if a
particular regulation instantiates democratic self-governance or its antithesis inevitably is highly
context-dependent. Constitutional doctrine that reflects the concern of protecting the integrity of
democratic politics, however, must directly confront the question of what constitutes the relevant
political community if the doctrine is not to be babble. Sometimes the context is clear enough, such
that asking the question leads to a straightforward answer. Even when it does not, the question of
408

Most, but not everybody. For example, citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the United States but do not belong
to a state. Also, many peo ple live in uninco rporated parts o f states. Similarly, Native Americans who live on
reservations are citizens of the United States and the State in which the reservation is located, but are not citizens of any
local governments.
109

defining the relevant political community is crucial; identifying the relevant political community is
the tough question that must be answered, and it is better to confront the real question when tackling
difficult constitutional issues.
In this regard, consider the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton409 case discussed above.410 In
striking down an amendment to the Arkansas constitution that was adopted by a ballot initiative, the
plurality opinion unthinkingly imported a “fundamental” democratic principle that the Court had
developed in the federal context. The plurality’s One-Size-Fits-All analysis overlooked the crucial
question of what constituted the relevant political community, undermining the cogency of its
argument.
The Court had held in the earlier case of Powell v. McCormick

411

that additional

qualifications as to who could be a Congressman that were imposed by Congress when it sought to
prevent Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from taking his seat thwarted the desires of the majority of voters
in New York’s Eighteenth Congressional District, who had elected him. In so doing, Congress’s
additional qualifications violated the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that
“the people should choose whom they please to govern them”412 and accordingly were
unconstitutional. The plurality opinion in Thornton concluded that Powell’s principle – that
additional qualifications undermined fundamental democratic principles – equally applied to
conditions (such as term limits) that were imposed by the States,413 and struck down Arkansas’s

409

514 U .S. 779 (1995 ).
See supra at n. 15 and su rroun ding text.
411
395 U.S. 486 (1969). The plurality noted that this was the “mo st impo rtant[]” consideration in its rationale. See
514 U.S. at 806.
412
See xx.
413
See id. 820 (“the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact.”).
410
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amendment on that basis.414
The problem with the plurality’s reasoning is that it failed to consider who constituted the
relevant “people” whose choice had to be respected under fundamental principles of democracy. The
democratic principle’s application in the Powell case was sensible; the relevant political community
whose preferences merited respect clearly was the community defined by the 18th Congressional
District, and people outside of that community (members of Congress, who by necessity did not live
in Powell’s district) were interfering with the District’s choice. However, treating Powell’s principle
in a One-Size-Fits-All manner, as the plurality did in Thornton, actually vitiated the Powell principle.
Powell impliedly held that the relevant political community with regard to choosing representatives
is the congressional district. A majority of voters in every Arkansas congressional district approved
the term limits amendment. Applying the term limit accordingly would have implemented, rather
than undermined, the choice of the relevant political community.415
In short, the Powell principle relates to a problem of extraterritoriality – outsiders’
interference with a political community’s choice – not the substance of the regulation. It is not the
additional restrictions on who can sit for Congress that were problematic from the perspective of
representative democracy, but rather who imposed them. One-Size-Fits-All is flatly illogical in

414

See id.
This does not mean that the ultimate holding in Thornton was wrong, b ut only that the “most important[]”
justification that the plurality pro vided , id. at 806, was ineffectual. There are plausib le arguments outside of
“fundamental dem ocratic principles” that could have b een p ropound ed to strike do wn Arkansa s’s amendm ent. Indeed,
understanding the centrality of defining the relevant political community makes clear that an argument based on
democratic principles argument was possible. The claim would be that the relevant political community for purposes
of laying do wn the criteria for congressperson s is the national political com munity. A ny such argum ent, however, would
confront several challenges. First, it would have to be explained why qualifications are properly determined by the
national political community. In addition to requiring a norm ative justification, any such claim is in tension with the
Powell case’s holding that the congressional district is the relevant political com munity for purp oses of selecting
congressp ersons. Second, this argument is inconsistent with Powell insofar as the argu ment implies that Co ngress is
the appropriate forum for creating ad ditiona l qualifications – a principle that Powell squarely rejected.
415
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respect of this type of constitutional principle. Rather, any such constitutional principle that seeks
to protect fundamental democratic principles of this sort necessarily must be Tailored.
2. Limiting the Dilemmas of Majoritarianism. Another systemic difference across
different levels of government that implicates democratic theory and accordingly might justify
Tailoring is the number of voters in the polity. The federal polity encompasses the most voters,
whereas states, municipalities, towns, and villages generally have ever-diminishing numbers of
voters. To simplify a bit, in a political system characterized by majority rule, the number of voters
determines the number of persons that constitutes the majority that can translate its will into law.416
Insofar as democracy is “rule by the people,” the number of voters in a given polity determines the
relevant “we” that can rule itself by choosing policies that more than half its members desire.
The size and make-up of the “we” determines whether idiosyncratic groups can be guaranteed
that their political wills can be translated into law in some polity. For example, there were no more
than a few thousand members of the Rajneesh religious group in the 1980s, and it is virtually
inconceivable that their idiosyncratic political desires ever would have been shared by a majority of
American citizens. By creating the municipality of Rajneeshpuram,417 where all citizens were
adherents of the Rajneesh creed, the Rajneesh created a “we” that guaranteed that their particular
zoning and other needs could become law in some polity.
The realization that there are a multiplicity of possible “we’s” complicates democratic theory.
Even if one grants the proposition that it is fair that numerical majorities can politically coerce
416

There are two major simplifications in the statement above in text: the text (1) presumes direct rather than
representative dem ocracy and (2) ignores c oalition-building and log-rolling across issues that can allow numerical
minorities to obtain particular laws they might want. T he text’s simplifying assumptions do not, however, undermine
its point concerning the legitimacy of majoritarianism.
417
See Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Ore. 1984). For a discussion of the city of
Rajneeshpuram, see Mark D . Rosen, The Ou ter Lim its of Co mm unity Self-Governance: A Liberal Th eory, 84 V A . L. R EV .
1053, 10 82-86 (199 8).
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numerical minorities – a proposition that is not at all self-evident418 – how is it to be determined what
group constitutes the appropriate “we” from which to search for the “majority’s” will? If it is too
large, the desires of numerical minorities will be systematically submerged to the wants of
majorities. If it is too small, there are risks of balkanization, inefficiencies owing to duplicative
governmental institutions, and the coordination problems that attend large numbers of actors (in this
case, polities). It seems unlikely that there is a single, a priori solution to this question of how to
define the relevant “we.”419
One might think that determining the appropriate “we” is another way of asking the question
of how large a democratic political community should be. It might, in which case the query joins
a long line of democratic theorists who have asked how small democracies must be to work
properly. 420 On the other hand, there are important differences between the classical theorists and
the problem mentioned above. For one, the classic theorists who have been concerned with size did

418
For a good discussion of the pro blem of majority rule, see Peters, Majoritarianism as Adjudication, supra note 293,
at 1-7. Jurgen Habermas, Frank M ichelman, and Joshua Cohen try to solve this difficulty by arguing that legitimate
dem ocratic institutions permit people to understand themselves as the authors of the laws that bind them, see id. at 3-7,
but this approach is unavailing to the extent there exists discrete subgroups in society that have packages of interests that
systematically vary from the majo rity’s desires.
419
See, e.g., R OBERT D A H L, D ILEMM AS OF P LURALIST D EMOCRACY 96-100 (19 82) (noting the “dilemma” of “a more
exclusive versus a more inclusive demos” and co ncluding that there is no determinate theoretical solution as to how large
a democratic polity should be).
420
Plato calculated the optimal number of citizens at just over five thousand, and Aristotle thought a polity must be
large enough so the po lity is self-sufficient but small enough so that citizens could “know one another’s chara cters.”
D A H L & T UFTE , S IZ E A N D D EMOCRACY , supra note 316, at 5-7. R ousseau and Montesquieu also devoted co nsiderable
attention to the connection between size and dem ocracy. Id. These theorists’ were concerned with size did not grow
out of a co ncern of accomm oda ting a heterogeneo us po pulatio n. Rather, they thought that small size was a precondition
for the succ essful op eration of de moc ratic polities. Under classical Greek political thought, for example, “[a] dem ocratic
polity must have so few citizens that all of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to listen, to vote, perhaps
even to speak. Smallness, it was thought, enhanced the opportunities for participation in and control of the government
in many ways. For example, in a small polity every citizen stood a very good chance of being chosen by lot at least once
in his lifetime to sit on one of the important administrative bodies. Smallness made it possible for every citizen to know
every other, to estimate his qualities, to understand his problems, to develop friendly feelings toward him, to analyze and
discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity.” Id. at 5. To put the matter in the modern language of
econo mics, democratic politics was thought to work better in smaller polities because agency and information costs are
smaller in such political units. See Inman and R ubinfeld, supra note 380, at 74, 85.
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not think about societies that consisted of heterogeneous groups and interests.421 Furthermore, the
classical democratic theorists assumed that citizens could belong to only a single polity.422 This is
not the case under the federal political structures of today, where citizens simultaneously belong to
multiple political communities.
In fact, the federal political structure holds out the promise of blunting the problem of how
to define the relevant “we.” The key is that citizens belong to numerous “we’s,” and they can freely
choose what small polity “we” they wish to be part of. The problem is solved, however, only if the
smaller-level polities have sufficient political powers to satisfy their citizens’ needs.423 Tailoring
constitutional guarantees, it turns out, is a method for ensuring that such polities enjoy neither too
much nor too little political power.
The discussion below draws upon two schools of contemporary political theory to show the
connection between defining the relevant “we” and Tailoring. The first subsection discusses the
arguments of multiculturalist liberal theorists Will Kymlicka424 and Charles Taylor,425 who contend
that liberal values call for granting to certain groups extensive powers of self-governance that larger
polities do not enjoy. Insofar as Tailoring constitutional provisions is a doctrinal mechanism by
which such empowerment of select polities can occur, these theorists’ arguments are prima facie
justifications for Tailoring. The second subsection suggests that foundational liberal commitments
captured in John Rawls’s account are best realized by taking advantage of the opportunities inherent
in the federal political structure’s multiple levels of government for permitting citizens flexibility
421

See T A Y LO R , supra note 424, at 50-51.
This is true of all the political theorists referred to above in footnote 419.
423
It also turn s on the possibility of exit.
424
See W ILL K YMLICKA , M ULT ICULT UR AL C ITIZ EN SH IP 94 (1995 ).
425
See Charles T aylor, The Politics of Rec ogn ition, in M ULTICULTURALISM : E XAMINING
R E C O GN IT IO N (A M Y G U T M A N N , ED .) (1994).
422
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in defining the political “we” to which they wish to belong. This provides yet another prima facie
basis for Tailoring constitutional provisions.
a.

Multicultural Liberal Theorists. In separate works, philosophers Will

Kymlicka and Charles Taylor have argued that the foundational liberal principle of equality requires
government to take account of the systematic differences among people that account for the discrete
“groups” or “cultures” that may be found in a single country.426 True equality, they argue, requires
that such identifiable groups be treated in ways that are fitted to their idiosyncratic needs.
Subjecting groups that systematically differ from the majority to the same laws that apply to the
majority does not take account of the groups’s differentness and accordingly violates the principle
of equal treatment.427 In fact, the argument goes, applying one law to all is actually discriminatory;
because the majority’s approach almost invariably reflects the majority’s culture, applying it to nonmajority groups accordingly forces it to adopt the majority’s values.428
The solutions that Taylor and Kymlicka propose take advantage of federalist systems’

426

As is true with all the approaches to social ordering canvassed here, Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s are rejected by many.
See, e.g., B R IA N B ARRY , C ULTURE A N D E QUALITY (Harv. Univ. Press. 2001). For a partial re sponse, see W aldro n, Log ic
Of Cultural Accommodation, supra note 426.
427
See Taylor, supra note 4 24, at 39 (“w e give d ue acknow ledgm ent only to what is universally present – everyone
has an ide ntity – through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand [of equality] powers an
acknowledgment of specificity . . . . [Nondiscrimination requires] that we make . . . the ways in which citizens differ .
. . the basis of differential treatm ent.”); K YMLICKA , supra note 423, at 108-15. For a conc ise summary o f Kymlicka’s
argum ent, see Mark D . Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutiona lism, 12 J.
C O N TE M P. L EGA L I SSUES 803, 808-09 (2002). Jeremy Waldron recently has mad e a similar point. See Jeremy W aldron,
One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 W ASH . & L EE L. R EV . 3, 7 (2002) (noting that when “the
policy behind [a] statute is in large part itself cultural” that “it surely should be open to the possibility that the same
behavior . . . might have a quite different cultural meaning to those” from another culture such that “an intelligent
application of the rule-of-law ideal seems to militate against the idea of a single rule applying to everyone . . .”)
(emphasis in original).
428
See Taylor, supra note 424, at 43 (“the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal
dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegem onic culture. As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures
are being forced to take alien form.”); K YMLICKA , supra note 423, at 108 (“Government decisions on languages, internal
bound aries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the
needs and id entities of p articular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities,
and thereb y disadvantag es othe rs.”).
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capacities to vary the relevant “we.” The solutions also support the notion that Tailoring might be
desirable. First consider Taylor. His analysis builds on the fact that the minority groups he believes
merit differential treatment are situated in geographically discrete territories; the Quebeckers live in
Quebec and Canada’s aboriginal people primarily live in discrete geographical areas. Taylor
explicitly contemplates “[t]he possibility for variation in [the] interpretation” of the Canadian
constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights “in different parts of the country.”429 He argues that
“the standard schedules of rights might apply differently in one cultural context than they do in
another, that their application might have to take account of different collective goals. . .”430
Tailoring is a doctrinal mechanism that can accomplishing this insofar as it can accommodate
variations of what is constitutionally required across states or municipalities.
Similarly, Kymlicka argues for “self-government rights” that “devolve powers to smaller
political units, so that a national minority cannot be outvoted or outbid by the majority on decisions
that are of particular importance to their culture . . .”431 For Kymlicka, equality requires that
“members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as
members of the majority.”432 Kymlicka argues that the self-governing rights “might well involve

429
Taylor, supra note 4 24, at 53; see also Taylor, supra note 424, at 61 (supporting the notion that “some variations
in the kinds of law we deem [constitutionally] permissible from one cultural context to another . . .”).
430
Id. at 52. Elsewhere, however, Taylor argues that “[o]ne has to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that
should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one hand, from privileges and immunities
that are important, but that can ber revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy – although one would need a strong
reason to do this – on the other.” Id. at 59; see also id. at 61 (calling for “the invariant defense of certain rights” as
“distinguish[ed]” from “the broad range of immunities and presumption of uniform treatment that have sprung up in
modern cultures of judicial review.”). Taylor is regrettably vague about what falls into the category of categorical
“fundamental” rights and what is a re buttab le privilege or immunity. Pildes theory provides a basis for critiquing
Taylor’s notion of catego rical fund amental rights, see supra Part I.C(1).
431
K YMLICKA , supra note 423, at 37-38.
432
Id. at 109.
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exempting the national minority from federal bills of rights and judicial review.”433 If Kymlicka
supports exemption, it stands to reason that he also would endorse the differential application of
shared broad principles that Tailoring could provide. After all, Kymlicka is concerned that
accommodating minority communities not undermine the mutual solidarity that is necessary to
maintain a stable liberal democracy,434 and solidarity is more likely under a regime of differential
application of shared principles than wholesale exemption from those principles.435
Even if one were convinced by Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments,436 it is not clear that there
are any groups in the United States today that would qualify as deserving beneficiaries of the special
accommodations they advocate. Kymlicka argues that only “national minorities” – those “distinct
and potentially self-governing societies incorporated into a larger state” at some point in history –
are entitled to the rights of self-governance that can secure them the chance to survive, but not
groups that have voluntarily immigrated or groups that have been historically marginalized.437
Taylor’s argument would appear to justify differential treatment for a broader array of groups, but

433

Id. at 168. To be clear, Kymlicka does not suggest that this outco me is d esirab le from a liberal perspective.
Rather, “[l]iberals in the majority group have to learn to live with this, just as they must live with illiberal laws in other
countries.” Id. In fact, Kymlicka argues that “any theory which does not accord substantial civil rights to the members
of minority cultures is seriously deficient from a liberal point of view.” Id. at 164 ; see also id. at 165 . He is p articularly
critical of any internal limitations imposed by minority groups on their members that “limit the freedom of individual
members within the group to revise traditional practices.” Id. at 153. Kymlicka also argues that such things as genderbased mem bersh ip definitions violate liberal principles. See id. at 165. For an argument that liberalism should
acco mmoda te some illiberal prac tices such as these on the part of illiberal minority communities, see Rosen, “Illiberal”
Societal Cultures, supra note 426, at 819-31.
434
See K YMLICKA , supra note 423, at 173 -92 (arguing that acc omm odating minority rights is consistent with
maintaining the solidarity necessary to preserve liberal democratic governments).
435
The only caveat is that the regime of differential application must allow the minority community sufficient room
to self-gove rn that it no t “promote alienation and secessionist movements.” Id. at 185. For a discussion of one such
successful regime of differential application of shared principles in the U nited S tates, see Rosen, Of Tribal C ourts, supra
note 29, at 511-84.
436
For some who are no t, see supra note 425.
437
See K YMLICKA , supra note 423, at 19. Native Americans, as well as natives of Puerto Rican and Guam, have been
accommodated by creating special polities that do not constitute “states” or “municipalities.” See K YMLICKA , supra note
423, at 29. The question of whether these groups have been granted appro priate rights of self-governance lies beyond
the scope of this Article.
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it too seems to be tied to historical cultures.438 One could question whether these Canadian theorists
have adopted overly strict criteria for identifying deserving beneficiaries, perhaps owing to the
prominence of the Quebec and aboriginal paradigms that figure in their minds.439 In any event, their
analysis still is relevant even if their criteria are not altered. Even if there currently are not deserving
beneficiaries within the United States, Taylor and Kymlicka provide justifications for
accommodating future peoples who might become part of the American political community in the
future, and Tailoring is a doctrinal mechanism by which these theorists’ normative claims can be
operationalized in the event there were deserving beneficiaries.

These are useful insights.

Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s arguments suggest that Tailoring could be normatively desirable at some
point in the future, even if it presently is not. Taylor’s and Kymlicka’s analyses thus underscore the
desirability of not understanding One-Size-Fits-All as a categorical imperative of either liberal
commitments or constitutional doctrine.
b. Rawlsian Political Liberalism. The claim that Tailoring is sensible from
the perspectives of Kymlicka and Taylor is not difficult to establish because both these
multiculturalist theorists explicitly argue that select groups should be given extensive selfgovernance powers. The claim that Rawls also would be open to Tailoring is not as straightforward.
Rawls explicitly concludes that government cannot decide “basic questions of justice as [a] person’s,
or [ ] association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs,”440 and this would seem to foreclose the
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See T A Y LO R , supra note 4 24, at 66 (justifying the p rotection of cultures in p art on the basis that “all human cultures
that have a nimated who le societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human
beings”).
439
For such an argument in relation to Kymlicka, see Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, supra note 426, at 822-24.
440
J O H N R A LW S , P OLITICAL L IBERALISM 62 (1 994 ); see also id. at 196-97 (“Suppose that a particular religion, and
the conception of the good belonging to it, can survive only if it controls the machinery o f the state . . . This religion w ill
cease to exist in the well-ord ered society o f political liberalism .”).
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possibility of granting select groups with distinctive cultures extensive powers of self-governance
if, as Taylor and Kymlicka suggest, the very point of so doing is to enable the groups to rule
themselves in accordance with their distinctive cultural norms and values.
Elsewhere I have critiqued at length this conclusion of Rawls’.441 I tried to show that
foundational Rawlsian premises are more fully achieved by taking account of flexibility inherent in
the federal political structure,442 which Rawls appears to ignore.443 The gist of my argument is that
people in an original position, not knowing whether they represented liberals (who do not want the
state to take positions on contested visions of the good life) or perfectionists (who think that
government must actively promote a vision of the good life if people are to fully self-actualize),
would choose to create a federal political structure where liberals could situate themselves in liberal
polities and perfectionists could live in perfectionist polities, subject to two caveats: that people in
either polity could freely exit and that no polity can undertake activities that threaten the wellorderedness of general society. 444 People would not select the political structure Rawls suggests –
where no perfectionist polities can exist – because that would be tantamount to saying that a person
in the original position, even though she knew that she might represent a perfectionist, would choose
a political structure in which she would be unable to self-actualize in the event she represented a
perfectionist, even though she could have chosen a structure in which she would have been able to
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self-actualize regardless of whether she represented a liberal or a perfectionist.445 Such an assertion
violates the logic of the original position.
In short, my claim is that Rawls problematically overlooks federalism. As a result, he
envisions a political framework that is less just than is possible, as measured by his own criteria.446
Because my conclusions differ from Rawls’ in some very important respects, I refer to my analysis
as being “Rawlsian,” by which I mean that it is inspired by Rawls’s principles. I cannot, and do not,
claim that my approach is a straight-forward application of his theory. I do profess, however, that
my approach is the best instantiation of his theory. 447
All this Rawlsian analysis is relevant to constitutional analysis because the Rawlsian method
is particularly suited to identifying democratic constitutional institutions. Rawlsian analysis is social
contractarian – aimed at identifying the powers that persons willingly would cede to a government
of their creation by means of the original position – and democratic authority requires, at least, that
the government structure be one to which citizens hypothetically could be said to have consented.448
Tailoring constitutional guarantees in sub-federal polities (most likely sub-state polities)
where deserving perfectionists live can operationalize the above Rawlsian conclusion.
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Constitutional guarantees can be Tailored to afford deserving political perfectionists greater leeway
to govern themselves, subject to the above-mentioned constraints of exit and well-orderedness.
Tailoring is suited to maintaining the social unity that is required to satisfy well-orderedness; unity
is provided by the common constitutional principles that would govern both the perfectionists and
others. Varying applications of the principles, which would afford perfectionists greater leeway to
run their lives, need not undermine the commonality that joint allegiance to common principles
affords, though there surely would be limits on the degree of variation that could be tolerated.449
Once again, this Article is not the place to delve into the specifics of what constitutional provisions
could be Tailored, and what the doctrines would look like, under a Rawlsian approach.450 What
matters for present purposes is that a Rawlsian analysis provides prima facie support for Tailoring.
E.

Different Functions and Responsibilities. A final respect in which the different levels

of government differ is with regard to their functions and responsibilities. As shown above, one of
the areas of contemporary doctrine where Tailoring is found – the equal protection jurisprudence that
governs “special-purpose units” of government – has been justified by the Supreme Court on this
very basis.451 Special-purpose units of government may have property-based franchise while
“general” governments may not because the former “affect[] definable groups of constituents more
than other constituents” by virtue of their unique functions.452
More generally, each level of government’s distinctive functions would be relevant to
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constitutional doctrines that either in practice or effect employ a balancing test.453 The governmental
interest at stake by constitutionally proscribing the regulation of a field would be greater for the level
of government primarily or exclusively responsible for that subject matter. This was one of the
arguments relied upon by Justices Jackson and Harlan454 for giving states greater leeway to regulate
speech. Justice Harlan wrote as follows:
The Constitution differentiates between those areas of human conduct subject to the
regulation of the States and those subject to the powers of the Federal government. The
substantive powers of the two governments, in many instances, are distinct. And in every
case where we are called upon to balance the interest in free expression against other
interest, it seems important that we should keep in the forefront the question of whether
those interests are state or federal. Since under our constitutional scheme the two are not
necessarily equivalent, the balancing process must needs often produce different results.
Whether a particular limitation on speech or press is to be upheld because it subserves a
paramount governmental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend on whether that
government has, under the Constitution, a direct substantive interest, that is, the power to
act, in the particular area involved.455

In another case, a majority of the Court identified a subject matter that was the federal
government’s unique responsibility – setting customs policy – and suggested that this might give
rise to a unique due process doctrine. Stated the Court,
the two protections [the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses] are not
always coextensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more
importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal
legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State.456

This reason for Tailoring – that the different levels of government have divergent
responsibilities – may fall on receptive ears in today’s Court. Contemporary commerce clause
jurisprudence, for example, turns on distinguishing what is “truly national” from what is “truly
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local.”457 While many of the subject areas identified by the Court as falling into the latter category
might not be so readily characterized as such – for instance, the federal government long has played
an important role in family law458 – some fields almost certainly fall primarily if not exclusively to
federal competence.459 Alternatively, even if it is not possible to identify many (or any) subjects that
are the exclusive domain of any single level of government, there might be broad agreement that
certain subjects are primarily the responsibility of one or the other level of government. This might
suffice to have effects on the “balancing” of the government’s interest against the countervailing
concern protected by a particular constitutional guarantee.

V.

COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
This final part analyzes three possible down-sides to Tailoring. It shows that they are

considerations that weigh against Tailoring when taking account of Tailoring’s benefits and costs,
but that they are not reasons for categorically rejecting Tailoring. That Tailoring cannot be
categorically rejected is not surprising in light of the twin facts that constitutional law currently
contains some examples of Tailoring and many Justices have advocated expanding the instances of
Tailoring.460
A.

Administrability and Judicial Discretion.

Two related disadvantages of Tailoring were discussed earlier in relation to selective
457
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incorporation’s eclipse of fundamental fairness: compared to the contemporary One-Size-Fits-All
regime, Tailoring would increase the room for judicial discretion and would be more difficult to
administer. The concern is that Tailoring would leave the sub-federal polities in the dark as to what
are their constitutional obligations. Not only would the doctrines developed in the federal context
not necessarily apply to the States, but there might be doctrinal variations as between the States and
municipalities, and even across municipalities. The United States Supreme Court hears only about
one hundred cases a year, and relieving the sub-federal polities of the obligation to abide by alreadydeveloped constitutional doctrines in effect would leave them to their own devices.
Two factors suggest that although these are very real countervailing considerations against
Tailoring, they are not categorical reasons to reject Tailoring. First, as purely descriptive matter, our
country’s constitutional jurisprudence does not systematically adopt the simplest of all possible legal
rules so as to maximize adminstrability and minimize judicial discretion. Many constitutional
doctrines are complex. The administrability difficulties they create presumably are justified by the
benefits that attend adopting them rather than a simple rule; complexity frequently is needed, and
doctrinally adopted, because of the complex mix of considerations that doctrine must mediate. The
question accordingly becomes whether Tailoring is a doctrinal complication that is worth its costs.
Given the wide array of potential benefits of Tailoring examined in Part IV, it would be surprising
to conclude that any and all such benefits would be outweighed by administrative and discretionaugmenting costs.

Whether any of the systemic differences between the various levels of

government are adequate bases to support Tailoring accordingly can only be answered by
considering the costs and benefits that would attend the Tailoring of each particular constitutional
guarantee.
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A second reason why these adminstrative and discretion-augmenting concerns are real costs
but not categorical reasons to reject Tailoring is that similar costs are borne all the time outside the
context of Tailoring. Due to its small size, the Supreme Court is incapable of passing judgment on
the vast majority of federal law – constitutional, statutory, and regulatory – that is created. Yet
virtually no one takes this as an argument that Congress categorically must legislate less or that
administrative agencies must make fewer rules.461 Rather, it is understood that large and increasing
quantities of law are a concomitant of a large and complex society that must be tolerated, even if
such a quantity of regulations invariably makes the legal system more complicated to administer and
increases judicial discretion. Consistency accordingly suggests that Tailoring’s administrative and
discretion-augmenting burdens at most are costs that weigh against Tailoring, but that they are not
legitimate bases for rejecting Tailoring as a per se matter.
Another reason to reject the position that administrability and discretion costs render
Tailoring categorically undesirable is that the costs themselves are not fixed but are a function of
how Tailoring is operationalized. Tailoring could be effectuated in a manner that significantly
reduces these costs. One variable is the weight of the presumption that is attached to One-Size-FitsAll. The stronger the presumption, the fewer are the discretion and administrability costs. Second,
it could be decided to altogether forgo Tailoring as between certain polities. For example, the costs
relating to discretion and administrability would be reduced by not Tailoring as between states and
municipalities or across municipalities. The diminished benefits of Tailoring in this limited fashion
might be worth it, as a pragmatic matter.
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Regardless of the quantum of the costs, the question arises as to how they are to be balanced
against the potential benefits of Tailoring identified in Part IV. The answer is that choosing between
them is an eminently “political” process that is not reducible to a purely rational process, but that
simultaneously reflects and helps constitute the very character of our national political community.
This is so because none of the potential benefits of Tailoring is commensurable with the costs of
Tailoring; for example, it is not possible to translate both the benefit of accommodating the needs
of certain minority communities (a benefit according to Kymlicka and Taylor) and the costs of
increasing discretion and complicating administrability into numbers that can be compared on a
common scale. Trading-off among incommensurable goods hence is not a process that can be
undertaken by a perfectly rational machine executing an algorithm, but involves subjective value
choices that reflect and shape the character of the decisionmaker.462 Choosing between One-SizeFits-All and Tailoring thus reflects a doubly subjective, political process: deciding which if any of
the potential benefits of Tailoring are to constitute actual benefits for purposes of constitutional
doctrine, and then determining how such benefits are to be traded off against the costs relating to
judicial discretion and administrability.
B.

The Nature of Our Political Union. A profound potential challenge is that Tailoring

would risk undermining our Constitution and tearing asunder our national political union. The very
point of the Constitution, it might be argued, is to ensure the uniform protection of rights everywhere
in the country. Such uniformity is what defines our national character. Moreover, it might be
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claimed, uniformity is a prerequisite for citizens’ respect for the Constitution.463
These may be concerns that weigh against Tailoring, but they are not legitimate grounds for
categorically rejecting Tailoring. Let us start the analysis by considering Tailoring across the federal
and state governments (“vertical Tailoring”). There are several reasons why it is unlikely that the
health of the American Constitution rests on the federal and state governments being subject to
identical constitutional constraints. First, it is incontrovertible that prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights limited only the federal government, not the States. Even
after adoption of the Civil Rights Amendments, constitutional limitations continued to vary as
between the federal and sub-federal governments under the regime of fundamental fairness.464 It was
not until the 1960s, when the Court adopted the doctrine of selective incorporation, that
constitutional guarantees were systematically applied in identical measure to the federal and subfederal polities.465 Even if one prefers selective incorporation to the doctrines that preceded it, it is
hard to argue that American constitutionalism is contingent on a type of uniformity that was absent
during the majority of this country’s existence.466 The conclusion that American constitutionalism
is not dependent on such uniformity is definitively established by the fact that there are several
contemporary examples of vertical Tailoring, such as the equal protection doctrine that permits
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property-based franchise in certain local governments,467 dormant commerce clause doctrine,468 and
area-based and population-based apportionment doctrines.469
The harder challenge is Tailoring across states or across municipalities – what might be
called “horizontal Tailoring” across polities at the same hierarchical level. A regime under which
the U.S. Constitution permitted New York to bar its citizen from doing act “x” in New York but did
not permit New Jersey to similarly regulate its citizens undoubtedly would strike many as strange.
Nonetheless, is horizontal Tailoring categorically incompatible with American constitutionalism?
No. This is proven by the fact that there already is some. Consider the community standards
doctrine. Obscene materials receive no First Amendment protection and accordingly can be freely
regulated,470 but what qualifies as obscene is determined on a place-by-place basis.471 The
community standards doctrine thus “permit[s] differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse
communities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas”472 with the result that “material may be proscribed
in one community but not in another” as a matter of constitutional law.473 Less analogous, but still
instructive, are the unique constitutional doctrines that apply in military enclaves. For example,
although the Bill of Rights applies on military bases,474 it is black letter law that “the different
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of
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[constitutional] protections.”475 Thus, there can be prior restraints476 and bans on private citizens’
political speech477 in military enclaves that would not be permitted in states or municipalities. The
community standards doctrine and military law strongly suggest that horizontal Tailoring is not
categorically incompatible with our constitutional order, for they are contemporary doctrines under
which the identical activity may be constitutionally protected in one place (for instance, certain adult
magazines in San Francisco) but not in others (the same adult magazines in a more conservative
community such as Salt Lake City).
These doctrines, however, are exceptional. What would happen to our constitutional order
if what was constitutionally permissible more commonly varied from location to location, as might
happen under Tailoring? There would not seem to be anything inherent in constitutionalism that
requires, as an a priori matter, that such geography-sensitive constitutional doctrines be exceptional
rather than mainstream. Constitutional rights that are “rights, simpliciter” by their nature are not
geography-sensitive whereas “rights against rules” may generate doctrines that are geographysensitive to the extent that conditions that are doctrinally relevant vary from place to place,478 and
I know of no basis for concluding that constitutionalism by its nature requires that “rights,
simpliciter” outnumber the “rights-against-rules.” Indeed, as a descriptive matter, it seems to be the
case that most constitutional rights are of the “right-against-rules” variety.
That jurisprudence does not preclude the mainstreaming of geography-sensitive constitutional
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doctrines does not mean that such a modification would be without effects on our constitutional
order. Most importantly, it likely would change citizens’ views of constitutional law. Change in and
of itself is not a bad thing, however, so it must be asked: how would citizens’ views change, and
would such a change be beneficial or harmful?
Answering these questions first requires an understanding of what attitudes likely inform
citizens’ current expectation that constitutional doctrines are uniform nationwide. A crucial
component, I imagine, is a widespread belief that constitutional rights by necessity are “rights,
simpliciter.” Once it is understood that many are not – and Tailoring, it should be recalled, is an
option only vis-a-vis those constitutional rights that are “rights-against-rules” rather than “rights,
simpliciter”479 – citizens’ receptivity to horizontal Tailoring is far more likely. Why? Since a
constitutional right of the “right-against-rule” variety means that what the Constitution permits to
be regulated is highly context-sensitive, the expectation of nationwide uniformity across all polities
of a similar type with regard to constitutional protections that are “rights-against-rules” reflects an
unrebuttable presumption that all such polities are identical for constitutional purposes. This
unrebuttable presumption of identicality, which horizontal Tailoring rejects,480 is a less firm
foundation for uniform rights than is the “rights, simpliciter” conception of constitutional rights,
under which nonuniform constitutional rights are conceptually incoherent.
What underlies the unrebuttable presumption of identicality that grounds the expectation of
nationwide uniformity of “rights-against-rules”? The most plausible candidate is the belief that it
479
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is the very nationwide uniform application of constitutional rules that helps to constitute our country
as a unified polity. While this is a plausible conception of national identity, it by no means is the
only possibility. Our country is extraordinarily heterogeneous, and several of the approaches
explored in Part IV in essence reflect the view that our country’s very real diversity is better managed
by offering a menu of options, including possible variations in what regulations are constitutionally
permitted across polities of the same level.481 In short, the unrebuttable presumption of identicality
reflects not some deep and intrinsic need of constitutionalism, but instead mirrors only one of several
competing conceptions of our country’s national identity and the Constitution’s relationship to that
identity. Whether horizontal Tailoring is desirable or not thus turns on normative commitments, not
the nature of constitutionalism.
It follows that whether the change in citizens’ views of constitutional law that would
accompany the mainstreaming of geography-sensitive constitutional doctrine turns on contestable
normative commitments. This is an issue that I cannot hope to resolve here in this Article. It is
enough for present purposes to identify the contestable foundations on which One-Size-Fits-All rests.
Finally, it is important to recognize that even if the unrebuttable presumption of identicality were
forthrightly adopted as reflecting the preferable conception of our national identity, this would not
lead to the rejection of Tailoring generally, but only of horizontal Tailoring.
CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court cases typically read as if constitutional principles self-evidently are
One-Size-Fits-All, this is not so. Several contemporary constitutional doctrines fit the paradigm of
Tailoring, and many Justices have advocated that other constitutional principles be Tailored.
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Jurisprudentially, One-Size-Fits-All is not an intrinsic part of American constitutionalism. Though
there are real costs that would attend the Tailoring of constitutional principles, they constitute
pragmatic concerns, not bases for categorically rejecting Tailoring. The pragmatic analysis that
appropriately informs the choice between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring necessarily must take
account of Tailoring’s many potential benefits. The potential benefits result from the fact that the
different levels of government systematically vary in important ways. Consequently, a constitutional
limitation as applied to one level of government may have very different repercussions when applied
to another. Whether any of Tailoring’s potential benefits is to count as an actual benefit, however,
is a function of the decisionmaker’s political preferences. Determining how any such benefits are
to be traded-off against Tailoring’s costs requires yet another subjective, political choice since
Tailoring’s costs and benefits are technically incommensurable.
In the end, then, a choice must be made between One-Size-Fits-All and Tailoring, and the
decision invariably will be guided by contestable normative commitments. This Article has not
sought to engage in the debate as to which normative commitment is superior, but has aimed to
highlight the nonaxiomatic and contestable assumptions that lie behind the One-Size-Fits-All
approach that typically is viewed as the doctrinal status quo. The choice between One-Size-Fits-All
and Tailoring should not be made on the basis of a misperception of constitutional necessity. Given
Tailoring’s many potential benefits, however, it seems wise to soften the categorical presumption
of One-Size-Fits-All to a rebuttable presumption so that the merits of One-Size-Fits-All versus
Tailoring can be examined in the incremental manner that is the common law’s wisdom.
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